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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis explores the role of land reform in the production of space and relations of power 
in rural South Africa after 1994, based on a case study of a cluster of restitution farms in 
Makhado municipality in Limpopo province in northern South Africa. It uses Henri Lefebvre’s 
theory of the production of space, which proposes that space is a dynamic social construction 
and that spatial and social – and hence power - relations are mutually constitutive. Land 
reform processes are considered using three components of the production of space identified 
by Lefebvre, namely the material, the conceptual and the lived. These components are applied 
to three core themes in land reform which emerged from the research: authority and land 
governance; property relations; and land use (production and settlement). 
 
The investigation was based primarily on interviews with inhabitants in the research area 
affected by land reform, with individuals with some historical knowledge of the area, and with 
various individuals from government and other support organisations with some relation to 
land reform in the area. The methods included an element of participant observation and 
some archival research. 
 
The research indicates that land reform had an uneven impact on the production of space and 
power relations in the area of study. Contradictions emanating from within the state in 
particular exacerbated this unevenness. The retention of the private property framework and 
the entrenchment of pre-existing forms of authority and relations of power – private 
landowners and traditional authorities – constituted limitations on the role land reform could 
play in altering rural spaces and power relations. However, land reform simultaneously 
facilitated openings for subterranean shifts through new practices, rooted in everyday 
activities at the micro-spatial level, which signalled potential broader shifts in spatial and 
power relations over time. 
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“A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realised its full potential: 
indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed 
ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses.” 
 
(Lefebvre, 1991:54) 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction: Space, power and land reform 
Land reform is a fundamentally spatial project. It aims to reorganise space to fit into a new set 
of political and social priorities. In South Africa, capitalist space was historically racially 
structured. Systems of authority, property regimes and land uses intertwined to form this 
structure. White-owned land was constructed as private property under the authority of 
individual landowners backed by the state, where commercial production took place. Land set 
aside for blacks was constructed as communal property under the control of traditional 
authorities (with oversight by the white state). The land was used as a dumping ground for the 
black population surplus to the needs of the racial-capitalist economy, and there was 
settlement and some survivalist, subsistence production. Capitalist space in South Africa was 
thus inherently racialised. With political democratisation in 1994, land reform was one 
intervention that sought to break this racialised spatial structure. However there was a 
profound ambivalence, both in the conceptualisation and the practice of land reform, 
regarding the relationship between racialised space and capitalist space. 
 
The ending of racial oppression and the realisation of racial equality was at the core of the 
African National Congress (ANC)-led project after 1994. However attempts to resolve racial 
inequality were situated within a framework of capitalist continuity. The Constitution 
protected private property rights, and laws and policies sought the capitalist modernisation of 
the economy on deracialised lines. This posed the question about the relationship between 
racial oppression and class exploitation, about whether it was possible to retain the latter 
while eliminating the former. The contradictions that emerged from this logic were laid bare in 
the land reform programme. In this light, the restructuring of rural space serves as an indicator 
of the depth of transformation brought about by land reform. 
 
The meaning of space needs to be clarified. Spatial transformation might mean a restructuring 
of capitalist space to eliminate the inefficiencies of apartheid planning. Or it might mean the 
transfer of ownership that breaks down the racialised spatial structure inherited from 
apartheid. Alternatively, it could mean a fundamental shift in power relations that underpin 
the way space is organised. Space is therefore a contested terrain, with different social forces 
laying claim to what space is and how it is produced. 
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This thesis aims to bring to the surface some of the contested ways of seeing and organising 
space. Whose purposes do they serve, and what social relations of power lie behind these 
different views? I have adopted Henri Lefebvre’s theoretical framework of the production of 
space as a useful avenue for investigating these issues. Lefebvre (1991, Brenner and Elden, 
2009), the grandfather of the field of study that focuses on the social construction of space and 
spatial relations, shows how capitalism as a system has moved from the production of things in 
space to the production of space itself: the structuring of the totality of space. Space is 
progressively commodified under capitalism (i.e. it is turned into a thing that can be bought 
and sold) and the way it is structured more than merely carries, but actually generates, 
capitalist social relations. The production of space is simultaneous with the production of 
society and social relations; there is a dialectical relationship between them. The core of 
Lefebvre’s theory is that social relations and spatial relations are generated through the 
interconnection of the organisation of material things in space, the way space is represented, 
and people’s daily lived reality. These three components in the production of space – the 
material, the conceptual and the lived – form the analytical basis of my thesis. 
 
Insofar as social relations are unequal, i.e. some social actors have greater power than others 
to shape society, spatial relations are also unequal. Unequal relations of power are inextricably 
intertwined with the production of space – the power to change things, the power to do 
things. But while capitalist relations dominate space, they are always and everywhere open-
ended and both contestable and contested in big and small ways. Gillian Hart (2002:33) refers 
to “multiple trajectories of socio-spatial change” that are rooted in specific geographies and 
histories and the inter-relations between external and internal factors. That is, contingent, 
historical factors play a significant role in shaping the limits and possibilities of social and 
spatial change. Structure conditions agency, which conditions structure. The ‘second nature’ 
(Schmidt, 1971, Smith, 1984) of past human activity is fixed in space, shaping the way space is 
organised and channelling ways of thinking about how it might be organised in the future. At 
the same time, what people do today shapes the conditions of future action. 
 
This thesis considers the intersection between two bodies of thought that have remained quite 
distinct from one another in the past: those of space and land reform. Both have long, but 
largely distinct, intellectual histories. This relative isolation from one another is surprising, 
given the inherently spatial character of land reform. Land is very closely allied to space. It is 
the fundamental material base for spatial practices and for the daily lived experiences of all 
3 
 
life. Representations of land as a commodity are closely allied to representations of space as a 
commodity. The organisation of space and the use of the land are intertwined, with the 
political territory of the state and private ownership of land predominating (Sack, 1986). 
 
Explicit considerations of the spatial implications of land reform are scattered in the 
international literature. Wolford (2003, 2004) shows how ‘spatial imaginaries’, or the way the 
spatial structured the social, shaped resistance and the rise of the Brazilian Movimento sem 
Terra (MST). She shows how specific socio-spatial contexts shaped decisions to join the MST. 
Simmons (2005) also emphasises the unique socio-spatial configurations that resulted in the 
emergence of resistance around landlessness in Brazil. Garcia-Colon (2002, 2006) looks 
explicitly at the production of space and changing power relations emerging from land reform 
in Puerto Rico. Closer to home, Motzafi-Haller (1997) considers the politics of space and land in 
Botswana through Foucauldian lenses, and looks at how spatial change led to changes in 
power relations. Moore’s (2005) book on land, space and power in Zimbabwe employs 
Lefebvre’s spatial triad with a strongly ethnographic approach, again with an emphasis on how 
context shapes spatial and social arrangements. Spierenburg (2005) evokes lived practices and 
their role in stymieing land reform in Zimbabwe without explicitly discussing the production of 
space, although it is implicit in the analysis, especially given the close interconnections of space 
and power. Also in Zimbabwe, Hammar (2001, 2002) considers the production of rural space 
with particular emphasis on the role of state violence.  
 
Reflections on space, power and land reform are almost non-existent in the South African 
literature. Considerations on rural space tend to be technocratic in orientation, with an 
emphasis on dominant conceptions of space, i.e. spatial planning and how it is implemented 
(Rogerson, 1998, Sadiki and Ramutsindela, 2002, Hall et al., 2007, Quan, 2007, Ramutsindela, 
2007, Parnell and Crankshaw, 2008). Although Lefebvre’s work is known and used in urban 
studies in South Africa (for example Dierwechter, 2004, Breed, 2008, Farber, 2008, Dirsuweit, 
2009), there are virtually no attempts to translate it into a rural context, apart from Gillian 
Hart’s (2002) seminal work in KwaZulu-Natal which this thesis hopes to build on. Hart shows 
how specific forms of dispossession and the site-specific responses to it potentially threaten 
dominant efforts to reconstruct rural space after 1994. Fraser (2006) emphasises the role of 
place in Levubu in Limpopo, treating it as a conditioning factor in the way restitution unfolds 
but not necessarily looking at how space itself is produced nor how space was altered as a 
result of restitution. Ramutsindela (2007) considers macro-level spatial consolidation as a 
result of restitution but without approaching the issue of lived space. Other valuable 
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ethnographic or field work on the social and power dynamics on land reform farms does not 
consider space in any explicit way (James, 2007, Lahiff et al., 2008, Walker, 2008).  
 
Some of the fairly extensive literature on land reform in South Africa looks at changing power 
relations as a result of land reform, especially from a gender point of view. Jacobs (2004) found 
that needs for independent income, health and personal security were of higher priority for 
rural women than land rights, although this did not mean land rights were not important. 
Women may have different priorities to men in land reform processes. Where men might 
emphasise the direct economic benefits of land access, women may stress aspects of land 
access with a positive impact on other facets of their lives, for example increasing their 
personal security (Agarwal, 2003, Jacobs, 2004). In South Africa, a number of studies have 
found that women emphasised land for housing and food gardens rather than agricultural 
production, indicating connections to livelihoods issues that went beyond immediate 
economic interactions in the market (Marcus et al., 1996, Cross and Hornby, 2002). Cross and 
Hornby (2002:11) argue that this represents a “feminisation” of land demand. This relates to 
the changing agrarian structure, ‘deagrarianisation’ (Bryceson and Jamal, 1997) and the 
prospects for land-based economic activities. 
 
Women, especially poorer women without the status or resources to assert claims to land 
rights, are often disadvantaged in land reform programmes. Collective tenure, when modelled 
on colonial distortions of indigenous tenure systems where chiefly control is accentuated, 
disadvantages women (Claassens, 2005). But individualisation of titling, especially when this is 
targeted at household heads (who tend to be men), does the same (Lastarría-Cornhiel, 1997). 
This raises fundamental questions about the way the South African land reform programme 
was structured. Although individual titling offered greater opportunities for women to access 
land in their own right, this would act against resource-poor women in the context of land and 
agricultural markets (Jacobs, 2004). Nevertheless, there is general agreement that women’s 
independent control of land, their entry into ‘non-traditional’ areas of production (e.g. 
livestock production), and their active participation in decision-making structures would be 
indicators of changing social relations (Cross and Hornby, 2002). 
 
A body of literature deals in some detail with traditional authority and the contested ways it is 
being reclaimed in post-1994 South Africa (van Kessel and Oomen, 1997, Ntsebeza, 2005, 
Oomen, 2005, Crais, 2006) and the related impact on land governance systems, especially in 
the former homelands (Claassens, 2005, Claassens and Cousins, 2008). This has extended into 
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the role of traditional authorities in the post-1994 land restitution process, where land was 
transferred to groups of people dispossessed under racially discriminatory laws after 1913 
(Levin, 1996, Hellum and Derman, 2006, Claassens, 2008a, Fortin, 2008). Another body of 
literature on rural authority and land governance relates indirectly to the authority of white 
land owners and commercial farmers. This is indirect because there has been very little 
consideration on how white authority has shifted as a result of land reform or of the wider 
democratic changes in rural areas. Fraser (2006) deals with white farmer responses to 
restitution in Levubu. Hellum and Derman (2008) also look at the continuing power of white 
landowners in the joint venture approach used in Levubu. But apart from these, the emphasis 
has been on on-going evictions and efforts by white land owners to reduce the impact of 
tenure reform for farm workers by externalising the farm labour relationship (du Toit and Ally, 
2001, du Toit, 2003, Wegerif et al., 2005). The literature suggests that despite land reform, 
pre-existing rural elites retain significant authority and control. 
 
Some work has also been done on the new legal entities – like the CPAs – established to hold 
and manage collectively owned land mainly (but not exclusively) transferred through the land 
reform programme, especially restitution. The Legal Entities Assessment Project has done a 
number of case studies over the past decade, looking at the dynamics of the new institutions 
and their interaction with older structures of governance and forms of authority.1 A number of 
other studies have considered the role of the new institutions in altering power relationships 
(Derman et al., 2006, James, 2007, Lahiff, 2008b, Walker, 2008). Women were given equal 
statutory rights in the constitution of the CPAs, which marked an advance over historical rights 
where women’s land rights were subordinated to those of men. Nevertheless, these rights 
were mediated by prevailing social conditions. Bob (1999:180), for example, found that 80% of 
women land reform ‘beneficiaries’ who she interviewed were not even aware that they were 
listed as formal beneficiaries. Despite statutory requirements for women’s representation on 
decision-making structures, women’s participation tended to be muted as a result of broader 
social – in particular patriarchal - constraints that acted to silence them (Pharoah, 1999, 
Walker, 2003). This muting of women’s participation also extended to use of the land, where 
women did not feel confident to challenge gender roles both within households or more 
broadly (Cross and Hornby, 2002). The thesis adds to this body of literature by bringing new 
case studies, but also by offering a description and analysis of the intersection of these three 
                                                          
1
 See www.leap.org.za.  
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forms of authority – traditional, white landowner and new collective institutions - in a single 
geographical location, and the ways land reform impinges on them. 
 
The main body of the land reform literature considers the relationship between land reform 
and socio-economic change. In particular, there is an emphasis on the impact of land reform 
on economic development and on livelihoods and the reduction of poverty (May et al., 2002, 
Shinns and Lyne, 2004, Aliber et al., 2007, Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2008). This 
essentially economic dimension of land reform is used as the primary indicator of the success 
or failure of the programme. This is understandable in that a central goal of land reform is to 
improve the material conditions of the rural African population. More recently, there has been 
some emphasis on increasing class differentiation amongst land reform groups and small 
holder farmers, aimed at breaking down homogenous notions of these categories (James, 
2007, Aliber et al., 2009a, Hall, 2009b, a, Cousins, 2010b). Another strand in the literature 
considers the ‘multi-dimensionality’ of land reform, giving credence to social and cultural 
aspects of land reform in conjunction with the economic (James, 2007, Walker, 2008, Cousins, 
2010a, Cousins and Scoones, 2010). I have situated this thesis in this strand of the literature, 
both to add to it but also to show how the socio-cultural and the economic are mutually 
constitutive. They are not just different angles on land reform but are intermeshed with one 
another. 
 
Finally, there is an important thread in the literature that concentrates on changing property 
relations as a result of land reform, both in terms of shifting conceptions of private property 
rights (van der Walt, 1995, 1999, James, 2007) and in terms of new collective forms of 
property ownership resulting from land restitution and redistribution (Lahiff, 2008b). 
Collective freehold was prefigured in the ‘black spots,’ and restitution resurrected these forms 
(James, 2007, Walker, 2008). The intersection between private property and indigenous tenure 
and efforts to convert the latter into titled property has also been the subject of some analysis 
(Cousins, 2002, Cousins et al., 2005). There are very few if any other studies that show 
practically how property relations, or their spatial connotations, have altered as a result of 
land reform. This may be because of the general acceptance that land reform is comfortably 
ensconced within a framework of private property and therefore the transfer of land does not 
alter property relations. Such a view, however, produces a static view of property as either 
private or not private, with little dynamism or contestation. My thesis is that land reform has 
unfolded in a way that has produced some stresses in the way property relations are 
conceptualised and practically manifested. 
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The value of a spatial analysis based on Lefebvre’s triad is that it can assist in connecting the 
various dominant themes in the land reform literature with an integrated, multi-dimensional 
approach to land reform. In particular, greater attention to the lived, everyday activities and 
experiences of inhabitants on and around land reform farms reveals a more complex 
relationship to issues of poverty reduction and economic advancement. At the same time a 
spatial analysis allows us to connect land reform into the broader structure of society, into the 
dominant capitalist social relations, exposing the power relations that underpin the way land 
reform unfolds. Lefebvre provides a framework that both enables us to see the structural 
constraints to rapid change – in particular the abiding power of property relations and the 
state - but can simultaneously pinpoint the practical, daily practices that both produce and 
contest these relations and structures of power. It creates a framework for considering the 
planning and implementation of land reform while incorporating into the theoretical structure 
the way that inhabitants interact with and shape land reform in their everyday lives. This 
opens up the possibility of connecting the socio-cultural and economic aspects of land reform 
with broader considerations of the interplay between structure and agency in the processes of 
land reform in South Africa. Ultimately, the framework can enable us to think about how land 
reform is shaping rural space and social relations beyond the individual land reform farms. 
1.2 Background to land reform in South Africa 
It is commonly estimated that 87% of land in South Africa was under direct control of whites, 
including state ownership, at the end of apartheid (James, 2007:3). The South African land 
reform programme was initiated after 1994 to address the vast inequalities in land ownership 
in the country, especially in racial terms, and to make inroads into the extreme poverty found 
in the rural areas. The programme has three pillars: restitution, redistribution and tenure 
reform. The restitution programme is the focus of this study, given that three of four 
properties transferred in the research area were through the restitution programme. The 
overall land reform programme is based on a ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ model, which meant 
land is bought and sold as a commodity using the market as a mechanism for its distribution. 
 
The programme simultaneously is fundamentally state-driven, with land transferred outside 
state processes (e.g. private transactions, or land occupations) not considered to be land 
reform. The state’s presence and legitimation is required at every stage of the reform process, 
from claim making to post-settlement land use. This immediately signals the importance of 
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understanding the state and the market as interlinked spheres in the reproduction of capitalist 
relations, rather than as opposing spheres (in the form, for example, of private vs. public). As 
the thesis will show, the restitution and redistribution programmes had potentially far-
reaching spatial implications, since transfer of ownership would both alter the racial 
distribution of land and population and would open the way for new owners to determine how 
the land was used. However, it was also contained within a framework of private property 
which played a key role in securing pre-existing spatial arrangements. 
 
The goal of restitution was to return the land to those who were dispossessed as a result of 
racial laws and actions after 19 June 1913, the date of the passing of the Natives Land Act. The 
Constitution and the Restitution of Land Rights Act2 conferred the right to restitution of land 
(or financial compensation in lieu of land) to anyone who made a claim to having being 
dispossessed of land, where the validity of the claim could be proven. Procedures were 
established to verify and confirm claims, including the creation of a national Land Claims 
Commission, Regional Land Claims Commissions (RLCCs) covering the provincial level. Around 
95% of the 79,696 rural and urban claims lodged by the cut-off date at the end of 19983 were 
settled or in the final stages of settlement at the end of September 2009.4 Around 84% of the 
1,042 claims lodged in Vhembe district, where the research site is located, were settled in 
2008. Around 72% of the total was rural (Vhembe District Municipality, 2008:101). These 
figures did not accord well with a survey conducted by Aliber et al. (2009b:23) on 
redistribution and restitution projects in Vhembe and Capricorn districts, which only identified 
117 projects across the two districts (81 redistribution and just 36 restitution projects). 
‘Ground-truthing’ is rarely if ever done in the official process, and this poses a major challenge 
to the validity of official statistics (Walker, 2005b). 
 
Unlike the restitution programme, the redistribution programme is discretionary. Qualifying 
individuals can apply for state assistance to purchase and own land. Initially a small fixed grant, 
known as the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), was made available to black South 
Africans who earned below R3,500 per month. The size of the grant meant applicants had to 
pool their grants to buy land together, resulting in large groups becoming owners on single 
                                                          
2
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996; Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 
1994 
3
 The numbers do change from time to time as some claims are separated into more than one claim 
during the verification process and others are scrapped because they are invalid. This figure comes from 
the end of September 2009.  
4
 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform M&E Unit, via Karin Kleinbooi, 2 November 2009 
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farms. Small additional grants were made available to support settlement and some capital 
investment, but not enough for sustained production.  
 
Two key problems dogged land reform from the start: a very slow pace of transfer of land, and 
limited productive use of transferred land. Just 7% of agricultural land was transferred by the 
end of September 20095, compared with a target of 30%, initially set for 1999, then shifted to 
2014 and then pushed back to 2025 (Ensor, 2009). Insufficient money was made available to 
meet the government’s redistribution targets and although budgets increased quite sharply in 
real terms after 2003, so did land prices (Aliber and Kleinbooi, 2009:4). The Department of 
Land Affairs (DLA, now Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, DRDLR) did not 
have the internal capacity to meet the targets, and in many years did not even spend the 
budget it had. Efforts were under way in 2011 to make it easier and cheaper for the state to 
acquire land for land reform, but there were constant delays as a result of internal differences 
(Leppan and Sibanda, 2011). 
 
According to the land reform ministry, 29% of redistribution farms had failed outright by 2009, 
and another 22% were in serious decline (South African Press Association, 2009). Elsewhere, 
government officials were quoted as saying up to 90% of land reform farms had failed (Bleby, 
2010, Groenewald, 2010). It is notable that this estimate was made purely on the basis of 
economic efficiency, revealing the extent to which this term was hegemonic in the field of land 
reform. An early response by the state to the failure of productive use of transferred land was 
to reorient the redistribution programme away from poverty alleviation towards commercial 
production. Redistribution to large groups and lack of agricultural support were seen as the 
two most important causes of lack of productive activity on transferred land. 
 
In 2000, the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme replaced 
SLAG. The new programme established a sliding grant that matched state financial support to 
applicants’ contributions. Those with their own resources could therefore get more support 
from the state, up to a maximum of R100,000 (which increased over the years). The grants 
allowed individuals in the same household to each acquire grants which could be pooled 
together. This was aimed at discouraging group ownership because of the perceived negative 
impact on commercial possibilities. From 2008 concerted efforts were made to integrate land 
reform with agricultural support, especially through the Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
                                                          
5
 Ibid. 
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Programme (CASP), the core farmer support programme run by the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) and the provincial Departments of Agriculture (DoA). Up to this 
time, the programmes did not work closely together, with the result that those benefiting from 
land reform seldom received adequate ‘post-settlement’ support. The agricultural budget had 
experienced deep cuts in the mid- to late-1990s, which left decaying infrastructure and weak 
services in its wake. These changes aimed to increase productive use of transferred land. 
 
There is an apparent divergence in the way the land reform programme was set up between 
the two imperatives of speeding up land transfer and using the land productively. At the 
outset, popular expectations were shaped by a ‘master narrative’ of rural dispossession and 
restoration, framed as an issue of justice (Walker, 2005a:823). This narrative, carried into the 
Constitution and subsequent legislation, established the right of people to return to their land, 
regardless of the economic consequences. Set against this was a ‘modernisation’ trajectory 
that insisted that future-oriented development is more important than restoring people’s 
previous rights and practices (James, 2007:45). There is no reason, in principle, why redress of 
historical injustice and future-oriented development should be incompatible. But the narrative 
through which land reform is debated in South Africa set up an opposition between these. A 
simple example relevant to the research is the use of space for large-scale commercial 
agricultural production and the replication of pre-colonial spaces, in particular as defined by 
traditional authorities. The thesis provides a detailed consideration of these tensions. 
 
The third leg of the land reform programme, tenure reform, was designed to meet the 
constitutional obligation to provide secure tenure for those with tenure insecurity as a result 
of past racially discriminatory laws. On white commercial farms, laws were passed to secure 
tenure for farm dwellers and labour tenants. However, land owners retained significant 
control over inhabitants on their property. In particular, the law allowed for continued 
evictions in the name of economic efficiency. A national survey conducted in 2005 found, as a 
result, that more people had lost land rights through evictions after 1994 than had been 
granted land rights through the land reform programme (Wegerif et al., 2005). 
 
Tenure reform also sought to secure tenure for inhabitants in the indigenous tenure areas 
where land allocation was effectively controlled by traditional authorities. The Communal Land 
Rights Act (CLRA) was passed in 2004, ostensibly to secure tenure rights on communal land but 
in reality giving traditional authorities greater control over land access than before. In 2010 the 
Constitutional Court struck it down on the basis that “it undermines security of tenure and 
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gender equity, and grants authority to traditional leaders who have not been elected and 
whose interests do not reflect those of the communities” (Legal Resources Centre, 2010:1). 
This had potentially far-reaching implications for land governance and for the structuring of 
space, although much depends on the concrete relations between land owners and 
inhabitants in specific contexts. Nevertheless, the Court’s decision did establish boundaries 
regarding the extent to which land governance institutions had to consider the interests of 
inhabitants before making decisions about how land would be used, and hence how space 
would be structured. 
 
Land reform is confronted by these questions about the character of property rights and the 
authority that goes with ownership and control over land, about land use and the role land 
reform can play in responding to rural poverty, about the relationship between racial redress 
and the imperatives of production, and about the role of the centralised state. Private 
property, individual ownership and commercial agricultural production, controlled by the 
landowner and regulated by the bureaucratic state, are tightly packaged together in 
conceptions of the way the core of land reform should proceed. Restitution is constitutionally 
bound into a restoration paradigm (although there were state challenges to this in places like 
Levubu, near the research site). This places restitution land and the older SLAG group ‘projects’ 
in a kind of ‘no-man’s land’: between communal tenure and private property; between 
commercial agriculture, subsistence agriculture and settlement; between liberal democratic 
authority and traditional authority. The research inserts itself into this ambiguous region 
between categories and considers what role land reform has played - or may yet play – in the 
transformation of rural space. 
1.3 Core questions and research site 
The thesis sets out to explore what contribution land reform has had on the transformation of 
rural space in South Africa. This was done through case studies of a set of geographically 
contiguous but contrasting farms in northern Limpopo province, with varying levels of 
formality and external support, varying levels of commercial and subsistence production, 
residential settlement and freedom of land use, and varying systems of governance and 
authority. Restitution was the dominant type of land reform in the area, and is therefore 
emphasised in the thesis. Despite statist desires to control all land reform processes, the 
centralised state was unable to totalise its control, and land reform in practice emerged as a 
product of numerous forces in society (ranging from markets to individual inhabitants), of 
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which the state was but one (albeit a powerful one). It is this emergent practice of land reform, 
rather than just the official land reform programme, that is the focus of the research. 
 
In this thesis, the analysis of land reform is broken into three key dimensions in an attempt to 
reach a more complex understanding of land reform that goes beyond its economic impacts, 
while still incorporating these. These dimensions emerged in the process of doing the field 
work but also arise from contemporary debates about land and agrarian transformation in 
South and southern Africa. The dimensions are systems of authority and land governance (how 
materially consequential decisions are institutionally channelled and who benefits); changes in 
property relations (including the redistribution of material resources and the terms of this 
redistribution); and changes in the way land is used (how and by whom resources are used). In 
combination these capture both the structural forces that shaped land reform and the 
practical activities, the agency, of inhabitants in shaping land reform. The combination of these 
three dimensions of land reform capture core aspects of the production of space in its 
conceptual, material and lived aspects. On this basis, the core questions are: 
 
i) What representations of space arose from land reform, and how were these materialised in 
spatial practice? 
ii) What conceptions of authority and land governance, property relations and land use were 
generated in the processes of land reform? 
iii) What contestations around authority and land governance, property relations and land use 
emerged as a result of land reform in practice? 
iv) How did these conceptions and contestations manifest in spatial practice and lived space? 
 
The PhD research candidacy was linked to the Livelihoods after Land Reform research project, 
a comparative study of the livelihood impacts of land reform in South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Namibia led by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of 
the Western Cape (Aliber et al., 2009b). In South Africa, Capricorn and Vhembe districts in 
Limpopo were selected as sites on the basis of agro-ecological similarities with the sites in the 
other countries. After discussion with the South African team leader, we agreed the depth PhD 
research could offer could add the most value in Vhembe. My specific research site is 26km 
south-east of Louis Trichardt/Makhado6 town in Makhado municipality, Vhembe district in the 
                                                          
6
 White residents of the town were opposing a change of the town’s name from Louis Trichardt to 
Makhado on procedural grounds. At the time of writing, the name was still Louis Trichardt. Inhabitants 
in the research area (both black and white) referred to the town as Louis Trichardt (or ‘Louis’, or ‘LT’) 
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north of Limpopo province, the northernmost province of South Africa bordering on Zimbabwe 
(Figure 1).7 
 
 
Figure 1: The study area in regional context 
 
It became apparent early on that the district was much too large as a unit of analysis, at over 
21,000km2 in extent with about 570 settlements (Vhembe District Municipality, 2007:13). It 
also became clear that the interface between inhabitants and the state happens at a municipal 
rather than a district level. The district performs more of a co-ordinating role and, although 
district officials occasionally relate directly to citizens, there are many instances where they 
explicitly do not have the mandate to do so without municipal authority. So the district is too 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and to avoid using both names all the time, I refer to the town as Louis Trichardt throughout the thesis. 
Reference to Makhado is to the municipality and not the town. 
7
 All maps are derived from official South African maps, 2329BB, 2330 AA and 2330 AC in the 1:50 000 
series. I took all photographs. 
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high as an institutional level, and the specific farms are too insignificant at that level. For these 
reasons I opted to bring the frame of reference down to the municipal level. 
 
Table 1: Basic parameters of restitution and redistribution on the farms 
Claimant group Farm name and 
portion 
Farm also 
known as… 
Size 
(ha) 
No. of 
claimant 
households 
Grants 
due 
Mavungeni 
redistribution 
Vleyfontein 310 LS 
portion 1 
Lovedale Park 561 98 none 
Mavungeni 
restitution 
Vleyfontein 310 LS 
portion 2 (eastern) 
Sweetwaters 745 200 R1.139m 
Munzhedzi 
restitution 
Vleyfontein 310 LS 
portion 2 (western) 
 519*  
477 
 
R2.664m 
Diepgezet 390 LS  459 
Zwartfontein 392 LS  274 
Shimange 
restitution 
Syferfontein 85 LT  Efrata, 
Vudyodyodyo 
719  
366 
 
R1.88m 
Uitschot 84 LT**  288 
*Not clearly specified in documentation 
**Not transferred 
Sources: Aliber et al 2009, Northplan, Agriconcept, Kenneth Maluleke and Associates 
 
The research focuses on three restitution groups: Mavungeni, Shimange and Munzhedzi. Five 
farms (see Figure 2 and Table 1) were returned to these groups through the restitution 
programme in 2002. The farm land surrounds Vleifontein, a rural township on the edge of the 
former Venda homeland, established on the farm Vleyfontein 310 LS8 as a relocation 
settlement following forced removals of the Venda population from Tshikota outside Louis 
Trichardt in 1982. The state expropriated the farms from their white owners between 1968 
and 1982 with the aim of incorporating them into the Venda homeland. The farms were 
initially under the ownership of the central state through the Southern African Development 
Trust (SADT), and were transferred to Venda in 1986. On being relocated, Vleifontein residents 
were told the surrounding land was available to them to use for production and for eventual 
expansion of the township, and some residents did engage in low level cropping and cattle 
grazing. When the restitution programme was launched after 1994, the former inhabitants of 
the farm claimed the land back. For Vleifontein residents, the restitution process threw a 
spanner in the works, since the land access they had enjoyed until 2002 was suddenly removed 
when the claims were settled. Vleifontein residents had their own claim to land at Tshikota 
and Masangani (where people were removed to Tshikota even prior to being moved to 
                                                          
8
 I have retained the distinct spellings of the township and the farm. The township is on a portion of the 
farm, as is a part of Munzhedzi and both portions of Mavungeni. I use ‘Vleifontein’ throughout the thesis 
to refer to the research site as a whole, since the township is at the epicentre of the area of which 
Vleyfontein farm is just one part.  
15 
 
Vleifontein) on the edge of Louis Trichardt town. However, there were delays, not all residents 
of Vleifontein were claimants, and it was not even certain if claimants would move back even if 
the claim was settled. 
 
 
Figure 2: Close-up view of the study area, with farms 
 
In discussions between the claimant groups – Mavungeni and Munzhedzi – it was agreed that 
Mavungeni would put in a claim for the 745 ha eastern portion of Vleyfontein 310 LS (known 
as portion 2), while Munzhedzi would put in a claim for the western part of the same farm. The 
land on which Vleifontein was situated was excised from the claim and the Munzhedzi 
claimants (on whose land it was located) received the neighbouring Zwartfontein 392 LS in 
compensation, along with Diepgezet 390 LS which was part of their original claim. In 2000, two 
years before the claim was settled, the Munzhedzi claimants occupied the farms as a defensive 
measure against local government plans to extend Vleifontein onto Munzhedzi land. 
Diepgezet, Zwartfontein and the portion of Vleyfontein 310 LS, with a total area of 
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approximately 1,204 ha, were restored to Munzhedzi CPA in 2002 (Aliber et al., 2009b:66). 
There were 477 registered claimants in the Munzhedzi claim (Kenneth Maluleke and 
Associates, 2004:13). Today Munzhedzi is essentially an informal extension of Vleifontein, with 
thousands of households settled on the land. There is a fairly high degree of back yard food 
production, but very limited agriculture of more than a hectare anywhere in the settlement. 
Services are very poor, and apart from a school, and a few shebeens (informal bars) and spaza 
shops (informal retail outlets) scattered around, residents get most services from the 
neighbouring Vleifontein. To the south of Munzhedzi, moving towards Nthabalala village in the 
former Venda homeland, settlement peters out and the land is steeply hilled with dense bush. 
 
Because of uncertainty about the restitution process, 98 households from amongst the 200 
claimant households at Mavungeni also applied for a redistribution grant for the 561 ha 
portion 1 of Vleyfontein 310 LS, on the west side of the Elim-Bandelierkop road (Figure 2). The 
redistribution and restitution portions were both transferred to the Mavungeni CPA within 
months of one another in 2002 (Agriconcept, 2000:14, Mavungeni CPA, 2004, Aliber et al., 
2009b:58). Part of the Mavungeni land was under servitude for an existing graveyard and 
sewerage works for Vleifontein. Mavungeni sought the neighbouring Uitschot 84 LT as 
compensation, but since the Shimange claimants had already laid claim to Uitschot, the 
Mavungeni CPA requested financial compensation for the land lost because of the servitudes. 
This was not forthcoming, but the approval of the redistribution land on portion 1 of 
Vleyfontein 310 LS might have been considered by the state as adequate compensation. The 
redistribution of portion 1 of Vleyfontein 310 LS enflamed tensions with Munzhedzi, who laid 
claim to that land and felt their legitimate claims were ignored.  
 
At Mavungeni, in contrast with Shimange and Munzhedzi, agricultural production continued 
after expropriation in the 1980s, as white farmers and Venda Ministers leased the land for 
production at various times. AgriVen, the former Venda Agricultural Development Corporation, 
also involved some Vleifontein residents in an agricultural project on the land in the 1990s. The 
combined Mavungeni land had a dairy, two farmhouses and two commercially viable orchards 
(macadamia nut and avocado). Later the Limpopo DoA invested in a hi-tech commercial 
poultry house on the redistribution part of the farm and negotiated a sub-contracting 
arrangement with a commercial poultry processor in the province. The CPA selected ten 
claimants to work on the project. Mavungeni is fairly sparsely settled, although the 
unauthorised Xikopokopo settlement at the entrance to the farm next to the main road was 
expanding fairly rapidly over the period of the research (Figure 3). Moving further into the 
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farm, there are large stretches of land without any settlement, interspersed with some areas 
of 10 ha or more under agricultural production. These portions of land under cultivation or 
orchards are noticeably larger than those found on the other transferred farms in the area. 
 
 
Figure 3: New houses dot Mavungeni as the unauthorised Xikopokopo settlement expands, 2010 
 
Like Munzhedzi, Shimange land fell into disuse from an agricultural point of view after the 
apartheid expropriations. Shimange was used as a base for the Venda Department of Water 
Affairs and, while inhabitants and Vleifontein residents used the land for some basic 
agriculture, natural resource harvesting and cattle grazing, this was not systematic or 
organised. The Shimange claim, representing 366 claimant households, was initially made on 
two farms, viz. Syferfontein 85 LT and Uitschot 84 LT with a total area of approximately 1,030 
ha (Northplan, 2004:10). However, when the land was transferred the Uitschot claim was 
inadvertently excluded. The RLCC convinced the CPA leadership to sign off on Syferfontein and 
promised to follow up with Uitschot after the handing over ceremony in March 2002. The 
claim for Uitschot subsequently seemed to have been lost, to the dissatisfaction of Shimange 
CPA members whose families originally resided on that farm. Shimange is very sparsely settled. 
A few families and individuals occupy the old farmhouse buildings (Figure 4), and there are a 
few shacks scattered near the boundary with Vleifontein. There is some production 
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immediately around the farmhouses, as well as in a cleared area about half an hour’s walking 
distance through dense bush. There are also a few cattle kraals near the farmhouses, which 
expanded in size over the period of the research. There is a core group of permanent 
inhabitants, perhaps 10 to 15 people, and a smaller number of other claimants who use the 
land and come to the farm regularly, but who do not live on the farm. 
 
 
Figure 4: Shimange’s farmhouse looms out of the mist 
 
The state appointed consultants to develop land use and development plans on each of the 
restitution farms, and each group was to receive a further grant from the RLCC as part of the 
settlement to set the plans in motion. Each group received a tractor and a trailer from the DoA 
on settlement of the claims, but the RLCC grants were not forthcoming. The groups therefore 
had the land and plans for how to use it, but inadequate resources to carry the plans out. 
 
The Mavungeni and Shimange claimants were overwhelmingly Tsonga-Shangaan, who settled 
on the land as clans with the Baloyi family as one of the dominant families (shown in Chapter 
4). Munzhedzi and Vleifontein were both Venda-dominant, but from different clans. 
Underlying ethnic tensions between Shangaan and Venda occasionally flared up into open 
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conflict, but settlement was ethnically mixed despite apartheid attempts to segregate people 
by ethnicity. 
 
This is typical of a borderland in South Africa, a buffer zone between distinct racialised spaces, 
incorporating both forced removals out of and into the area. This offers insights into the 
effects of forced removals from both angles. The presence of white farmers on the edge of the 
research site enables us to understand the on-going racial and class dynamics in the present. In 
essence, the research site is a microcosm of the fundamental dynamics that shaped rural space 
under apartheid. The introduction of land reform into the area completes the picture in 
opening the possibility of exploring how land reform had an impact on a range of different 
dynamics, including urban-rural interfaces, racial relations, class relations, relations between 
different forms of tenure and land governance, relations between different property regimes 
and between different trajectories of land use. All of these have contemporary relevance in 
South Africa. 
 
A few other farms and settlements have relevance to the study. Impinging directly on the 
research site is the farm Moddervlei 44 LT, neighbouring Mavungeni on the east of the 
research site (Figure 2), which was sold to the state during apartheid and put under the 
authority of AgriVen. The former owners, the Hennings, entered into a management contract 
with the state under the name of Mununzwu Newco, which was still in place at the time of 
writing. The farm produced macadamias and avocadoes commercially. The Hennings had a 
long history in the area, having at various times owned and leased parts of Vleyfontein, 
Uitschot and Syferfontein. They had their own claim for the return of Moddervlei, and a group 
of former farm workers had a separate claim for the same farm. 
 
On the other end of the research site is Maila, a village on the western border of Munzhedzi 
under the authority of headman Keith Nthabalala. On both these edges, there were simmering 
boundary disputes between neighbours which will be elaborated on more fully in the thesis. 
Off the beaten track, but with a relatively strong influence on the research site is Nthabalala, a 
village in the former Venda homeland which is also the seat of the Nthabalala Tribal Council 
which claimed (disputed) authority over the space of the research site. When people were 
forcibly removed from the five farms under apartheid, many of the Vhavenda were moved to 
Nthabalala, while Shangaans were dispersed to Riverplaats, Mbokota and further afield in the 
former Gazankulu homeland. Chief Munzhedzi mobilised people from Nthabalala to 
participate in the pre-emptive occupation of 2000. 
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Panning out from the research site, a number of nodes structure the site’s position in relation 
to the regional space (Figure 1). Elim is a sprawling conglomeration of settlements about 7 km 
north-east of the research site that resulted from the merging of several villages and 
settlements over the years. It is centred on a Swiss Mission hospital and, more recently, the 
Hubyeni shopping mall, and also has a thriving informal fresh produce market (Figure 5). Elim 
is a key transport, retail and services node for inhabitants at the research site, standing at the 
intersection of the Thohoyandou-Bandelierkop and Louis Trichardt-Giyani roads. Given Elim’s 
historical position in the former Gazankulu homeland, it remains underdeveloped in 
comparison with Louis Trichardt. 
 
 
Figure 5: Informal fresh produce market at Elim crossroads 
 
Historically the homelands were very underdeveloped, while white rural towns had a high level 
of quality infrastructure. Those who were not long distance migrants generally commuted 
from the homelands to white urban areas to work every day and then returned home at night. 
Subsidised transport was mostly provided by the state to maintain this spatial segregation. The 
completion of the tarring of a final 10km stretch of the Bandelierkop road connecting Elim 
directly to the national N1 highway (and going directly past Vleifontein) is likely to divert 
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traffic, especially going to Thohoyandou, through Elim. This is a shorter route than going via 
Louis Trichardt, and is likely to see the further growth of commercial activity in Elim. 
Thohoyandou is the main town in the former Venda homeland, and became the Vhembe 
district capital. 
 
En route to Thohoyandou is the Levubu irrigation scheme, established in the 1930s using state 
resources, but becoming fully functional in the 1950s with the building of the Albasini Dam. 
The black inhabitants were forcibly removed to make way for the scheme which was handed 
to white commercial farmers. The scheme had up to 420 properties on 29,520 ha of land, and 
employed up to 10,000 workers (Derman et al., 2006:5). It was a major producer of subtropical 
fruit and nuts, and was at the epicentre of the agricultural economy of the district (Vhembe 
District Municipality, 2007:19). Almost the entire valley was under restitution claim. A number 
of these claims were already settled, mainly through a ‘strategic partnership’ approach where 
the land was only returned to the claimants on condition that they did not tamper with the 
inherited commercial agricultural land use (Derman et al., 2006, Fraser, 2006). 
 
The research site is marginally located in the broader economy, but central to debates about 
land reform, rural development and poverty reduction. Limpopo is the most ‘rural’ province in 
South Africa, with 87% of the population considered to be rural, compared with 45% for the 
country as a whole (Aliber et al., 2009b:11). Vhembe was ranked as the fifth most vulnerable 
district in South Africa in terms of functionality, socio-economic profile and services backlog 
status (Department of Co-operative Governance and Municipal Affairs, 2009:25). In turn, the 
research site is located in a marginal part of the district: Vleifontein is ranked low, as a ‘local 
service point’, in the municipal hierarchy established by the National Spatial Development 
Perspective (NSDP) (The Presidency, 2006). Services at Vleifontein consisted of a (private) 
clinic, a post office, a small general dealer, a school, a police station, a pension pay point, a 
sports field, a public bus terminus and a petrol station. Bulk water and electricity infrastructure 
was inadequate for residents. 
 
Agriculture was the third biggest employer in Vhembe district behind community services 
(government) and trade (wholesale and retail), with about 15% of the formally employed 
population in the district in 2006 (Vhembe District Municipality, 2008:47). Agriculture’s share 
of total employment in the district was declining, down 25% in the past decade (Vhembe 
District Municipality, 2008:45). The overall agricultural economy in the district slumped 
significantly over the decades, with the amount of land under commercial farming falling by 
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about two-thirds between the 1960s and 2002 (Aliber et al., 2009b:16). The arid area in the 
western parts of the district was historically a cattle farming area. On the east side of Makhado 
the former homelands start, and they are densely settled with basically no government 
support for commercial agriculture historically. This left Makhado municipality as the main 
agricultural production area in the district, thanks primarily to Levubu. More than two-thirds of 
formal agricultural employment in the district was in Makhado municipality. Nevertheless, 
small-scale agriculture is practiced in the former homelands in Thulamela and Mutale 
municipalities east of Makhado, and district support was increasingly focused on this. 
Agriculture was one of the weakest economic sectors from a value-adding point of view, with 
almost no processing in the area, and inputs mostly purchased from outside. 
 
The research site is situated on a series of spatial fault lines. It is at the intersection of private 
property (white-owned farms), former nationalised state land, and the indigenous tenure 
regimes of the former Venda and Gazankulu (Shangaan) homelands, and the accompanying 
border between (racially exclusive) liberal democratic governance and the private governance 
of commercial farms, and traditional authority. It is located precisely on the boundaries 
between private commercial agricultural production, state ‘project’ agriculture, and 
homestead agriculture. And it is at the interface between rural farmland, ‘urbanised’ township 
and rural village settlement. Each of these lines cuts through the research site, and the site 
thus captures, in a microcosm, the core dynamics that have shaped rural space in South Africa. 
This offers the potential for insights into the dynamics underlying the production of rural space 
with pertinence beyond the research site.  
1.4 Methodology 
Research is caught in a constant tension between relevance and rigour (Smith, 2001). On the 
one hand the knowledge should be relevant, even practically useful. On the other hand the 
information and knowledge generated from research should be as accurate as it can be. 
‘Research fatigue’ is fairly common in some South African rural settlements, where initial 
research in a particular place stimulates others to follow up. When the research does not 
generate any practical changes in the lives of research participants or the inhabitants of the 
area, some people may eventually become tired of taking time to talk to researchers but 
getting no benefit. I encountered this amongst some individuals early on in the research, 
people who questioned my motives and why they should spend time responding to my 
questions. 
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I sought to adopt a critical-emancipatory approach in the research, promoting emancipatory 
praxis and “a critical consciousness which exhibits itself in political as well as practical action to 
promote change” (Grundy, 1987:154). I aimed to build a bridge between academia and 
‘development activism’: using detailed, in-depth research and theorising as the grounding for 
considered interventions. On the one hand, academia forces nuance whereas activism tends 
towards crude binaries. On the other hand, activism forces concreteness and practicality 
whereas academia tends towards abstract argument with no practical consequences. In the 
words of Wendy Brown  this is “the tension between the political necessity to fix meaning, to 
‘suture’ textual drift in a formal principle which can only guide us in action, and theory’s 
permanent ‘deconstruction’ which cannot ever be recuperated in a new positive programme” 
(quoted in Zizek, 2008:103). I attempted to manage this tension in the research, keeping both 
these components alive. 
 
Practically, I sought to integrate my research into on-going processes of development being 
carried out particularly through Nkuzi, a land rights non-government organisation (NGO) with 
an office in Elim and a history in the area stretching back to 1997. Nkuzi assisted many 
claimant groups to work through the restitution process, including the three groups that form 
the research focus. Nkuzi was respected in the area, and I was able to envelop myself in the 
organisation’s ‘colours’ to gain acceptance. But Nkuzi was also struggling as an organisation. 
The Elim office suffered heavily, with inability to pay for basic communication infrastructure or 
transport for fieldworkers. The result was a steady attrition of staff and inability either to 
provide services to community members or to go out into the field to do the ‘community 
facilitation’ work at the core of their mission. The logic of my approach was to work with Nkuzi, 
using the research to provide a basis for specific interventions that would emerge in the 
research process in collaboration with active participants from amongst the inhabitants of the 
area. 
 
In this I used a combination of methodologies, primarily participant observation, semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussions. Appendix 1 provides a list of interviews and 
field trips. These were mostly with inhabitants on the farms and in Vleifontein, but also 
included people who knew the area and people in and out of government who were working 
with or interested in land reform in one way or another. I recorded most but not all interviews. 
In a ‘scoping’ phase I got to know the lie of the land a bit better, and met some of the key 
respondents. The issues that emerged during this process set the agenda for the research: the 
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conflict between the Xikopokopo group and the Mavungeni CPA; tensions between Munzhedzi 
and Nthabalala, and between the absent Shimange CPA members and the ‘pioneers’ settling 
on the land; and the abandoned and landlocked Vleifontein residents. I wrote a diary and took 
field notes, and occasionally tried to identify themes and patterns in relation to my conceptual 
framework of space and power. 
 
I had planned to carry out various participatory research and planning activities. These 
methods have proven effective in involving people actively in research and of shaping the 
agenda around their own concerns and interests (Archer and Cottingham, 1996, Chambers, 
1997). However, participatory methodologies must be connected to practical action, otherwise 
there is a danger of mobilising the energy of participants and then letting it dissipate, with 
potentially damaging consequences for future attempts to do joint work (Alcorn, 2000). My 
use of participatory methodologies was therefore dependent on the availability of resources to 
carry the results forward into practical action. Nkuzi initially indicated resources were 
available, but these dissolved as Nkuzi faced internal challenges, and the process could not be 
undertaken. Interactions with government were positive, in particular at the municipal and 
district levels, but the processes required to link into government planning and budgetary 
cycles proved too much for me and Nkuzi to realise any tangible movement. Consistent time 
needed to be put into facilitating interactions between Nkuzi and government, and as an 
individual I did not have that time available. I live in Johannesburg, which is about four and a 
half hours from Vleifontein and Louis Trichardt. Personal and work commitments meant 
travelling back and forth between Johannesburg and the research site. As mentioned, capacity 
in Nkuzi was also weak and, without resources to get the ball rolling, there was little to offer in 
a partnership with government. There was neither a local driver of the process, nor the 
resources to drive it. 
 
The result was that the action part of the action research faded, and I made a decision to 
emphasise interviews and a kind of semi-involved observation. I walked on the farms with 
inhabitants who identified key historical and current points of interest, and I used a geographic 
positioning system to construct maps showing these (Figures 7 and 15). I spent time on the 
farms, to get at least a glimpse of daily life. I attended meetings when possible. For example, I 
attended a meeting of the Nthabalala land claims committee and subsequently accompanied 
them to a meeting with the DLA in Polokwane, where I observed the process and had an 
opportunity to speak to some of the residents of Nthabalala about their histories and land 
issues. I also attended meetings of CPA committees and tribal gatherings as an observer, and 
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given a chance to make comments and suggestions. I found the process useful, and I think the 
participants in these meetings did too.  
 
The area has two main languages, Tshivenda and Xitsonga. These are notoriously difficult 
languages to learn, and are spoken by less than 7% of the national population.9 I did not 
attempt to learn the languages, given the constraints I faced in having to travel and not being 
in the area full time. I was fortunate to have Sipho Baloyi as a research assistant, who is 
conversant in both languages, although he is a native Xitsonga speaker. He is well-known in the 
area, and his presence did not prove to be a hindrance, even in potentially sensitive situations, 
for example at the Nthabalala tribal gathering or at Munzhedzi when discussions turned on the 
tensions between Munzhedzi and Shimange, where he lives. Mike Mokgalapa, a Tshivenda 
speaker, also assisted me with translations when I stayed at Munzhedzi/Maila. I was surprised 
that many people spoke English fluently in the area, and I needed translation assistance in less 
than half the interviews (Appendix 1). Nevertheless, it is possible and even likely that this 
resulted in some bias in the people I spoke to and the information and ideas I consequently 
was able to get. 
 
I am a white, urban, middle class male in South Africa. Different people will have their own 
views about what that means. For some, it meant the possibility of resources (hence 
overstating the lack of resources or support). For others, it meant suspicion or distrust which I 
could not at all times penetrate, in particular with regard to gender issues and when talking to 
women. Few African rural women will be willing to talk forthrightly about gendered power 
dynamics with a white man from the city, and why should they? I specifically sought women to 
speak to, but my presence as a white man was not the only obstacle. The internal power 
relations on the farms also resulted in me constantly being redirected towards men. The CPA 
committees were overwhelmingly dominated by men, as were the claims committees and the 
DoA. Ultimately, about a quarter of the overall respondents were women (Appendix 1). This 
aspect of power in the research site remained closed to me and constitutes a limit of the 
study. The analysis, the findings of the research, is a product of my interaction, as a subjective 
individual, with a range of respondents with their own views about the world, themselves and 
me. All any researcher can do is acknowledge this fundamental subjectivity, and try to mediate 
it through gathering multiple viewpoints.  
 
                                                          
9
 http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/language.htm 
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So while I set out to make the study relevant to the needs and concerns of the inhabitants of 
the area, I had little immediate success in practical terms in the actual research process. 
However, there is a question about whether research relevance can only be measured on the 
basis of its contribution to immediate, practical outcomes. This is an important aspect of 
relevance, especially to people who are living in poverty. However, if the research is to take 
the form of critical-emancipatory research, there may be a broader relevance both in raising 
structural issues that precisely prevent the success and even possibility of immediate practical 
interventions, and also of bringing the voice of inhabitants themselves, in their own words, 
into the story about what is happening in land reform. Bringing the history of dispossession 
out of the hidden depths and improving our theoretical understandings also make a 
contribution, partly at a broader societal level but also amongst the direct participants in the 
research process. I found a passion about the history that surprised me, shared by many 
people across the racial and class spectrum. If the research contributes to facilitating dialogue 
about those issues, it has relevance. The process was not ideal, because the analysis still 
resided with me as the researcher, and I chose and selected what to put in and how to 
interpret it. 
 
Qualitative research as a whole has attracted criticism for a lack of rigour in comparison with 
more controlled, quantitative forms of research. The extent to which epistemic claims beyond 
the practice setting can be made is questioned. Action research, in these terms, is acceptable 
as a guide for practical action, but is less valid as a method for advancing theoretical 
knowledge (Herr and Anderson, 2005:52). Validity refers to “the reasons we have for believing 
truth claims” (Moghaddam, cited in Newton and Burgess, 2008:22). This conception is 
dependent on the nature of the truth claims being generated. I think this argument about 
validity can be short-circuited by focusing more on the rigour of the information gathering 
process than on the validity of the ‘truth’ that is presented in the final research. This thesis is 
an interpretation of events, and does not claim to be the truth in some absolute sense. 
Readers may not even agree with my interpretation. That in itself does not invalidate the 
research. Some issues in the research are subjective by their very nature. For example, what 
were the Hennings’ motives in trying to secure a 25 year lease at Mavungeni after the claim 
was settled? Or did Chief Munzhedzi’s grandfather sign away his rights to the chieftaincy to 
Chief Nthabalala, and why? These are subjective issues that are central to the story of 
Vleifontein and the surrounding farms, but which are complex and multi-faceted and have no 
definitive answer. 
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The important thing is that the reader has enough trust in the data I have used as the basis for 
my interpretation. I can show the reader that I have listened to and incorporated different 
relevant points of view. Triangulation is thus a critical method in ensuring a rounded view of 
the story. The nature of the research is qualitative and interpretive. To supplement this, I drew 
on surveys conducted on the same farms by other researchers in the Livelihoods after Land 
Reform project.10 I also used archival material (mainly from the Historical Papers archive 
housed at the William Cullen Library at Wits University in Johannesburg, but also from 
documents and maps that people in the area gave me, including from Nkuzi and Sam Shirinda 
in particular) to verify the history of the area. The transect walks and maps strengthened my 
understanding of the history of the area, and the way the history intersects with the present 
materially, through representation, and in everyday practice. They helped to reveal how the 
past remains present on the land, even if often hidden by thornbush and undergrowth, in 
memories of how the space was used and visions about how it might be used. 
 
I began the fieldwork in earnest in October 2008 and continued through to May 2010, thinning 
out towards the end as I started to write. While writing, I continued going to the research site 
at intervals, to keep the dialogue going and to work with Nkuzi to plan the way forward 
beyond the PhD. Seeing space as produced does not come naturally. We take space as given, 
and it takes some intellectual effort to see the social relations that lie behind space and its 
dynamic reproduction in everyday reality. As I moved through the spaces of the research site, I 
had to become conscious not only of the social relations underpinning those spaces, but also 
my own preconceptions about where I was and what I was seeing. From this perspective, the 
research pushed me to examine my own thinking about space, my unquestioned assumptions 
about what space is meant to be used for, how it is materially organised, how that 
organisation is sustained and how people live it. 
1.5 Chapter synopsis 
Chapter 2 of the thesis starts by locating Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space in the 
broader literature on space, and provides a more detailed conceptual exposition of the theory 
and the spatial triad – material, conceptual and lived space – that underpins it. The Chapter 
continues with a consideration of power as situated in social activity, and the implications of 
this for the production of space. An important part of this section is a consideration of the role 
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 ‘Livelihoods after Land Reform Munzhedzi survey data clean’, Excel database provided by Michael 
Aliber, 14 July 2010 
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of the state in managing the production of space, including the limits to state control over this 
production. Chapter 3 then applies this conceptual framework to the South African rural 
context, looking in particular at the broad relationship between the production of rural space 
and authority and governance, property relations and land use (production and settlement on 
the land). This Chapter establishes these key themes and their relationship to the land reform 
programme. 
 
Chapter 4 uses the spatial triad as the basic framework to consider how space was produced 
historically in the research site around Vleifontein in Makhado municipality. It does this 
through an historical overview of the production of mechanisms of authority and land 
governance, property relations, and production and settlement patterns in the research site. It 
considers the changing representations of space and spatial practices that created the 
structural context out of which land reform emerged and with which it interacted. This is at a 
broad historical level and establishes the context for the following three chapters which look in 
detail at the three themes, developed earlier, in the research site following the transfer of land 
on the farms around Vleifontein. 
 
Chapter 5 considers how dominant conceptions of authority and land governance were 
formulated in the process of land reform and how they altered the institutional channels 
through which space was produced. It looks at what situated social forces and social dynamics 
shaped these conceptions and how these forces influenced the materialisation of these 
conceptions. Finally it contemplates how the situated social activity of the everyday life of 
inhabitants in the research site intersected with and shaped dominant conceptions of 
authority and governance and their translation into spatial practice. This chapter establishes 
the changes in the institutional framework introduced by the processes of land reform through 
which power was channelled in the production of space. It indicates the changing institutional 
architecture, the form, through which the content of property relations and land use were 
filtered. Chapter 6 follows a similar analytical logic with regard to property relations and 
Chapter 7 looks at agricultural production and settlement using the same framework. 
 
Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, pulls the analysis together and reflects on the implications 
for land reform and how we understand it in the broader context of capitalist restructuring 
and agrarian change in contemporary South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND POWER 
2.1 Introduction 
The basis of Lefebvre’s theory on the production of space is that social and spatial relations are 
mutually constitutive. This chapter provides the broad theoretical framework drawing heavily 
on Lefebvre, but also on other Marxist geographers. It details the thesis that space is a social 
product that is both reproduced in the everyday activities of human inhabitants in interaction 
with one another and with the natural and built environment, and is simultaneously structured 
into enduring forms that transcend individual human actions. Being a social product, space is 
inextricably interconnected with social relations of power. I therefore spend some time 
elaborating a theory of power as emerging from situated social activity. Of great importance 
here is the role of dominant power, of the power wielded by capital and state. But I seek to go 
beyond an approach to power that produces a rigid division between those with power and 
those without. Rather, power is distributed throughout society and is produced in action, even 
while there are concentrations of power. The state is central to the production of space, but it 
has its own limits and contradictions which open the door for individual and collective agency 
in everyday life. 
2.2 The production of space 
Lefebvre (1991) starts from the position that space is socially constructed. A dialectical 
relationship exists between space and society, with each one structuring the other. According 
to Doreen Massey (1994:268), “spatial form can alter the future course of the very histories 
which have produced it.” Until the 1970s, space was taken for granted as a universal of human 
existence in which objects existed and events occurred on a passive ground called space. 
Spatial sciences like cartography and geometry sought to establish the relationship between 
objects in space and represent them accurately on maps. But in the 1970s human geographers 
(including Lefebvre) began to consider the power dynamics which underpinned this seemingly 
objective process of representation, and raised issues about how space itself was a 
construction (Gregory, 2000:768). Lefebvre was part of a Marxist strand of theorists who 
attempted to apply a political economy approach to the production of space based on 
historical materialism. He extended Marx’s work on commodity production to show how space 
had become a commodity with a use value and an exchange value. Lefebvre argued that space 
is produced in the same way as other commodities are produced, using available natural 
resources and employing human creativity to transform these resources into something with 
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greater value to human beings, but which had to be exchanged (bought and sold) to liberate 
that added value. 
 
An economistic reading of the Marxist approach was later critiqued for focusing solely on class 
relations and for ignoring the dialectical relationship between space, race and gender, or the 
role of cultural practices in the production of space (Gregory, 2000:769-770). Later still there 
was a movement against dualism that highlighted the hybridity of spaces and opposed the 
dichotomies of time and space (Massey, 1994), absolute space and relative space (Gibson-
Graham, 1996), and between material, concrete space and imagined, symbolic space (Gregory, 
2000:771). These critiques were not levelled at Lefebvre in particular, but rather were part of 
the development of thinking around the production of space and its relationship to the social 
that Lefebvre was instrumental in introducing. 
 
Lefebvre conceptualised a spatial triad consisting of spatial practice, representations of space 
and representational spaces as a way of thinking about how this social construction happens 
(Lefebvre, 1991). These can best be understood respectively as the material, the conceptual 
and the lived dimensions of space. An analogy of the heart is useful in understanding the 
difference between these elements in the production of space. Spatial practice, or the material 
element, is analogous to the heart as a physical organ in and of itself. ‘Representations of 
space’, or the conceptual, is analogous to the way we think about the heart, with particular 
reference to the scientific knowledge about the role of the heart in the body. There are also 
non-scientific representations attached to the heart, such as conceptions of love. However, 
these are not codified and they are subordinated in dominant discourse (the medical-scientific 
discourse in this case). However, they are widespread in popular discourse and are integrated 
into the third element in the production of space, viz. representational spaces or lived space. 
Lived space is analogous to the actual experience of living with a heart beating in your chest, 
how it feels. It is the daily existence of being alive with a heart. This is something different 
from scientific knowledge of the heart, and is also different from the heart as a physical organ. 
At the same time, these aspects are inextricably interconnected. The feeling of moving around 
in the world with a heart is premised on the existence of the heart as a physical organ. The 
material is the basis without which no lived space can exist. Likewise, the scientific knowledge 
about the utility of the heart is based on a detailed analysis of its physical functioning. 
 
To return to the production of space, then, spatial practice refers to the material configuration 
of things in space, “the directly experienced world of empirically measurable and mappable 
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phenomena” (Soja, 1999:265). It is what exists tangibly. This material underpinning of spatial 
practice has two components to it: the natural base (mountains, rivers, air, the land itself) that 
establish both the limits and possibilities for human activity; and the human infrastructure, or 
‘second nature’, created in relation to this base; the built environment of roads, dams, bridges, 
houses, orchards, fences. Spatial practice is hence a ‘co-production’ between humans and the 
natural environment (Goodman, 1999). ‘Second nature’ is built up over time as new layers are 
placed on the landscape, and old infrastructure decays or is destroyed, adapts or survives 
intact in earlier forms. The deeper the infrastructure is located in time, the more significance it 
has in space and social relations. In this way time is embedded in space because, rather than 
just disappearing, new and past infrastructure articulate with one another, bringing the past 
into the present through the built environment (Merrifield, 2006:105). 
 
This material aspect of the production of space, with the accompanying human activity, can be 
seen as the ‘conditions’ Marx refers to when he says humans make their own history, but not 
in conditions of their own choosing. The underlying material base of spatial practice opens 
some pathways and closes others. It is the context in which actions take place, actions which 
can transform or reproduce those conditions within the practical limits imposed by the same 
conditions. I concur with Thrift’s (1996:3) notion that ‘context’ should not be taken to mean 
“an impassive backdrop to situated human activity.” Rather, Thrift continues, context should 
be taken “to be a necessary constitutive element of interaction, something active…” 
Presumably Lefebvre uses the concept of spatial practice rather than ‘the material element of 
the production of space’ not only because it is less unwieldy, but also because what exists 
tangibly goes beyond the material to incorporate the social practices that flow from and into 
the existing physical configurations of things in space. The other two elements of Lefebvre’s 
triad are integrated into spatial practice in this way, because social practices are both what 
people do every day, but they are also discursively constructed so that specific meanings are 
attached to specific spaces that shape the way people think about and use those spaces. 
 
Institutions are a key part of the second nature underpinning spatial practice. That is, second 
nature refers not only to the tangible things produced in space but also to the social 
relationships which enable that production. An institution is any structure or mechanism of 
social order and co-operation that transcends individual human lives and intentions.11 
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 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institution#cite_note-0 
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Conventions, social norms and roles are constitutive of institutions.12 Organisations are 
institutions, but so are systems of organisations like the capitalist system as a whole. Like 
space, institutions appear to be part of the natural order, although they are produced through 
everyday activity. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can usefully be deployed here. Habitus, says 
Bourdieu, “makes it possible to inhabit institutions, to appropriate them practically, and to 
keep them in activity, continually pulling them from the status of dead letters, reviving the 
sense deposited in them, but at the same time imposing the revisions and transformations 
that realisation entails” (Bourdieu, cited in Thrift, 1996:15). Institutions are manifestations of 
spatial practice, and the ‘sense deposited in them’ (in Bourdieu’s phrasing above) is the 
meaning attached to them through representations or conceptions of space and the way that 
inhabitants co-create, manipulate and alter these meanings in their everyday lives. These 
manifestations can die away if inhabitants stop using them, and Lefebvre refers to the decay of 
spaces abandoned by those who created them. Human activity and application of meaning are 
required for the constant activation, the bringing to life, of the artifacts of past human activity. 
 
Lefebvre provides a brief history of the production of space that reveals the inextricable 
interconnection between the natural base and social activity in the production of space. He 
refers to ‘absolute space’ as the social space created by the early interaction between humans 
and the natural environment. “Absolute space was made up of fragments of nature located at 
sites which were chosen for their intrinsic qualities (cave, mountaintop, spring, river) but 
whose very consecration ended up by stripping them of their natural characteristics and 
uniqueness. Thus natural space was soon populated by political forces” (Lefebvre, 1991:48). 
Absolute space was thus a symbolic structuring of the natural environment which resulted in 
the emergence of a social space. Over time it grew into a relativised and historical space, which 
also marked the emergence of the division between town and countryside, both conceptually 
and in practice. The key point to note here is that the attachment of meaning to particular 
sites forms the basis for the production of space. The formulation of these meanings, of these 
conceptions of space, is the second element of the triad, representations of space or the 
conceptual. 
 
Following the growth of historical space (at the same time as capitalism was emerging as a 
global system in the time of Dutch and British imperialism) (Arrighi, 1994), space began to be 
conceptualised as a commodity, whose use value could only be liberated through the 
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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/ 
33 
 
realisation of its exchange value (i.e. sale on the market). Lefebvre (2009d) identified three 
driving characteristics in the commodification of space under capitalism: homogeneity, 
fragmentation and hierarchy. Homogeneity abolishes specificity and converts space into a 
uniform commodity that can be broken up and sold, where “all the elements are exchangeable 
and thus interchangeable” (Lefebvre, 2009a:192). The logic is the erasure of distinctions 
between different spaces and the imposition of uniformity in the service of accumulation. At 
the same time, the growth of private property as part of the capitalist mode of production 
“unsettled, atomised and pulverised pre-existing space, tearing it into pieces”, reconstituting it 
in spaces that were “differentiated according to use” (Lefebvre, 2009b:249). Homogeneity is 
thus an imposed unity over fragmented spaces with separate functions of production and 
reproduction (e.g. housing, exchange, transportation). Fragmentation simultaneously poses a 
problem for the coherence and unity of the system and provides the basis for the exchange of 
discrete parcels of space. It is also an instrument of political power; “it divides and separates in 
order to rule” (Lefebvre, 2009d:215). Amongst these fragments, some are considered to be 
more important than others; they are arranged in a spatial hierarchy, broadly with urban 
centres at the top of the hierarchy, through second and third order towns, productive rural 
land and finally the rural peripheries that are marginal to circuits of capital accumulation 
(spaces identified as non-productive in capitalist terms). In South Africa, the latter largely 
incorporates the former homelands where almost 40% of the national population still lives 
(Hemson et al., 2004:5). 
 
Lefebvre referred to the commodification of space under capitalism as the growth of ‘abstract 
space’. The abstract character of space under capitalism refers to the generalisation of its 
commodity form. A false binary is sometimes set up between the terms ‘abstract/space/global’ 
on the one hand and ‘concrete/place/local’ on the other hand and a lot has been written on 
this (see Gregory, 2000). Lefebvre does not have this in mind when he talks about abstract 
space. He is not trying to set abstract space against concrete place, but rather to show how 
new conceptions of space emerged under capitalism that generalised how space should be 
organised beyond any specific case. But those conceptions still have to be materialised to have 
any effect and thus abstract space “has real ontological status and gains objective expression 
in specific buildings, places, activities, and modes of market intercourse” (Merrifield, 2006:111-
112). Abstract space is “‘real’ in the sense in which concrete abstractions such as commodities 
and money are real” (Lefebvre, 1991:27). The commodification of space is built on the base of 
what exists materially, the absolute space of the past. Absolute and abstract space are not 
separate either spatially or temporally, but rather are “two translations of the same sentence” 
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(Bourdieu, cited in Thrift, 1996:14), two different ways of seeing and structuring the same 
space. 
 
Lefebvre emphasised dominant representations of space in the second element of the triad. 
This refers mainly to formalised and codified representations, in the form of official planning 
and mapping in particular, which accompanied the capitalist mode of production and the 
associated rise of science as the dominant knowledge structure. Lefebvre described 
representations of space as a combination of scientific knowledge and ideology used to justify 
the application of this knowledge. Power relations are central here. Science can claim a certain 
type of objectivity (for example, it describes laws of physics that are applicable anywhere on 
earth), and this objectivity supports abstraction since it means generalising from the specific. 
The application of scientific knowledge to space, therefore, leads to abstraction from the 
particular, the effacing of local specificity. Yet the kinds of scientific knowledge pursued, and 
the uses they are put to, are socially structured. Certain types and parts of knowledge – those 
that best serve the purpose of the practical realisation of capital accumulation and private 
surplus extraction - are privileged and others are suppressed or ignored. Knowledge is 
constructed and channelled in favour of sectional interests, regulating the relationship of 
humans to the environment (Boddington, 1978). Consequently certain spatial forms are 
conceptualised to facilitate these goals. Homogeneity, fragmentation and hierarchy 
characterise dominant representations of space under capitalism. 
 
This is not to say there are not other representations of space. But these tend not to conceive 
of space as a whole but only the part that is captured in immediate experience. Abstract space 
is precisely the separation of spatial conceptions from immediate experience. It opens the way 
to a technocratic approach to space that rests on a narrow focus of what physically exists and 
how to alter it, i.e. it only considers spatial practice and representations of space to the 
exclusion of lived space (Soja, 1999:267). This is where Lefebvre introduces the third element 
of the spatial triad, lived space. Subordinated representations of space are incorporated into 
lived space from a conceptual point of view, since they are not codified or systematised and 
they are inextricably linked to everyday experiences of space. Official maps codify certain 
features of the natural and built landscape and provide a scientific representation of them. 
What official maps entirely ignore, however, are the social activities and relations that exist in 
those spaces so represented. For example, a map of Vleifontein shows a road going past a 
small central area that includes a post office, a general dealer and a clinic. But what the map 
does not show is the buzz of social activity around this central area on pension day, when 
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inhabitants come from all around to set up stalls to sell and to buy live chickens, vegetables, 
airtime, clothing, baskets, medicinal herbs and dozens of other goods, many of which are 
locally produced and others which are traded in from further afield. People walk around 
engaging in countless individual economic and social interactions. This is a lived space with 
significance for inhabitants that arose from the on-going interactions between the built 
environment and inhabitants’ daily lived experience and practice. Yet the importance to the 
inhabitants of that blank space on the map between the dot representing a post office and the 
dot representing a clinic is completely effaced from the dominant representations of that 
space. 
 
Both lived space and representations of space are integrated into spatial practice. Dominant 
representations of space significantly structure the built environment, even though there are 
limits to how far this can go, a theme which I will turn to shortly. Capital investment is the 
process of materialising dominant conceptions of space. Lived space, everyday practices and 
experiences, brings the physical element of space to life, imbuing existing space with meaning, 
and in so doing both reinforces and transforms those meanings and the space itself. Lefebvre 
counterposes what he calls ‘differential space’ to the abstract space of capitalism. According to 
Lefebvre, this refers to everyday practices that challenge the commodification of space and its 
homogeneity, fragmentation and hierarchy and shift towards the primacy of use over 
exchange (Lefebvre, 2009a:192). Differential space is presented as an alternative to capitalist 
space, and necessarily also requires alternative social relations. The architect Lucien Kroll 
describes alternative space as favouring and expressing “living relationships and activities that 
spring from diversity, unexpected initiatives, and above all, that something in social man [sic] 
that leads to the creation of community” (quoted in Milgrom, 2002:87). Dominant 
representations of space, under capitalism, will tend to reinforce the commodification of 
space. This means that alternatives must emerge from lived space, from the everyday activities 
of inhabitants.  
 
One strand of the literature on everyday life tends to emphasise how it is caught up in 
dominant structures, and will thus reproduce dominant conceptions of space and spatial 
practices (Marcuse, 1968, Adorno, 1991, Bourdieu, 1994, Debord, 1994). However, not 
everyone agrees that a conscious awareness of domination and power relations is necessary to 
alter structure. A number of theorists suggest that practical activity, even in the absence of a 
total consciousness, is the lifeblood of structure and inhabitants in their everyday life 
constantly influence the reproduction and alteration of social relations and of space, more as 
36 
 
an on-going negotiation of space and social relations than the seamless dominance of capitalist 
space and relations. De Certeau (1984) talks about how people do not merely passively absorb 
dominant cultural products, but reinterpret and adapt them for their own use, thereby 
changing their meaning and the way they influence social life. Scott (1990) suggests that 
people express opposition to dominant power in hidden ways that may subvert that power 
without appearing to do so. Bayat (2010) theorises how large numbers of people, even when 
fragmented from one another, can have a significant impact on norms and rules in society 
when they engage in common, yet contentious, practices in everyday life. He calls these “non-
movements,” which are action-oriented rather than ideologically driven, overwhelmingly quiet 
rather than audible, based on a politics of practice rather than protest (Bayat, 2010:19-20). 
 
Others suggest this is not enough, and that more conscious efforts are required to bring into 
being and maintain alternative spaces. Bell hooks (1990) talks about the need to select a site of 
resistance and to have a community of resistance, both which require the conscious political 
act of appropriating and using space. Gardiner (2000:6) argues the need for a critical 
awareness that can lead to questioning routine, everyday life, “expos*ing+ its contradictions 
and teas[ing] out its hidden potentialities, and rais[ing] our understanding of the prosaic to the 
level of critical knowledge.” This is not so much an argument about a ‘true’ (as opposed to 
‘false’) consciousness as it is about the possibility of shattering the routines that regularly 
reproduce subordination through their very enactment, opening spaces for alternative ways of 
doing to emerge. Soja (1999:272) emphasises the radical nature of alternative spaces: they are 
“radically open and openly radicalised.” It is not just a gradual transformation of space that is 
required, but “an open challenge to capitalist space, a strategic choice that is aimed at 
constituting a community of resistance” (Soja, 1999:275). 
 
I think it is possible to occupy a position that recognises the ultimate necessity of a rupture, a 
sharp break between one mode of production and another, while also recognising the 
dialectical process of small, incremental changes gradually converting into large qualitative 
shifts even without necessarily consciously trying to orient these small changes in the direction 
of the ‘one goal’ of a revolutionary rupture. In physics this is called a phase transition, a 
sudden global change in behaviour arising from many short-range, local interactions (Ball, 
2004:119-120). Ball makes a convincing case that such transitions also occur in society. This 
conversion of quantity into quality is also one of the ‘laws of the dialectic’ as formulated by 
Engels (1940). Zizek (2008:389-90) refers to “hidden evental sites” where apparently minor 
measures, comfortably located within the prevailing hegemonic framework (like land reform 
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contained within a framework of the capitalist mode of production), can set in motion 
processes that can lead to a major transformation in the entire field. Rather than a single 
event, revolution may better be understood as a “lengthy, complex, contradictory process of 
systemic transformation” in which each of these individual measures or events “are 
themselves components of an immense historical dialectic, invisible and absent as an empirical 
perception at every one of those points, but whose overall movement alone gives them their 
meaning” (Jameson, 2007:68). A revolution in spatial form may almost be seen to be a 
consolidation, a tangible manifestation, of changes that have already taken place in the society 
below the surface. 
2.3 Space and power 
The above shows that space is the product of relations of power, and certain spatial practices 
reinforce unequal relations of power. I start from the understanding that power is not a thing 
that can be possessed, stored and distributed at will, but is rather a potentially unlimited 
product that is generated through agency; it emerges out of processes of situated social 
interaction and must be looked at relationally (Long, 1992:27). This implies that every person 
has some power as long as they are alive. Even if they are not aware of it, every action a 
person takes ripples beyond them into the world (although to an unequal extent). Power is 
thus dynamically distributed throughout society to a greater or lesser extent depending on the 
concentration and fluctuation of social activity. For this reason cities have greater social weight 
than the countryside, because there is a greater concentration of social activity in cities. Power 
is not transferable in space. The product of action, power operates in specific, concrete 
circumstances rather than in general, abstract ones (Wickham, 1983). Power acts where it is 
produced. Hence I will talk about power emerging from situated social activity. 
 
This should not be taken to mean control over power is in the hands of those who produce it, 
i.e. those who engage in the situated social activity. Lefebvre (1991:48) talks about how the 
growth of absolute space (natural space populated by human, political forces) resulted in the 
separation of those who produced space (peasants or artisans) from those who managed it 
and those who used it to organise social production and reproduction (warriors, scribes and 
princes). This is a result of an appropriation, either on the basis of outright violence or on the 
basis of hegemony (the ‘velvet glove’ of consent masking the ‘iron fist’ of coercion) (Gramsci, 
1991). Hegemony refers to ‘consent to be ruled’, but always has the physical force of the state 
as ultimate arbiter of the terms of consent. Hegemony includes the formation of alliances of 
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varying durability that may incorporate subordinate interests in order to widen social support. 
Consent to be ruled either means accepting the legitimacy of the separation of control over 
power from the producers of power or it means recognising the conjunctural limits to 
challenging that state of affairs, or a combination of these. Informal and explicit resistance 
signals a (mostly partial) rejection of consent to be ruled. Spatially speaking, it means a 
(partial) rejection of the dominant structuring of space and of the dominant meanings 
attached to space and things and relationships in space. I say partial because there always 
remains a mix of consent to be ruled and consent to the dominant structuring of space, 
deriving from the fact that dominant ideas and hence practices necessarily integrate and 
compromise with at least some of those ideas and practices they have subordinated, and 
sometimes reflect wider interests too. It is the only way of eliciting consent without resorting 
to blatant and open violence. The work of ideology is to induce consent to be ruled, and in 
particular the acceptance of the legitimacy of the state as a mediator of social relations. The 
emphasis placed on the role of the state in land reform is accepted by most inhabitants in the 
research site. The research will show how even the most open contestations seek to bring the 
state in to resolve local differences. 
 
We might go so far as to extend the notion of the production of commodities to the 
production of power. It is produced under specific social conditions but may be appropriated 
from its producers for private or sectional use. Thus, for example, the power generated in 
drawing together the necessary resources to engage in agricultural production was ceded to 
institutions of land governance which increasingly had come to represent sectional interests in 
the research site. Latour (1987) points out that the centre is as much situated as the 
peripheries it dominates. The centre’s power to control and channel social activity derives 
from its accumulation of information from many locations and the compression of this 
information, which enables state actors at the centre to identify commonalities and 
differences and to get a representation of the whole at a glance. Inhabitants at locations in 
what are represented as the peripheries are peripheral precisely because they are not 
recipients of information from all locations but only generate their own information which is 
sent to the centre. This underpins the weakness of municipal and even district agricultural 
officials in relation to strategic planners at provincial and national levels although, as we will 
see, this is not entirely a one-way process. 
 
Representatives of capital, including state actors, seek to deploy their ‘power-over’ (Holloway, 
2005) to produce spaces conducive to the reproduction of social relations that permit private 
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accumulation through the production and appropriation of surplus value. The capitalist state 
and private owners of capital, especially those organised into corporate entities, are dominant 
both in conceptualising space and of materialising those concepts through the construction of 
the built environment. This includes the production of ideologies based on power-over that 
can justify private ownership and private accumulation of socially-produced wealth. The 
materialisation of these concepts in the landscape alters the context in which on-going social 
activities are performed, strengthening control over social activities and the power generated 
from them. For example, state investment in the high-tech Mavungeni poultry house 
strengthened the hand of corporate agro-processors and channelled the daily activities of 
members of the poultry co-op in the direction of reinforcing the unequal relations of power 
that underpinned the contract. 
 
However, there is no direct translation of concept into practice. The production of space in the 
service of accumulation is mediated on two primary counts. First, there are internal tensions 
between different units of capital which means there is no single, unified capitalist interest. 
Although there may be overarching, general, interests in common in the ordering and 
commodification of space, at any particular time and place, capital at different phases of the 
accumulation cycle (i.e. in money, labour process or commodity form) may, and almost 
inevitably does, have different material interests in the organisation of space (Harvey, 1993, 
2006). In the concrete context of Limpopo, the diversification of farmers’ activities into 
ecotourism and game farming, or the willingness of the state to allow the rail system to 
disintegrate, indicate shifting social and economic relations, which benefit some while others 
lose from these shifts. 
 
Different ‘fractions’ of capital (Poulantzas, 1978) across and within sectors (e.g. mining, 
finance, manufacturing) may also have different short-term interests, notwithstanding a high 
degree of integration at times. For example, the recent debate in South Africa about whether 
to drop the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ land reform policy in favour of a more state-driven 
model emphasising the possibility of expropriation of private land is illustrative. ‘Capital’ was 
not a unified force in this debate. Those with limited access to land were in favour of 
expropriation below market value, while those who own and control most of the land wanted 
the retention of the willing buyer, willing seller model of market-based exchanges. In South 
Africa, fractions of capital are largely split along racial lines. 
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It is commonplace in Marxist theory that the role of the state under capitalism is understood 
as being to ensure the general interests of the capitalist class as a whole are secured despite 
the sibling rivalries between individual capitalists (Marx and Engels, 1965, Lenin, 1976). 
According to Aglietta (1987:235-236) the state fulfils functions that cannot or will not be 
performed by any individual capitalist (e.g. maintaining the homogeneity of space), but which 
are necessary for the overall functioning of the system. Lefebvre concurs, and places a great 
deal of emphasis on the role of the state in regulating capitalist space, preventing 
fragmentation from spilling out of control and turning into a ‘space of catastrophe’, which 
represents for capitalism “an antagonistic and ruinous tendency” (Lefebvre, 2009b:248). Not 
only must the capitalist state prevent space from tearing apart under these pressures, but it 
must also monitor and suppress or abolish the emergence of other spaces (Lefebvre, 2009b). 
 
It is therefore necessary to recognise that the state and its institutional orientation are driven 
by the needs of the dominant economic class, and that this has spatial consequences. The 
state regulates space through law, policy and practice, and this regulation is by-and-large 
shaped in the interests of private accumulation and surplus appropriation. The state secures 
the private property framework and defends it against attack. The state confers authority and 
legitimates particular structures and institutions, and establishes the parameters of legitimate 
contestation. The state provides conceptual and material support for the realisation of 
profitable land use activities. 
 
Yet the state is not purely an instrument of the capitalist class, a position Lefebvre 
undoubtedly tends towards (see Brenner and Elden, 2009). First, institutions and processes of 
the state are part of society and therefore, to some extent, reflect the broader balance of 
forces in society (Poulantzas, 1978). Although institutionalisation and authority to control 
power give state structures some stability, different fractions of capital must nonetheless 
continuously compete with one another for influence over the state without a guarantee of 
success. Again, this is evident in the prevarication of the South African state with regard to the 
‘willing buyer, willing seller’ model. Different capitalist fractions are engaged in an on-going 
ideological struggle to bend the state to their interests. In the process, the agendas of other 
subordinate groups may become more significant as they can sway the state decisively in one 
direction or another. Civil society organisations, certainly not closely tied to the agenda of any 
capitalist fraction, first put the issue of scrapping the market-driven land policy on the agenda 
in the years leading up to the Land Summit in 2005 where it was agreed that the policy should 
be reviewed. The outcome is not purely based on which fraction of capital best represents the 
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‘national interest’ (which is an ideological justification for many state decisions in the South 
African context), but is also shaped by the (multiple, conflicting) interests of those occupying 
the state and the (multiple, often competing) interests of other groups in society that are 
neither part of the state nor capital. 
 
As much as capital is not monolithic, neither is the state, either politically, administratively or 
structurally. On the contrary, “political institutions…conspicuously fail to display a unity of 
practice… Manifestly they are divided against one another, volatile and confused. What is 
constituted out of their collective practice is a series of ephemerally unified postures in 
relation to transient issues with no sustained consistency of purpose” (Abrams, 1988:79). The 
state is better considered as a contradictory and disunited ensemble of overlapping 
relationships of power, an “unstable equilibrium” (Bayart, 1993:196). This is certainly the case 
in South Africa (Marais, 2011). In such circumstances, the role of the state in regulating 
capitalist space, containing its disintegration and suppressing alternative spaces from emerging 
must be downgraded from a fait accompli to an on-going effort which is by no means at all 
times successful. There is neither agreement within the state on how this should be done, nor 
even whether it should be done in the first place. At the level of representations of space this 
is evident in conflicting policies and laws, and lacunae and omissions in the legal framework on 
land reform in South Africa. Examples are the indecision and lack of clarity in defining the role 
of traditional authorities in land governance, or the uneasy relationship between the retention 
of private property and an impulse to extend indigenous tenure systems, or the coupling of a 
large-scale commercial farming mindset with transfer of land to groups. 
 
Even if an agenda is agreed on, the next step is to convert that agenda – those representations 
of space - into spatial practice, i.e. to embed them materially and shape the accompanying 
activity of inhabitants to reinforce that agenda. A second mediation comes into play here, 
because of the difficulty of realising an adequate translation of concept into practice. John 
Allen critiques approaches to power that see it as something that is possessed, and where the 
powers of the centre “are transmitted intact through a hierarchy of commands from one 
official to the next” (1999:197). He proposes, rather, that “power and its commands are 
translated rather than transmitted across space. In any chain of actors, power is modified and 
transformed as it passes from hand to hand… It is actively constituted through space” 
(1999:198). I would want to go beyond Allen here, because his language suggests that power 
still moves through space, whereas I am proposing that social power can only be used where it 
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is produced. The question is how social relations are manipulated to meet certain ends that in 
turn generate situated social power that produce certain tangible outcomes. 
 
The production of power in a locality requires social action. The central state or the head of a 
land reform agency can issue orders about what social actions must take place in a given 
locality, but they rely on the people there to make those actions happen. Consent to follow 
orders is largely secured through remuneration and the possibility of material or status 
advancement, and their obverse, the threat of material or status loss. For some there may be 
an intellectual commitment to what they believe the institution of authority is doing. However, 
even then there are difficulties of translation; there are entrenched existing social relations, 
‘customs’ and ways of doing; there are personal and local group interests. While bureaucrats 
derive their authority from their position in the institutions of authority, they also bring their 
own power into the relationship, translating and adapting and manipulating rules and 
procedures for ends they have identified (Lipsky, 1981, Arce and Long, 1992, Brehm and Gates, 
1997, Meyers et al., 1998, Blundo, 2006). The extent to which local level bureaucrats interpret 
and implement policies make them de facto policy makers as well as rule-followers (Keeley and 
Scoones, 2003, Leach et al., 2007:9-10). Thus in order to understand land reform and its spatial 
effects, we have also to understand the context-specific relations between the social forces 
that generate power, and the competing spatial agendas of these social forces. 
 
Not only is the state internally divided, but it always has an incomplete and unstable 
relationship to the broad flow of social activity. It may constantly try to convert these flows 
into more stabilised institutional arrangements, but is never entirely successful at this, making 
the situation unstable and open to mutation (Allen, 1999:204). It is not always – or ever – 
possible for the state and capital, and their embodied representatives, to impose their 
conceptions of space completely onto existing lived spaces and other ways of seeing space. It 
is necessarily a negotiation. 
 
Conversely, inhabitants living a space are not homogenous either. There is not a single 
‘community’ or ‘civil society’ with the same experiences, power, resources or interests that 
negotiates (discursively and practically) as a unified bloc with representatives of the state or 
capital. Lived experiences, practices and rootedness in particular places by their very nature 
are diverse and manifold. This provides the basis for the emergence of alternative spaces to 
dominant capitalist spaces, but it also means unequal control over power and a proliferation of 
agendas within ‘society’. Lived space brings structure to life, but in a diversity of ways, some of 
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which reinforce dominant conceptions of space and social relations and some of which 
challenge them. 
 
A balance is required here between suggesting that the state is all-powerful, and suggesting 
that the state is nothing more than a barometer of the social balance of forces in society. 
Abrams (1988), referring to the legitimacy accorded to the state by inhabitants, argues that we 
should take the ‘idea of the state’ extremely seriously. This ‘internalisation’ of the idea of the 
state as a legitimate overarching authority (see, amongst others, Foucault, 1980, Bourdieu, 
1994) produces the state in everyday life, even where it is materially absent. For example, an 
act of signing a private contract between two individuals implicitly relies on the authority of 
the state in the background as the ultimate deterrent to breaking the terms of the contract. It 
is ultimately the law marshalled by the state that enforces contracts. 
 
Even the daily interactions between people have the shadow of the state looking over them, 
for if a person transgresses the rules of interaction (for example through assaulting another 
person) the state will be called upon to restore order. The rules of interaction emerge from 
customs and norms based in everyday life, but are thoroughly imbued with ideology and are 
codified in explicit rules with clearly defined consequences for non-adherence, backed by the 
might of the state. So, for example, not stealing macadamia nuts from an orchard, or not 
occupying land at will, may emerge from commonly held beliefs of relations between 
neighbours. But the state absorbs these and converts them into activities punishable by the 
state as an external agent to the dispute. 
 
Space and power are integrally linked in this way. The production of space is based on spatial 
practices that separate control of space from those who produce it in situated social activity. 
This separation is kept intact through the combination of consent and force. As with relations 
of power, consent to particular spatial arrangements and practices is at least partially based on 
the integration of representational spaces, of inhabitants’ daily lived realities and ways of 
seeing space. “‘Users’ passively experience whatever *is+ imposed upon them inasmuch as it 
[is] more or less thoroughly inserted into, or justified by, their representational space” 
(Lefebvre, 1991:43-44). 
 
Although we can say the state in its tangible form (offices, officials, politicians, concrete plans 
and the distribution and use of resources that materialise these plans) is fragmented and 
contradictory, the “idea of the state” (Abrams, 1988) exerts tremendous power. The 
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consequences for those involved in the immediate production of power through situated 
social activity in utilising the power so generated occur within the framework of a state. These 
consequences ripple back to the state over time and are either sanctioned (i.e. codified in 
rights and duties laid out by the state, or even merely tacitly accepted) or opposed by the 
state. The state’s authority is then determined by its capacity to step in and defend what it 
sanctions or to assert its authority to suppress unsanctioned uses of power. If the state is 
unable to co-ordinate its parts to do this, its authority may weaken or dissolve. On the other 
hand, if it can do this, it will necessarily reinforce particular relations of power based on the 
sanctioned (and unequally distributed) use of power and hence productions of space. In this 
sense Lefebvre is right that the capitalist state seeks to protect the homogenous, fragmented 
space of private property, including in South Africa where private property is a 
constitutionally-guaranteed ‘right’. This means the state has explicitly sanctioned a particular 
imbalance of power favouring property owners. 
 
To capture such dynamics, my field research had an ethnographic slant and was placed-based, 
and aimed at understanding the specific lived experiences in each setting. It is not possible, 
though, to establish a complete identity between lived space and alternative space even while 
the latter necessarily emerges out of the former. A key issue for the thesis is thus what social 
forces underpin the production of space following land reform, with the hypothesis that there 
will be contradictory and contested outcomes from land reform. There are no single winners 
and losers. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Neil Smith (1984:91-92) credits Lefebvre for originating the term ‘the production of space’ as 
an extremely valuable contribution, but argues that Lefebvre did not carry the concept 
through systematically or gain the full value of his own insights. He critiques Lefebvre for 
“conceptual indeterminacy” and ultimately for using the concept of space too loosely. 
Merrifield, on the other hand, considers this to be useful in that it prevents rigid orthodoxy. Its 
very indeterminacy allows us “to add our own flesh, our own content, to rewrite it as part of 
our own chapter or research agenda” (Merrifield, 2006:109). Lefebvre was against 
systematisation; he exhorted his readers to immerse themselves in reality, engage with it and 
learn and reflect on it in the process. He simply provided some tools that can help us to think 
more deeply and clearly about the world. 
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I have adopted a more open approach to theory than one which aims to develop a watertight 
theoretical model that will then be tested for how accurately it can explain reality. The thesis is 
not so much about proving or disproving a theoretical approach as it is about illuminating 
reality, using theory and concepts as tools that can reveal different angles on familiar 
questions. Thrift (1996:30-35) refers to this as “modest theory”, where we recognise the 
ontological and epistemological limits to what we can know. Lefebvre’s theory of the 
production of space is open-ended enough to accommodate and incorporate a wide range of 
different theoretical concerns on the relationship between structure and agency, and the 
connection between theory and real-world problems. Lefebvre’s theory seems to me to 
encapsulate and respond effectively to these concerns. 
 
First, his analysis is rooted in material reality, but incorporates elements of discourse that 
shape how we see, and hence act, on that reality. Against the abstraction and relativism of 
post-structuralist discourse theory, it locks us into the material manifestations of the 
production of space and its practical, daily use. At the same time, it shows how materiality and 
practical use are mediated by representations, by contestation at the level of ideas about the 
normative and actual uses of space. The way space is seen shapes the way it is used. 
 
Second, in the concept of ‘lived space’, Lefebvre points to the possibilities of people in their 
daily lives having some consequence in the way space is produced. It is no coincidence that 
Lefebvre has written extensively on everyday life and the closely related issue of the dialectical 
connection between structure and agency. Against the determinism of structuralist theory, 
Lefebvre’s triad reveals how everyday life can and does reproduce and alter structure. It 
concretises change in the everyday. But against a voluntarist theory of agency which says that 
whatever people do, things will change, it shows how practice itself emerges and is shaped by 
enduring structural characteristics: people are not just free to act as they wish, but are 
constrained by the material and ideological conditions in which they live. Finally, Lefebvre’s 
underlying theory of change is political in that he builds the possibility of changing space 
through conscious collective activity into his conception of the way space is constructed and 
lived. The theoretical framework touches on questions of structure and agency and 
incrementalism vs. rupture (reform and revolution) that continue to resonate in contemporary 
debates about social change in South Africa and beyond. 
 
The conceptual framework developed in this chapter started from the premise that social and 
spatial relations are mutually constitutive. The following chapters are based on the three 
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dimensions of land reform indicated in the introduction, viz. authority and governance, 
property relations and rights and agricultural production and settlement. Each of these 
dimensions is structured and analysed along the lines proposed by Lefebvre’s spatial triad: 
 
i) The material base of the natural environment and the ‘second nature’ of the built 
environment and institutions, and the accompanying spatial practices connected to these; 
ii) The dominant conceptions of space (filtered through these dimensions) and their 
underpinning forms of knowledge and ideology; 
iii) Subordinated or marginalised conceptions of space and the everyday lived practices of 
inhabitants that interact with the material and conceptual environment, and that practically 
produce space on an on-going basis. 
 
An analysis of the social forces and power relations that underpins the production of space 
cuts across all the dimensions, with the aim of identifying both the social forces at play in the 
production of rural space, and the array of sometimes contradictory and sometimes 
complementary outcomes generated by these different forces. In the following chapter, this 
conceptual framework is applied to the rural South African land reform context. 
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CHAPTER 3: LAND REFORM AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN RURAL SOUTH 
AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the three dimensions of land reform identified in Chapter 1, 
considering their theoretical role in the production of space and making a general, historically-
informed application of these ideas to the production of space in rural South Africa. This sets 
the basis for the detailed elaboration of these dimensions and their role in the production of 
space in the research site in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
3.2 Space, authority and governance 
As Chapter 2 showed, relations of power inform the way space is conceptualised and how 
these conceptions are translated into practice. This section establishes the institutional and 
governance framework within which space was and is produced in rural South Africa, giving 
institutional form to the content of property relations and decisions about land use. The 
apartheid bifurcation of space was replicated in the structures of governance and authority. 
The state oversaw the maintenance of the fragmented space of apartheid, holding the 
fragments together in a unity managed through control over the movement of inhabitants 
between productive and reproductive zones, and through the use of proxies closer to the flow 
of social activity. The proxies in the peripheries were spatially segregated. In the ‘white’ areas 
dominated by private property relations, private owners were given proxy authority over the 
property they owned and over the inhabitants who continued occupying that property. The 
voluntary movement of whites off the land in the 1940s and 1950s was of concern to the state 
in maintaining the spatial divisions underpinning segregationist and apartheid policies. State 
intervention aimed to retain a white presence on the land, through subsidising this presence 
and the activities which permitted its continuation (Cobbett, 1987, Bernstein and Amin, 1995). 
The central state ceded significant authority to white owners at the farm gate. 
 
On the farms, white landowners did not include black inhabitants in decision-making 
whatsoever. Landowners unilaterally determined how the land would be used, and imposed 
this in a top-down and sometimes violent way on black inhabitants. Class and race intersected 
here. Women, whether white or black, had limited authority historically in rural South Africa, 
although white women were not subject to the racial oppression which was part of the ‘triple 
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burden’ of class, race and gender of being a black woman in South Africa (Charman et al., 
1991). Black women were not treated as independent beings on the farms and their fortunes 
were heavily tied to those of their husbands or partners, whether labour tenants or farm 
workers. If the man was evicted, the women in that household were automatically evicted too 
(Hall et al., 2001). But there were limits to the unfettered imposition of state-derived 
authority. Black inhabitants were not merely victims of total domination. Although they were 
not in control of the labour process on the farms (i.e. their own situated social activity), their 
daily practices contributed to shaping those processes. A classic example was the resistance 
first to the imposition of labour tenancy and later to attempts to abolish it, rooted in everyday 
activities which significantly shaped rural socio-spatial relations (van Onselen, 1996, Williams, 
1996). 
 
The authority granted to white property owners by the state was the situated manifestation of 
broader governance based on racially-exclusive elections (Kaplan, 1980) with white political 
control of the state. In order to reproduce its authority the state legitimated the generalised 
authority of white over black in all aspects of social, economic and political life. Local 
government was structured around the needs of white land owners. Both across the farms and 
within the boundaries of the farms, space was constructed in the interests of white control and 
to facilitate accumulation and consumption by whites. The broader apartheid segregation was 
replicated at farm level, and structures of authority and governance facilitated this. 
 
Zones of reproduction characterised by indigenous property relations were spatially 
segregated from the zones of production dominated by private property relations. It should be 
emphasised that these were ‘ideal types’, representations that did not necessarily reflect a 
reality that was more mixed and complex in practice. This is dealt with in more detail in the 
section on property relations. The state’s proxies in these spaces were unelected traditional 
authorities whose initial claim to authority was based on birthright. The central state used this 
institution, but usurped its power and channelled its activities to support the broader 
objectives of white domination. The Native Administration Act of 1927 imposed white control 
over the tribal authority system (Letsoalo, 1987:36-37), gradually transforming “indigenous 
sovereigns into the lowest civil servants…, its rural tax collectors ands labour recruiters” 
(Comaroff, 1998:332). The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 ‘tribalised’ the reserves, fomenting 
ethnic divisions and establishing Tribal Authorities as institutions for a ruling elite (Ntsebeza, 
2005). Aspects of the historical systems of authority were selectively adapted or abandoned 
depending on the needs of the white state. Again, this was not an uncontested process, and 
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the outcomes were spatio-temporally contingent (i.e. in different places and times the state 
was more or less successful at this). There were internal challenges to the rule of traditional 
authority that forced compromises and changed the social relations (Delius, 1996, Ntsebeza, 
2005, Oomen, 2005). Many, but not all, traditional authorities were co-opted by the apartheid 
state. Many of those that resisted alongside their constituencies were deposed and replaced, 
providing a further indication of the extent to which traditional systems of governance were 
distorted to suit the political needs of the white regime (Mbeki, 1984, Delius, 1996, Levin and 
Mkhabela, 1997, Ntsebeza, 2005). 
 
But at the broadest level, a “bifurcated state” was created, with the white state exerting 
indirect control over the population of the reserves through the traditional authorities who, 
notwithstanding, did not have autonomy on any significant matters. For the oppressed 
population, this bifurcation manifested in a division between urban ‘citizen’ operating in a 
framework of rights (albeit highly circumscribed) and rural ‘subjects’ who did not have rights of 
citizenship (Mamdani, 1996). The powers given to traditional authorities included authority to 
allocate and administer land in their areas of jurisdiction. This went beyond their pre-colonial 
functions with regard to land, but within the context of a greater subjection to the white 
central state (Sibanda, 2000:47). The Bantu Areas Land Regulations of 196913 established the 
‘permission to occupy’ (PTO) system, which allowed the Bantu Affairs Commissioner to 
delegate authority for land allocation and management to traditional authorities. The white 
state intervened at regular points, however, including registration of allocations and doing the 
physical demarcations. Both with regard to broader authority and specifically with regard to 
land allocations, women were subjected to male authority. While the lived practices still gave 
women some control over resources and decisions, this was not represented in the formal 
systems or structures of governance and authority. Women struggled to hold onto the control 
they did have, which was increasingly eroded as top-down forms of control over land, its 
allocation, use and management were imposed by the white state. 
 
Two different representations of governance and authority therefore produced two distinct 
spatial practices with regard to governance and authority. The state maintained these 
fragmented spaces in an overall unity with private property relations dominating indigenous 
property relations, racially exclusive democracy dominating traditional authority and 
productive spaces dominating reproductive spaces. 
                                                          
13
 Department of Bantu Administration and Development (1969) Bantu Areas Land Regulation, 
R188/1969 
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After 1994 governance was a key focus for transformation. ‘Wall-to-wall’ local government 
structures were established, with rural hinterlands and towns and urban areas integrated into 
single political-administrative units. Coupled with new formulae for the distribution of central 
state resources based on criteria of poverty and need, this opened the possibility for 
governance arrangements that could channel social activity in ways that benefited those 
whose interests were subordinated before 1994. However, compromises in the political 
negotiations limited the prospects of change. A so-called ‘sunset clause’ entrenched power 
sharing for five years, including at local government level (Marais, 1998:87, 257). This gave the 
white power bloc in rural areas an opportunity to regroup and significantly shape the character 
of future policy and practice. Resource redistribution based on need through the fiscus was 
limited to a sliver of overall budget allocations. Traditional authorities were granted 
constitutional recognition, and pressure from the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders 
in South Africa (CONTRALESA) saw their hand increasingly strengthened in policy and law, 
especially after 2003 with the promulgation of the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act and the Communal Land Rights Act. These laws consolidated the role of 
traditional authorities both in governance in rural areas as a whole, and in land management 
and allocation in the areas under their jurisdiction (Ntsebeza, 2005:284-288). 
 
The overall result was a local government that remained dominated by white power in the first 
few years after 1994, and later subject to tensions between democratically elected local 
councillors and traditional authorities who had constitutional protection (i.e. whose authority 
the state legitimated). Traditional authorities are not uniformly strong, and the social dynamics 
in specific contexts play a big role in determining what part they play in governance in reality. 
This remains within the context of the overarching political authority of the state, re-centred 
on racial inclusivity, which uses a combination of incentives (e.g. official recognition and 
procedures for recognition, inclusion of traditional authorities into a formal pay structure, 
delegation of some types of authority and support for institutional structuring) and formal and 
informal penalties (e.g. withholding recognition, tacitly allowing internal challenges to the rule 
of ‘dissident’ or ‘rogue’ authorities, and in some cases outright repression) to maintain the 
overarching authority of the central state. 
 
The three dominant rural authorities – landowners (mostly white), traditional authorities and 
elected local government – formed the template for land governance. The protection of 
private property conferred significant authority on owners even after 1994 (see below). 
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However the ANC in government had a stated agenda to shift control over rural power, at least 
as far as race was concerned. If spatial and social relations are mutually constitutive, shifting 
how power is controlled and channelled requires an alteration of the situated social activities 
that generate power in the first place, and therefore the production of new spaces. Altering 
the institutions and mechanisms of governance and authority create the institutional template 
for this. Property relations and forms of production and settlement are materialised through 
this framework. 
 
New representations of authority and governance emphasised democracy and ‘co-governance’ 
between democratically elected institutions and traditional authorities. This applied both on 
the land reform farms and across rural spaces. On commercial farms, still privately owned by 
white farmers, relations of authority remained essentially unaltered, although there was some 
additional regulation of rights to control inhabitants through the extension of basic labour 
rights and minimum conditions of employment (including wages) to farm workers and tenure 
security laws for farm dwellers. Weak farm level and rural organisation and poor monitoring 
and enforcement by the state meant these rights mostly were not being realised in practice 
(Nzimande, 2003). On land reform farms, any land transferred through the land reform 
programme not owned by an individual was to be owned either by a CPA or a Trust set up for 
the purpose. The CPAs were new democratic institutions established in law14 that legally 
owned the land and were given authority, legitimated by the state, for land governance. They 
had a similar role at farm level to the role of elected local government at a broader level. 
 
The subsequent chapters of the thesis show how governance and authority were conceptually 
constructed in the specific context of the research site; how land reform influenced and 
shaped these concepts; how these intersected with representations of space; and how they 
translated into spatial practice, in particular how new governance structures and forms of 
authority intersected with pre-existing systems of authority and governance to create a new 
institutional architecture for the production of space. Lived space is integral to these questions 
since it brings in the everyday practices that shape spatial practices and the governance 
institutions that structure this space, as well as interacting with and mediating the translation 
of representations of space into practice. Refracting the analysis of authority and land 
governance through Lefebvre’s (1991) spatial triad of the material (spatial practice), the 
                                                          
14
 Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 
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conceptual (representations of space) and the lived (lived space) thus assists in understanding 
how land reform altered relations of authority and land governance in the research sites. 
3.3 Property relations, land reform and space 
In the broadest sense, ownership of private property rights confers a bundle of entitlements 
on the owner with the assumption that these naturally fit together. These entitlements include 
the right to exclusive privilege to use the property, the right to exclude non-owners, the right 
to transfer or alienate property, and immunity from non-consensual harm or loss (Singer, 
2000:3). Another entitlement that accrues to property owners is authority over the inhabitants 
of the asset the rights refer to. In particular, owners can choose who can live on, work on and 
use the land. The legal system, customs and culture of different places establish the scope of, 
and limits to, these rights. Private property rights are thus never absolute. They should be 
understood as contingent and contextual. They are contingent because changing 
circumstances change the rights that are recognised by the system, and the context in which 
they are exercised and their effect on others have always been of importance in shaping rights 
(Singer, 2000:10). Private property rights are distinguished by their abstraction from specific 
situations and the development of transactions between people who don’t know each other 
(Gordon et al., 2007:30). 
 
Private property rights – and hence property as a commodity - cannot exist without the state, 
as shown in Chapter 2. Having established the basis of property as a social relation, the state 
acts as a guarantor of those relations and their codification in rights. The concept of property 
rests on the legal recognition of the rights attached to it which is ultimately protected by the 
threat of physical force by the state. These rights are “only as strong as an individual’s capacity 
to call upon the collective to stand behind his or her claim to a benefit stream” (Bromley, cited 
in Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997:1303). Under capitalism, the state stands in as a proxy for ‘the 
collective’; it represents the whole. If an individual is incapable of calling on the state to 
protect their property rights, including if the state is unable to respond, property as a concept 
begins to dissipate. 
 
As Chapter 2 showed, property rights are firmly located in representations of space. The 
material, conceptual and lived dimensions of space manifest in property relations. At the core 
of the notion of private property is a particular conception of the ordering of space and - 
crucially – the meanings attached to that ordering and the spaces so ordered. The technical-
53 
 
scientific aspect of this is primarily related to the legal management of these relations and, in 
the case of land, the accurate mapping and recording of the physical dimensions and 
ownership of commodified parcels of land. 
 
The materialisation of these dominant conceptions of property in spatial practice has two key 
elements to it: the formation and maintenance of boundaries, and the use of the property. The 
latter is dealt with in its own section below. Suffice to say that use defines ownership, and lack 
of use brings ownership into question. This can be seen in the Brazilian Constitutional clause 
(Art 186) on the social function of agricultural land that establishes the ‘use it or lose it’ 
principle. It sets out conditions, including non-use, that justify the expropriation and 
reallocation of land. A similar principle is in loose operation in South Africa, but currently is 
only applied to land redistributed through the government programme. 
 
The establishment of boundaries is a material manifestation of private property. Generally 
these are physical boundaries (fences, walls) that clearly demarcate one parcel of land from 
another, and which facilitate the effective exchange of land. A representation of these is kept 
by the state and sometimes the owner as a formal description of the asset which is owned in 
the form of a title deed, but on an everyday level these boundaries may be contested. Lived 
space enters into the materialisation of property through spatial practice in the acceptance or 
contestation of existing demarcations between properties; through contesting or accepting the 
claims to rights by property owners; through contesting or accepting the authority of owners 
regarding the movement and activities of inhabitants on and around the property. Acceptance 
and contestation are not binary opposites but can occur simultaneously, i.e. they are never 
total. In the acceptance or contestation, inhabitants produce or alter the social relations of 
private property and the way they shape space. 
 
In South Africa, property rights were historically established in a hierarchy with private 
property, and ownership, at the apex and other rights in a subordinate position (van der Walt, 
1995:299). That is, spaces characterised by the private property regime were given more 
weight than spaces characterised by indigenous property regimes.15 This is the broadest level 
of hierarchy and fragmentation of space in the South African context, essentially splitting 
space into productive and reproductive zones, at least in dominant conceptions (Wolpe, 1972, 
                                                          
15
 The indigenous property regime is widely referred to as ‘communal tenure’ and the areas in which it is 
found (the former homelands) as ‘communal areas’. I will favour the use of the term ‘indigenous 
property regime’, since ‘communal tenure’ assumes certain collective relationships and the absence of 
individual rights which are not accurate. 
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Letsoalo, 1987). This did translate into spatial practices that concentrated productive 
investment and activity in spaces of private property and neglected indigenous property, 
although this was not watertight. The density of the built environment added to the economic 
value and hence dominant position of private property over time. 
 
After 1994 private property rights were constitutionally protected. This was a major victory for 
property owners (overwhelmingly whites). It can partly be understood as a compromise based 
on the balance of forces and the disarray of the left as there was also a strong liberal 
democratic element within the leadership of the ANC during the negotiations towards formal 
democracy that had always favoured the protection of private property (Habib et al., 1998). 
With reference to productive land, the right to private property was previously a racially 
exclusive right, with blacks living on land belonging to someone else (whites, or the state 
controlled by whites), with regulations relating to their tenure but few formal rights. Even in 
the former homelands the land was legally owned by the state, with traditional authorities 
merely administering on behalf of the state. The extension of private property rights (or, more 
accurately, the ‘right to property rights’ (van der Walt, 1995)) to blacks after 1994 did not alter 
existing ownership and only provided the formal right to ownership. In reality, whites or white-
controlled institutions and the state continued to own almost all the land. 
 
Other property rights previously subordinated to private property and ownership were given 
greater legal standing after 1994. These included tenure rights on private property and a 
variety of rights on the 13% of South African territory under indigenous property regimes. 
These regimes were characterised by mixed tenure, “comprising variable bundles of individual, 
family, sub-group and larger group rights and duties in relation to a variety of natural 
resources” (Cousins, 2008b:6). Indigenous regimes “relativised” rights to a greater extent than 
Western systems of private property, mediated as they were by group membership and 
control (Cousins, 2008b:5). Under apartheid these rights were codified to some extent in the 
state, but were only applicable to the restricted areas of the homelands and were 
hierarchically subordinate. 
 
There is potential flexibility in indigenous systems which allows for constant change and 
adaptability. However, indigenous regimes were shaped by over a century of intervention by 
colonial and apartheid forces, where social relations were restructured to serve the interests 
of white minority rule and privilege. In the transition to formal democracy, traditional 
authorities emerged as the representatives for the retention and even expansion of indigenous 
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property regimes, and provided representations of those regimes in their own interests. These 
representations included the centrality of the traditional authority in administering and 
managing land on behalf of inhabitants, cast as subjects (Claassens, 2008a). Traditional 
authorities succeeded in winning the state to their representations, both through threats of 
violence and destabilisation, especially around elections, and through presenting their 
representations as the authentic voice of African custom (Ntsebeza, 2005). Control over land 
was central to their quest. In 2004 the Communal Land Rights Act was passed which sought to 
extend private ownership into the former homeland areas, but under the control of traditional 
authorities (Claassens and Cousins, 2008, Cousins, 2008a). However, these dominant 
representations of the social organisation of space were challenged and the Act was 
overturned in the Constitutional Court in 2009. Part of the challenge emerged from the voicing 
of alternative, subordinated representations of how relations were historically structured in far 
more complex ways that the implementation of the Act would destroy and replace with the 
cruder dominant representations (Cousins, 2008a). The dominant representations 
subordinated the more complex lived experiences of inhabitants, interacting with these 
property regimes, to the interests of entrenched elites. 
 
After 1994 the profile of previously subordinated spaces was raised. This did not undermine 
the dominance of private property, but sought to find some accommodation between 
different property regimes that recognised their validity. It was an attempt to balance the 
interests of a modernising thrust with an appreciation of the continuing value of indigenous 
tenure systems, reflecting the dominant interests in the liberation movement and in the 
society more broadly. This attempt to balance these different regimes opened up the 
possibility for some innovative thinking about forms of ownership and tenure, but also 
produced contradictions in the context of overarching accumulation pressures. The land 
reform programme emerged in this milieu.  
 
Using Lefebvre’s spatial triad of material, conceptual and lived, and the underlying idea of the 
mutually constitutive character of social and spatial relations, the subsequent chapters of the 
thesis considers these dynamics in the particular space of the research sites. What were the 
dominant and subordinate conceptions of property that shaped space in this site in the past, 
and what conceptions of property underpinned the introduction of land reform? Where did 
these conceptions emerge from and how did they articulate with one another and with 
existing spatial practices, both in terms of the material and institutional base and the everyday 
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practices that accompanied these? How did the unfolding of land reform in practice alter 
property relations and hence spatial and power relations? 
3.4 Agricultural production, settlement and the production of space 
As indicated above, land use – with the focus here on agricultural production and settlement - 
confirms ownership. The right to decide how land is used is structured into conceptions of 
property. The extent to which they are accepted or contested is shaped by the relations of 
power and the institutions through which these are channelled. Land use connects 
representations of space to spatial practice, including the way land is used in the material 
manifestation of conceptions of space. Representations of land use have their own dynamic, 
but are interconnected with representations of property and authority. Lived space – the daily 
experiences and activities of inhabitants - inserts meaning into the physical and institutional 
environment constituting the basis of spatial practice. 
 
Whether land is used for residence or production, and how these different types of space are 
integrated or segregated constitute spatial practice. There is a very direct relationship between 
the material base and land use. Ecological conditions delimit the possibilities for agricultural 
production, and basic issues such as soil fertility, rainfall and temperature play a significant 
role in shaping the allocation of space for agricultural production or for non-agricultural uses. 
The ‘second nature’ of the built environment also structures future possibilities for land use. 
Roads, railway lines and sidings, silos and orchards can be removed or abandoned, but only at 
a cost (Harvey, 2006). More often they shape future investments in the land, channelling 
resources onto pathways that are already embedded in the land. This is the weight of 
‘structure’ that any future ways of using the land must contend with. 
 
There is a strong spatial relationship between land use and both property regimes and 
structures of authority and governance discussed in the other two dimensions above. Under 
apartheid the bifurcation between white-owned private property under the authority of 
private land owners and black, indigenous property regimes under traditional authority, both 
overseen by the state, was simultaneously represented as a division between productive and 
reproductive spaces. This was constructed and materially manifested on the basis of 
systematic dispossession and differential support for specific production systems in these 
different spaces. As a result of systematic state support to whites, especially after Union in 
1910, commercial agricultural commodity production emerged in the spaces of private 
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property with a significant physical and institutional infrastructure (Bayley, 2000, Webb, 2000). 
This produced a large-scale, capital-intensive agricultural sector (World Bank, 1994, Lipton, 
1996) with a high degree of unevenness amongst commercial producers. A small core of 6% of 
farm units produced 40% of total income in the mid-1980s (Cooper, 1988:53). It laid a strong 
material base for further expansion of commercial production, but also structured possible 
future pathways of development on the basis of a production system that historically relied on 
ultra-cheap labour, ecological degradation and state subsidies for its profitability and survival 
(Marcus, 1989, Goldblatt, 2010). 
 
Subsequent restructuring, deregulation and liberalisation in the agricultural sector increased 
capital-intensity (and concurrent job shedding) and asset concentration not only in the primary 
sector but all along the value chain (Food Pricing Monitoring Committee, 2004). While the 
amount of land under agricultural production remained relatively constant during this period, 
the number of farm units has dropped from 60,000 in the early 1990s to 40,000 in the mid-
2000s (Department of Agriculture, 2009:6, Statistics South Africa, 2009:10), clearly indicating a 
concentration of land ownership. Restructuring led to devaluation of some forms of ‘sunk 
capital’ as crop mixes altered and marginal lands were taken out of production. The 
rationalisation of silo capacity and the abandonment and even physical removal of railway 
lines that formed the backbone of the apartheid agricultural economy indicate the ever-
present “tension between the instability generated by newly forming capital and the 
stagnation associated with past investments” (Harvey, 2006:394). Investment in rural areas 
(i.e. the materialisation of specific conceptions of the use of space through plans) diversified 
out of agriculture with a growing emphasis on game farming and tourism (Visser and 
Rogerson, 2004, Viljoen and Tlabela, 2006). There was also a growing trend for farmers to 
diversify into non-agricultural activities, including construction and transport, with a growing 
tendency towards part-time farming. 
 
In contrast, historically the spaces of indigenous property, represented as they were as arenas 
of reproduction, were systematically starved of agricultural support. This resulted in the 
decline of independent black producers and their subordination as wage workers in the 
emerging capitalist regime (Bundy, 1988). Land use was reorganised away from dispersed 
settlements, where productive fields surrounded individual homesteads with grazing further 
out, to a situation where homesteads were concentrated into dense settlements with small 
yards, and separate land was set aside for cropping and grazing. These ‘betterment’ 
settlements, as they were known in South Africa, were similar to the ‘lines’ in Zimbabwe 
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(Yawitch, 1982, Moore, 2005). Although this was openly contested in many places, the force of 
its imposition was enough to alter the character of settlement and land use in large parts of 
the area under indigenous tenure regimes. The result was a system where virtually no-one 
could make a living from agriculture because the amount of land each person got was too 
small even to produce enough for their household use (Cooper, 1991:243). While more than 
1.3 million households in the homelands were engaged in some sort of agricultural production, 
this was a thin disguise for ‘displaced proletarianisation’, with the vast majority of African rural 
households directly reliant on wage remittances or state grants for survival (Hendricks, 
1993:71). 
 
Despite sharp differences in the character of the two spaces of apartheid, they functioned as 
an integrated whole (but not without internal contradictions) for the purposes of capital 
accumulation. Space is fragmented by land use but held together in a homogenous unity by 
the state. The homelands were first treated as enclaves where blacks were supposedly able to 
reproduce themselves without any intervention from the state. The homeland populations 
were treated as a “reserve army of labour” (Marx, 1976:782) that could be called on as and 
when needed. The dominant discourse had it that low wages could be paid to migrant workers 
in the ‘white’ areas because their family expenses were being offset by subsistence activities in 
the homelands which meant they did not have to pay all the costs of maintaining their families. 
The 1955 Tomlinson Commission (Union of South Africa, 1955) indicated that this theory did 
not translate into practice and that there was a crisis of reproduction in the homelands. 
Migrant workers were forced to subsidise those living in the homelands, even though the 
official line refused to acknowledge these findings. Over time, as capital intensity in the 
economy grew, the homelands became dumping grounds for blacks who were structurally and 
permanently surplus to the needs of the white-owned economy (Yawitch, 1982, Letsoalo, 
1987). It was only in the 1980s that political imperatives drove the government to attempt a 
decompression of class relations in the areas under traditional authority in an effort to create a 
buffer that could absorb popular protest (Morris, 1991). The creation of a ‘master class’ of 
black farmers and various centralised contract schemes were part of this process (Southall, 
1983, Bernstein, 1996, Van Averbeke et al., 1998). But despite these interventions, the division 
between productive spaces and unproductive dumping grounds remained largely intact. 
 
Most parts of South Africa have relatively poor ecological conditions for agricultural 
production. There is sufficient rainfall for agricultural production over about one third of the 
country, but only one third of this area has arable land (Goldblatt, 2010:6). Only about 15% of 
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South Africa’s total agricultural land is potentially arable and of this, 78% is of medium to low 
potential. High potential land is geographically concentrated, with 90% lying in Mpumalanga 
and KwaZulu-Natal (Vink and Kirsten, 2000:s4.1). The dominant discourse on agricultural 
production interacts with this scarcity both to organise rural space and to justify the division of 
space. On the one side is capital-intensive commercial production on large units of land, and 
on the other side is labour-intensive sub-subsistence production on small units. Most of the 
best land was kept for whites, and where blacks did have access to land with good agricultural 
potential, they did not receive support to farm for their own account. This produced a racist 
ideology that said that whites can farm and blacks cannot, and a series of associations were 
made on the basis of this: white = privately-owned = productive = large-scale = commercial; 
and black = communally-owned = unproductive = small-scale = subsistence/welfare.  
 
The notion of commercial viability sat at the core of dominant conceptions of agricultural 
production, with a tendency to focus narrowly on farm productivity and economic returns 
(Cousins and Scoones, 2010), taking the division of space for granted. There was nothing 
inherent about the economies of scale that viability was based on: the idea was rooted in 
“subjective and ideologically informed calculations regarding acceptable levels of income for 
commercial farmers” (Hall, 2009b:38). The dominant discourse on agricultural development, 
promoted by the organised commercial farming lobby, included the following key arguments: 
i) commercial agriculture is the only real agriculture, and for small-scale agriculture to be 
effective, it must be understood as just a smaller version of large-scale commercial agriculture; 
ii) subsistence farmers are inefficient and unproductive; iii) urbanisation is the wave of the 
future and must be supported, leaving rural areas to commercial farming; and iv) the key task 
of land reform is gradually to deracialise commercial agriculture, but leaving the structure 
intact (Cousins, 2007:228). 
 
The restitution programme in particular presented a challenge to these ideas, especially where 
large group claims were made on high-value commercial farms. Where restitution posed a 
potential threat to the interests of large commercial undertakings, such as the orchards in 
Levubu near the research site, the state intervened to ensure that production continued at the 
cost of meaningful restitution. On these farms, ‘strategic partners’ were brought in to provide 
management support and some equity, with the theory being that they would transfer skills to 
the beneficiaries over time so that eventually the latter could continue with commercial 
production on their own. In practice this seldom happened. Equity partners made profits for 
themselves but transferred limited skills to beneficiaries. In some cases, ‘beneficiaries’ were 
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not even allowed to settle on the land, or they continued as farm workers under the same 
conditions as previously, in the vain hope that one day they might receive dividends from the 
business on the land they ‘owned.’ (see Derman et al., 2006, Fraser, 2006, Hellum and 
Derman, 2006, Colquhoun, 2010) This is ownership stripped of the right to determine use. 
 
The second key area of land use considered in the thesis is settlement. Apartheid prevented 
the free movement of blacks to settle where they wanted, and sought to control the flow of 
people according to the needs of white-owned industry, including agriculture. Spatially, the 
goal of apartheid was to separate black residence from production. Although this was never 
realised as an ultimate goal, extensive attempts were made that resulted in the forced removal 
of millions of blacks, seriously weakening the social fabric (Platzky and Walker, 1985, 
Unterhalter, 1987) and producing ‘displaced urbanisation’ with dense settlements far from 
economic activities (Murray, 1987). Outside of the urban centres, blacks either lived on white-
owned commercial farms or in homelands in dense settlements or in dispersed settlements. In 
2003 Bekker (2003:1-2) estimated that 25% of the black rural population (defined as those 
living on commercial farms or in the homelands) lived on white-owned commercial farms, 35% 
lived outside dense settlements, and 40% lived in dense settlements, which he labelled as 
‘informal.’ As the process of agricultural restructuring intensified from the 1980s and as state 
influx control measures collapsed, informal settlements arose around the small rural towns, 
and the sharp boundaries between town and countryside blurred. This occurred both in the 
formerly ‘whites-only’ areas as well as in the former homelands (Cross, 2000). Based on 1996 
Census data, Cross et al. (2000:12) estimated that 53% of the peri-urban or rural population 
lived in dense settlements, with 1.21m living in dense settlements around small rural towns 
and secondary cities. 
 
The driving force of urban migration is seen to be the search for income and employment, but 
in conditions of high rural and urban unemployment an increasingly important reason for 
migration is improved infrastructure and public goods delivery. Bekker (2003:3-4) considers 
this to be “a move away from a collapsing land economy towards the nearest location of the 
developed cash economy.” Cross (2000:12) suggests that massive densification of settlement 
around rural towns and secondary cities may signal “the endgame for the rural poverty crisis, 
with a permanent change in the character of the South African rural economy.” However, it is 
possible to ask the counter question, that if rural conditions are so bad, why haven’t more 
people migrated to the cities since the ending of state controls over movement? Part of the 
issue is that unemployment is also high in urban areas, and urban labour markets have 
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become more closed to new work seekers from rural areas (Cross, 2000:14). What the state 
tried to do by force under apartheid, creating ‘insiders’ with urban employment and relative 
stability, and ‘outsiders’ marginalised in rural areas, the market is achieving through economic 
processes in conditions of theoretical freedom of movement. Most migration is rural to rural, 
often from isolated rural villages to the edges of small towns. Not everyone can then move 
from the often tenure insecure informal settlements around small towns into metro areas. 
According to Cross (2009), the people here are trapped, lacking sufficient resources to move to 
the cities, with a high percentage of women household heads and damaged households. 
 
Although Cross argues that circulatory migration (going to the urban areas for work and 
returning to the rural homestead periodically) is no longer relevant in the South African 
context, if it ever was, Posel (2003) differs, suggesting that migration is seldom a one-way 
stream ending in permanent settlement, but is more often a continuous movement from one 
place to the next. This leads some to argue for the need to “culturally privilege nomads in 
relation to the sedentary,… tolerance in relation to identity,… multi-affiliation in relation to 
exclusion” (Jacques Attali, quoted in Escobar, 2006:242). Achille Mbembe exhorts us to 
“attend to flows rather than places or structures”16. While there is a need to recognise the 
importance of flows, we also need to keep in mind the enduring importance of place. Cross et 
al. (1998) argue that it is neither permanent settlement nor permanent movement: mobile 
populations prioritise infrastructure, with an emphasis both on secure places and on freedom 
to move. Remaining in rural settlements is not purely about not being able to move, however. 
Inhabitants have built up resources over time, they have formal and informal tenure and 
property rights and social networks in these areas, even though these may be under pressure 
from the breakdown of public institutions to manage these rights and from growing 
populations. Although the rural population is dwindling as a proportion of the total population, 
in real terms it is still growing (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 1995:10). Despite 
processes of urbanisation and deagrarianisation, the rural will remain important and dynamic 
for decades to come. 
 
Lefebvre (2009a) makes the broad point that production in space has increasingly tended 
towards an economy of flows - of energy, raw materials, labour and information – which 
necessitates the spatial planning of the modern economy. This is structured around the needs 
of the capitalist economy. In South Africa the NSDP emphasised commercial agriculture as the 
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 Comments at South African Cities Conference, Wits University, 24-25 June 2009, hosted by Centre for 
Urbanism and Built Environment Studies and African Centre for Cities  
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only really viable economic activity in the rural areas. The plan proposed that rural inhabitants 
not involved directly in commercial agriculture should be provided with skills to enable them 
to migrate into urban areas to find employment (The Presidency, 2006). The basic approach 
was to concentrate economic resources where there was high potential, and support people 
living in areas falling outside these priority areas with education and welfare to enable them to 
move to those nodes. Twenty-six nodes of high potential were identified nationally, all of 
which were urban nodes, partly because the methodology privileged existing industrial and 
value-added activity. The NSDP was to cascade down, from province to district to local 
municipalities, with each level of government having its own spatial plan following the same 
logic. This was the image of the NSDP: a few intensive economic and social hubs connected to 
each other by corridors in a vast sea of emptiness. The rural expanse would be occupied by a 
very small minority of large-scale industrial farmers who themselves were linked into national 
and global commodity chains via transport corridors. It is a bleak picture, ripping the humanity 
out of the landscape, imposing abstract economic space where today there exists (at least 
partially, in fragmented form) social space. This accords with Soja’s (1999) general comment 
on spatial planning as tending to consider human geographies primarily as outcomes, focusing 
on the material or physical aspects of spatial construction (what already exists) to the 
detriment of representations and lived spaces.  
 
The land reform programme was also not well geared towards taking into account the lived 
spaces people were producing. Since its inception, land reform has not considered the 
dynamic movement of people, and the living connections between rural and urban areas. The 
first period of land redistribution until 1999 did emphasise settlement of groups of people on 
the land, with productive activity more or less being left up to them. The restitution model was 
also based on this approach. This, as we saw in Chapter 1, led to stagnation of production on 
these farms. In some cases, people did not want to farm. In other cases they did not have 
enough resources or support to farm. In others, the institutional framework was just 
inadequate to enable people to engage in agriculture. The second period of land redistribution 
after 2000 switched in completely the opposite direction and focused exclusively on individual 
production. The need for rural land for settlement was eliminated as a consideration despite 
its evident importance. Settlement on agricultural land in the context of limited arable land 
can threaten the ability to produce enough food for the country as a whole. However, there is 
a big demand for land for settlement, especially in the former homelands where households 
are compressed and land in areas proclaimed for settlement has run out (Centre for 
Development and Enterprise, 2005, Aliber et al., 2006). The Centre for Development and 
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Enterprise (2005) concludes from this that the focus of land reform should be on urban land 
for housing, and not rural land for production. The thesis will aim to get a better understanding 
of the continuing importance of land and its redistribution in rural areas both for production 
and for settlement. 
 
This opens the way to consider how land reform has influenced the way land is being used. 
What were the dominant conceptions of land use on land reform farms and how did these 
relate to the ecological base, the built environment and the practical mechanisms through 
which they interacted with one another? What other kinds of land uses emerged as a result of 
land reform, and how did spatial practices change as a result? What social forces were behind 
these different activities and what power did they wield in shaping land use and hence rural 
space in the research site? 
3.5 Conclusion 
The three inter-related dimensions of authority, property and land use historically produced 
rural spaces resting on a racially-bifurcated space that was nonetheless unified under the 
auspices of the state. The space was placed in a hierarchy, with white, private, commercial 
farming land dominating black, indigenous tenure land. As Lefebvre helps us to understand, 
these categories were discursive constructions, representations, but they were also materially 
manifested through deliberate interventions and investments, both by the state and capital. 
Nevertheless, these ‘pure’ representations encountered pre-existing spatial practices that had 
to be accommodated, adjusted or absorbed in this translation into materiality. 
 
The remainder of the thesis shows how land reform intersected with these processes, in part 
altering their dynamics and in part being absorbed by these dynamics in the on-going 
production of rural space. Chapter 4 introduces the specific historical processes in the 
production of space in the Vleifontein area, the site of the research. It considers how systems 
authority and property emerged and developed and what spatial implications this had, and 
looks at how land use on the specific farms changed over time. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE HISTORICAL PRODUCTION OF SPACE AROUND VLEIFONTEIN 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter spelled out some of the historical dynamics that shaped rural space in 
South Africa as a whole. This chapter looks at how some of these dynamics played themselves 
out in the specific research site. It starts with a brief overview of the history of the area, from 
initial settlement to white conquest, and then considers the way space was constituted prior 
to the arrival of the whites. It then provides an overview of the way white encroachment led to 
a fundamental shift in the production of space, with the introduction of a private property 
regime, the bifurcation of space and authority between private property and indigenous 
tenure, the subordination of chiefly authority and the bifurcation of spaces of production and 
labour reproduction. Although the story is broadly similar to the generic story presented in 
Chapter 3, contingencies such as the historical settlement patterns and structures of authority, 
the history of white occupation and the specific location of the farms in the research site 
shaped the character and dynamics of land reform in the post-1994 era. It is not intended as 
an exhaustive history of the way space was produced in the area, but rather as a sketch to 
highlight some of the key dynamics that shaped the possibilities and limits of land restitution 
and reform in the future. 
4.2 Brief historical background to the area 
By most accounts, the Soutpansberg area was first inhabited by the forerunners of the 
Vhavenda, who came from north of the Limpopo River as far back as 1200. It appears that 
Thoho-ya-Ndou (translated as the ‘Head of the Elephant’, with the elephant being the totem of 
the Vhavenda), who ruled from 1761 to 1790, was the first to unite disparate clans and 
groupings under a single chief (Nemudzivhadi, 1985:19). When Thohoyandou died, this unity 
fragmented and his three sons ruled in separate fiefdoms. The Batlokwa, later to be absorbed 
into the Vhavenda, arrived in the area at this time. It was also during the rule of the three sons 
– in 1820 - that the first whites, led by Coenraad Buys, arrived in the area. Buys founded a 
settlement at Mara (Government of Venda and Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1986:1-
2). In 1836 Louis Trichardt and his party arrived, and shortly thereafter intervened in a 
succession dispute amongst the Vhavenda, assisting Ramabulana (also known as Ravele) to 
defeat Ramavhoya for the chieftaincy (von Warmelo, 1932:6, Nemudzivhadi, 1985:20). 
Trichardt left in 1837 in the direction of Mozambique. Hendrik Potgieter and his party arrived 
in 1849 and established the settlement of Zoutpansbergdorp, which in 1855 was renamed 
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Schoemansdal under the leadership of Schoeman. Initially relations between the Voortrekkers 
and the Vhavenda were good, but soured when the latter realised the Voortrekkers had come 
for good (Nemudzivhadi, 1985:20). 
 
Meanwhile in 1820 Soshangana, a Zulu captain, fled from Shaka to Mozambique and over time 
subjugated the local population to form the Gaza empire. As with the Vhavenda, the group 
that came to be known as the Shangaans emerged over time from a diversity of different clans 
and groupings. Following the decline of Zulu power after the battle of Blood River in 183817, 
Soshangane reoccupied the lower Limpopo, forcing the movement of other inhabitants along 
the Olifants and Limpopo-Levubu Rivers (Harries, 1989). Patriarch Nkukwana, Chief Shimange’s 
father, arrived in the area that came to be known as Syferfontein (now Shimange) in the mid-
1840s, and Shimange was born in 1850 (Northplan, 2004:3). Another wave of immigrants from 
Mozambique entered present-day Limpopo following the Gaza civil war in 1858-62 (Harries, 
1989:83). These were the forerunners of what came to be known as the Tsonga-Shangaan. 
Their main area of settlement was the south-east edge of Limpopo, spilling into the 
neighbouring Mpumalanga to the east, but they also spread into the Spelonken to the south of 
the Soutpansberg, the research site for this thesis. Joao Albasini, a Portuguese national who 
moved from Mozambique and settled in the southern foothills of the Soutpansberg in 1859, 
was recognised by both the nascent white state and black inhabitants as a chief. He gave 
asylum to large numbers of Venda refugees from north of the Levubu River as well as Tsonga-
speakers both from the coast and from other local chiefdoms. By the 1860s four semi-
independent clusters of East Coast refugees existed in the Transvaal area (Harries, 1989:84). 
Albasini’s leadership was eventually challenged and the Tsonga chief Njhakanjhaka was able to 
reclaim the chieftaincy a few years after Albasini’s death.18 Njhakanjhaka’s descendants are 
the present-day tribal authorities ruling over Elim. 
 
At this time the Vhavenda polity was loose, and the precursors to the Tsonga-Shangaan polity 
were still semi-independent groupings. The different groups mixed freely. Chiefs did not rule 
by exclusion but by inclusion. Accordingly, lived space was characterised by a relative freedom 
of movement: inhabitants were not tied to a particular ruler, but were free to move if they 
were dissatisfied with the leaders. This produced at least some degree of accountability in 
everyday practice. Thus, even if a group arrived from somewhere else completely, the chief 
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 Where the Voortrekkers under the leadership of Andries Pretorius defeated the Zulus, leading to the 
Zulu King Dingane’s final defeat in 1840 
18
 Hosi Tsakani Njhakanjhaka Mukhari ‘Claim for the Restoration of the Kingdom and the Kingship of the 
Magwamba’, unpublished and undated document, p.12-13 
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would incorporate them into his chiefdom as long as they were prepared to pay tribute in 
labour and goods (Harries, 1989:83). 
 
“If the chief gave you a portion of land, during the rainy season or the summer 
season, during the time of planting, all the people gathered and went to plough 
the land of the chief so that the chief could have mielies. That was the way of 
paying the chief, so there would be enough food in the chief’s house.”19 
 
According to Vhavenda oral history, the Tsonga-Shangaans and other clans and groups paid 
tribute to the Venda King and were allowed to stay in Venda, though “they did not have the 
right to the soil.”20 
 
So in the second half of the 19th century the area was settled in a patchwork of different 
groups, with most households and clans pledging allegiance to one or other regional chief. 
Whites had a small presence in the area. Nonetheless, some tensions did emerge at times, 
both within the larger groupings and between them. Around 1865 the Venda paramount 
Ramabulana sent his brothers out from his Soutpansberg stronghold into the surrounding land 
to prevent the expansion of white occupation. This included Nthabalala, who was a brother of 
the paramount, and whose kraal was situated at a place they named Vari, on present-day 
Ballymore farm just north-east of present-day Vleifontein township. The Nthabalala royal 
family claimed they occupied an area that incorporated some of the farms in the research site 
(Figure 6) between 1865 and 1935, when they were forcibly removed to present-day 
Nthabalala.21 Munzhedzi (whose real name is Rambau) was a commander under Nthabalala 
whose kraal was located at present-day Munzhedzi.22 According to David Baloyi, a Shangaan 
whose ancestors settled at present-day Mavungeni, “*My family] came with Joao Albasini. So 
they came here looking for grazing and water, and they occupied this land here. It was no-
man’s land by then.”23 Although the Vhavenda chiefs may have claimed authority over the 
area, they did not necessarily have an immediate presence in all parts of the land they claimed. 
 
                                                          
19 Interview, David Naiedzani Nthabalala, 9 November 2009. Theoretically, the motivation was that the 
chief should always have enough food at their house so that if visitors arrived there would be something 
for them to eat. “The chief’s house was known as the home for all people” (Informal discussion, Thomas 
Mokgalapa and Simon Rambau, 13 November 2009). 
20
 ‘Who are the Vendas/Vhavenda/Bavenda’, document annexed to Nthabalala community land claim, 7 
February 1995, author unknown 
21
 Nthabalala Local Council, ‘Claiming 24 farms in Northern Transvaal on Region G settlement situated at 
Soutpansberg District by Nthabalala royal family’, letter sent to District Director, Tshitale District, 
Department of Land Tenure and Local Government, 7 February 1995 
22
 Interview, Peter Makhubela, Solomon Thovha and Chief Nthabalala, 11 June 2009 
23
 Interview, David Baloyi, 2 June 2009 
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Figure 6: Extent of Nthabalala restitution claim 
 
In 1867 growing tensions with the Boers led the Vhavenda under the leadership of Makhado to 
attack and defeat the Boers at Schoemansdal, which they burnt to the ground. The Boers 
retreated to Pietersburg (Nemudzivhadi, 1985:21) and the Afrikaner Transvaal state had no 
real presence in the area for the next three decades, although it still considered the area to be 
within its territorial jurisdiction. There were also episodic clashes between the Vhavenda and 
the groupings that came to be the Tsonga-Shangaan. According to Stayt (1968:19), the Tsonga 
continually harried the Vhavenda, and under Albasini were “a continual source of trouble and 
acted as a convenient buffer between the BaVenda and the Transvaal Republic.” The 
Magwamba (as the Tsonga-Shangaan groupings in the area were known for a time) fought the 
Venda for land, most notably in a battle that lasted from 1864 to 1888.24 On a more local scale, 
a group led by the Shangaan Chief Ribungwani displaced Nthabalala from a portion of the land 
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 Hosi Tsakani Njhakanjhaka Mukhari, ‘Claim for the restoration of the kingdom and kingship of the 
Magwamba’, (incomplete draft), p.6 
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and settled in an area they named Vudyodyodyo25, incorporating present-day Shimange and 
Uitschot and areas east of Shimange.26 
 
From 1872 the Berlin Mission (for the Vhavenda) and the Swiss Mission (for the Shangaan 
groupings) entered into the area. The Swiss missionaries arrived in 1873 and located 
themselves south of the Levubu so as not to compete with the German missionaries to the 
north and far south. In 1879 the Swiss Mission started the Elim Mission Station in the area that 
became Elim, 7km or so north-east of the research site. In Chief Njhakanjhaka’s assessment, 
the missionaries played an important role in disintegrating the chieftaincies: “Since their arrival 
there has never been peace and stability in the Njhakanjhaka’s Kingdom as they influenced 
Chiefs to have their Chiefdom… Large number of land (sic) belonging to Njhakanjhaka was 
declared farms and divided amongst Whites.”27 Although the missionaries sought to protect 
the interests of the indigenous population, this was in the context of private property, the rule 
of colonial law and wage labour. They played a key role both in introducing these concepts and 
in their practical application in the area, including securing large amounts of land that became 
private property. In 1898 the government of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) returned to 
the area and defeated Mphephu Ramabulana, the Vhavenda paramount at the time, drove 
him across the Limpopo River, and subjugated the Vhavenda. They were subsequently brought 
under the administrative control of the Union of South Africa in 1910. 
4.3 Space and authority, property and land use before the whites 
The conception of the relationship between people and the land, and the spatial practices that 
flowed from this, were significantly different prior to the arrival of whites into the area. Land 
restoration became a highly emotive issue precisely because the historical connection 
between inhabitants and the land was so tight. It was conceived as an organic connection that 
bound people to particular territories. Lived space integrated inhabitants with the land, and 
meaning was attached to place in ways that influenced life on a day to day level. The ancestors 
were represented as being present in the land, a benign force protecting and nurturing the 
land’s rightful inhabitants: 
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 The name is literally translated into “the hen killed by fat”, which is a way of saying the land was very 
fertile: “If you killed a chicken *that was raised there+ and started frying, you don’t have to add oil. You 
will find it is full of fat and instead you will just remove”  (interview, Rosemary Tiba Baloyi, 27 August 
2009; Eric Tshabalala, 29 August 2009)  
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 Interview, Mackson Musisinyani Mavunda, 23 August 2009 
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 Hosi Tsakani Njhakanjhaka Mukhari ‘Claim for the Restoration of the Kingdom and the Kingship of the 
Magwamba’, unpublished and undated document, p.16 
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“There is a certain poem which each person is reciting. Mostly when you are a 
Baloyi you recite it like this, when you are a Maluleke you say it like this, when 
you are a Chauke you say it like this. So when we are reciting that poem, to 
mention everything which happened to our people, my own people…They say the 
Baloyis are like the ape, the monkey. So whenever we see an ape, it’s our 
grandfather. We Baloyis, only. Some, when they see a wolf, it’s their granny. And 
then some, when they see an elephant, it is their grandfather. All these animals, 
but for us, the ape. That’s why here when we try to plough something or plant 
anything, we never saw an ape coming to destroy. I don’t know if it can start, but I 
have ploughed more than four years here, it will never step in my field, because 
it’s my grandmother.”28 
 
Most people interviewed during the research were not yet born in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. Although historical knowledge was passed down orally, this tended to be 
held by individuals rather than widespread. Therefore memories of the way land was used and 
occupied before the arrival of whites was very thin. Two of the oldest people I spoke to were 
Mr Elias Zifa Khosa and Ms Mhlaba Khosa, born respectively in 1909 and 1919 and who grew 
up on a farm on the eastern border of Syferfontein. According to them there was no land-
allocating authority at the time. Plots were not allocated and each household farmed as much 
as they wanted or were able to farm. They rotated their production in cycles of 2-3 years to 
allow the land to regenerate.29 Lived space was characterised by a relative freedom of 
movement, and ability to make decisions about what, where and when to plant – within the 
constraints of a harsh environment and the need for survival. 
 
Whether or not a land-allocating authority existed was probably locally-specific. According to 
the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905 (SANAC) (1905:22), “garden lots are 
apportioned by the Native Chiefs and the people enjoy common rights in regard to water, 
wood and grazing.” However, this referred specifically to areas the white state had identified 
as native locations at that time. The Khosas were born onto land that was already held under 
title by whites. Land access was not an issue in the pre-colonial era: “*Before the whites, the 
land was] very big, very big! You can move from here [Nthabalala] until Vleifontein and Elim. If 
you release the cattle today to graze that side, they will come tomorrow. The cattle would 
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 Interview, Rosemary Baloyi Tiba, 27 August 2009 
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 Interview, Elias Zifa Khosa and Mhlaba Khosa, 9 June 2009 
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graze until they know they are returning back here.”30 Homesteads were scattered around the 
farms, with some distance between them.31 
 
“During that time the place was not congested like now, where the yards are so 
small. You would find people were living in large numbers in the very same house, 
where there is a large portion of land where they are able to feed their animals, 
livestock. Then they will also be able to cultivate on that land… That changed 
during the settlement of the whites, and we were forcibly removed to the 
reserves and we did not have enough space to do those things.”32 
 
Solomon Thovha at the Nthabalala tribal authority, who was aghast at the density of 
settlement found at Munzhedzi and on other farms, offered a sense of the extent of pre-
colonial land: 
 
“Stands destroy the land. If I can cut stands for 40 in an area of 1,700 ha, it’s too 
small! Because they must still do the boreholes, whatever… You will destroy it 
completely. Even if I can cut stands for only 10 people…”33 
 
Figure 7 shows the spread out character of historical settlement patterns at Mavungeni and 
Shimange. “One family was staying down there, one up there, one up there, you see. They 
were doing some agriculture, having some farming, some cattle, which were growing up here, 
grazing on all this land.”34 The culture was of mutual help: 
 
“When this ploughing time has come, you did not only plough your field. The 
other families have to bring their cattle to come and plough on one day. Today we 
plough your fields, tomorrow we plough his fields, that other day we plough his 
family’s fields.”35 
 
The chieftaincy occupied a central role in unifying the cultural and social life of those under 
their control. For example, inhabitants of neighbouring areas all converged on Munzhedzi’s 
kraal for circumcisions or to do the dhomba dance, a traditional Venda dance that could only 
be performed at the chief’s kraal.36 Exclusive control over these activities functioned both to 
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 Interview, Solomon Thovha, 1 October 2009 
31 Interviews, Zille Leshabane, 10 November 2009; Samuel Rambau, Violet Rambau, Elisah Madima, 9 
November 2009 
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 Interview, David Naiedzani Nthabalala, 9 November 2009 
33
 Interview, Solomon Thovha, 1 October 2009 
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 Interview, David Baloyi, 2 June 2009 
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 Interview, Sam Shirinda, 16 November 2008 
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 Munzhedzi tribal gathering, 28 October 2008; interview Simon Rambau and John Paswane, 24 
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unify the cultural life of those under the chief’s control and simultaneously entrenched the 
authority of the chief over such activities. 
 
The chief’s kraal became the centre of ‘the community’ not only from the point of view of 
social space, but also geographically. The location of the chief’s kraal moved when a chief died 
and a new chief was inaugurated, which meant the geographical space shifted over time in 
relation to the chief’s kraal at its centre: 
 
“During the reign of chief Ntwalima, they *Nthabalala] were settling near 
Bandelierkop, that side… When the chief passed away they changed the place and 
moved to another place. In the Venda tradition, when a chief has passed away, 
they changed the place where they were settling. When they moved from 
Dzanani side, they resettled around here at this mountain called Muvari, during 
the time of Nthabalala himself, who was the second chief.”37 
 
The chiefs also marshalled the physical space. Boundaries between homesteads and territories 
were not precisely defined and the chiefs resolved disputes as and when they arose: 
 
“During that time there was no exact boundary. The boundary started to be there 
during the allocation of stands, when people started to settle in and say this is 
mine. Because during that time there were only few houses, you find there is a 
house here, there is another house that side. Then we say, ok, we’ll rule until that 
place. There were no exact boundaries… There were no conflicts because the 
chief would be the one to come and resolve those issues, if there were problems 
with the boundaries. The chief will come and say ok, you as the headman of 
Maila, you rule up to this place, you as a headman of Munzhedzi, you will rule up 
until this place. So it was simply resolved by the chief, that issue of boundaries.”38 
 
“There were no boundaries at all. Boundaries came into place when the whites 
settled here, because they started to form their own boundaries and say this will 
be my farm. Then we started to use the land up to the area where there’s a fence 
of a white farmer.”39 
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Figure 7: Historical points of interest 
(Key on following page) 
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Key to Figure 7: Historical points of interest 
 
(Dots represent known homesteads) 
1 Old farm houses, Shimange 
2 Efrata former location 
3 Efrata location after 1930 
4 Cattle dip ruins 
5 Shimange grave site 
6 Efrata school garden 
7 Dairy ruins 
8 Silage storage ruins 
9 Anglo-Boer graves 
10 Old farm houses, Mavungeni restitution 
12 Old farm houses, Mavungeni redistribution/Lovedale Park 
13 Chief’s kraal, Munzhedzi 
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4.4 White encroachment and the restructuring of space and power 
4.4.1 The construction of commercial farms 
The process of land alienation in the Soutpansberg district, and the construction of private 
property rights, was gradual, and not without resistance from the African inhabitants of the 
land. This resistance contributed to shaping the outcomes of the struggle to create private 
property under white ownership, although the violence and damage wreaked by colonisation 
cannot be underestimated. In 188640 the white state established ‘occupation farms’ to create a 
security buffer between the areas already settled by whites and the still relatively independent 
African chieftaincies (Mulaudzi, 2000:53). The area once known as the Klein Spelonken, 
including the farms in the research site, was part of this.41 Vleyfontein, Diepgezet and 
Zwartfontein (i.e. Mavungeni and Munzhedzi) were surveyed and registered in 1894, and 
Syferfontein and Uitschot (i.e. Shimange) in 189942. The occupation farms were given to white 
men on condition that they occupied the farms and sought to use them beneficially. Africans 
disagreed with this and “generally speaking, *they+ continued to live on private property 
without recognising the authority of their new landlords or the property relations that private 
property implied” (Mulaudzi, 2000:65). In 1907 an Act was passed allowing for the conversion 
of occupation into freehold title (Crown Land (Zoutpansberg) Commission, 1908:10). On paper 
legal ownership of land had changed, but it took longer for social relationships to follow suit. 
This was true for Limpopo as a whole (Levin, 1996). 
 
According to Frederick Newnham (1908:16), who worked in the Native Affairs Department in 
the early 1900s, “the great Bavenda and Tshangaan chiefs had partitioned the country 
between themselves and, until the less generous areas to which the number of their people 
entitled them were specifically defined [by the white state], they spread themselves at will and 
the whole extent was barred to the white colonist.” In short, he was calling for land enclosure 
and the containment of Africans on smaller pieces of land to make room for white colonists. 
This path was pursued, first through legal dispossession. Initially, this was only at the level of 
representation, and had little impact on lived space, but was backed up by force where this 
was deemed necessary and where it was possible. Once the land was enclosed, even if only in 
law to start with, the inhabitants were increasingly brought under the control of the legal 
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 Undated and untitled map of original farm boundaries, provided by Charles Leach 
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owners, whether private individuals or the state. This imposed structure of authority and 
control began to have a direct effect on lived space, constraining inhabitants from using the 
land and moving around as they historically had. The white state faced chronic resistance to 
the beaconing off of land: “It was no easy task, for the evidence was often conflicting and the 
Natives were not always amenable to reason; sometimes they refused to allow a census of 
their families to be taken, sometimes they objected to the presence of unpopular officials…the 
delay interfered with the [white] settlement of the country” (Newnham, 1908:15). 
 
Following the military defeat of the Venda in 1898, clans and chieftaincies were required to 
pay tribute to the British crown and later to the ZAR. There was some acceptance of this since 
the payment of tribute was also a tradition amongst Africans. However some clans and 
chieftaincies resisted the payment of taxes to the ZAR, seeing this as an acknowledgement of 
the ZAR as opposed to the British crown (Mulaudzi, 2000:46). Laws were passed requiring all 
Africans living on state or private land (i.e. all land that was not part of a proclaimed reserve 
ruled by the chiefs) to pay some kind of rent to the landowner. In 1904 the state claimed 
ownership over all unsurveyed land with the purpose of replicating tenant-landlord 
relationships found on privately-owned land. Hut tax, poll tax and straight rentals gradually 
became the norm. Africans outside the locations found themselves converted into tenants – 
and later ‘squatters’ - on land controlled by a white landlord. For a time Africans still lived on 
the land largely as they previously had, and retained their own conceptions of their 
relationship to the land. It took time for lived space to be affected by these representations of 
space. Whites may have thought they had secured the space as ‘private property’, but that’s 
not the way the black inhabitants of the land saw it. They saw the white ‘owners’ as just other 
people who had found a way to settle on the land, but who at some stage began aggressively 
asserting themselves and their exclusive claim to the land. Unfortunately for the indigenous 
inhabitants, this aggression was backed up by the state with its monopoly on legitimate 
violence, and its agenda of expanding abstract space both through consolidating and extending 
private ownership and the commodification of space, and extending its own political 
domination. 
 
SANAC (1905:23) found that “as with those on private farms, Natives on Crown lands have free 
water and grazing rights, and have not in the past been restricted as to the extent of garden 
lands they cultivate.” Identifying rights as “free” and referring to lack of restrictions “in the 
past” indicated plans to commodify access to water and grazing, and to begin to limit access to 
land. However, the state’s decision to impose rentals could also be read as an inability to 
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impose territorial segregation and wholesale removal of Africans into designated locations or 
their conversion into labourers (Mulaudzi, 2000:208). Some Africans responded to the 
enclosure of the land by opting to buy back the land: “Many Natives had formerly dwelt there, 
and in obedience to that instinct which urges them to cling to their ancestral homes they 
adopted the only method open to them and proceeded to buy back, when possible, the land of 
which they had been deprived” (Newnham, 1908:3). 
 
This response indicates the extent to which the commodification of land was becoming a 
reality. However, African land purchase did not confer rights equivalent to those of whites. 
They were restricted in the areas they could buy land; individual tenure was limited to 5-10 
acres, compared with the ‘burgher right’ that entitled each white man to two farms of 6,000 
acres each; registration of the land was in the name of the state (Newnham, 1908:6); and 
alienation or transfer of land was not allowed without the sanction of the government (South 
African Native Affairs Commission, 1905:29). So even in the days before the Land Act, private 
property had a fundamental racial bias in its very conception. Those who were unable or 
unwilling to buy the land back were converted into squatters targeted for removal or tighter 
regulation. According to SANAC (1905:32&35) “the unrestrained squatting of Natives on 
private farms, whether as tenants or otherwise, is an evil” and “it will be far more difficult to 
preserve the absolutely necessary political and social distinctions if the growth of a mixed rural 
population of land-owners is not discouraged.” Various squatter laws sought to reduce the 
number of Africans permitted on white land, although the state was not always able to enforce 
these laws because for many white farmers rents were their largest source of income 
(Mulaudzi, 2000:231). 
 
The 1913 Land Act sought to eliminate rental tenancy and to replace it with labour tenancy as 
the only way that Africans could remain on what was defined as white-owned land (Mulaudzi, 
2000:217). Later the 1936 Natives Land and Trust Act proposed changes to labour tenancy to 
strengthen the power of white landowners and extended the service period for tenants 
(Mulaudzi, 2000:219). As white settlement expanded and commercial agriculture gradually 
took hold, land owners became more interested in transforming rent farms into labour farms 
(Mulaudzi, 2000:243). The only way farmers could get labour for their farms was to constrict 
access to land, and labour tenancy served both to force African inhabitants to work for white 
landowners for nothing, and to restrict the numbers of livestock tenants could have, and to 
restrict their access to land for cultivation to ever-smaller portions. Determining the specifics 
of these restrictions was part of the power conferred on owners through private property. 
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Labour tenancy was not a completely new concept, and a form of it preceded white 
encroachment on the land, as indicated above where commoners provided labour to the chief. 
By the 1930s labour tenancy had emerged as the dominant labour form on white farms in the 
Zoutpansberg (Mulaudzi, 2000:249). It was with the materialisation of labour tenancy in spatial 
practice that lived space for black inhabitants really was altered. They were forced to react to 
dominant representations of space in ways that changed how they lived on the land on a daily 
basis. 
 
“We were having some, not ground, because it was called state land, this one. One 
family was staying down there, one up there, one up there, you see. They were 
doing some agriculture, having some farming, some cattle, which were growing up 
here, grazing on all this land. The only thing is some people were coming to hire this 
farm, staying up there in that house, you see that old house there. They used 
people, our mothers and fathers, to go and work in the farm, without anything. So 
they worked in the farm, when they see they have enough, they go back.”43 
 
Labour tenancy had the contradictory effect of both alienating Africans from the land and of 
tethering them to the land in a subordinate position. 
 
“Some boers came to buy that farm [Syferfontein+… They were not handling our 
people properly. They said children must not go to school, they must come and 
work at this farm. There was poultry and pigs here. So they wanted people just to 
come and work for nothing. So our people refused and said no, we cannot go! 
After all, that farm is ours, it is our grandmother’s farm… [The white farmer] said, 
if you don’t want to come and work, you all go. So they were chased.”44 
 
“*My father] was a teacher. He used to hire somebody to work for him because 
every year he had to work, I don’t know what it was, for 3 months a year. So he 
hired somebody to work for him. But thereafter I am sure I don’t know when it 
was they refused, they said he must leave teaching and come and work, physical, 
on the farm… So he said he can’t leave teaching and come and work. So they gave 
him trek pas. He went as far as Pretoria, because when he arrived there…they 
refused to give him a stand. They said, if you are from the farm, you must go to 
the farm.”45 
 
Labour tenancy cemented the subordinate relationship of African women to the land. African 
women were treated as minors under the authority of their father or husband (South African 
Native Affairs Commission, 1905:9). Women and children were not individually contracted, but 
were subsumed in the labour tenancy agreement (Mulaudzi, 2000:252). When men were given 
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a trek pas, the women who were part of his household also had to move with him. They had 
no independent access to land that was becoming private property. The lived space 
experienced by black women was subordinated to the movement of their male relations. 
 
A key aspect of labour tenancy was that, apart from imposing the requirement that tenants 
worked for the land owner for a period, it also limited the amount of land tenants could access 
for cropping and grazing. The amount varied according to the amount of land the owner had 
and the owners’ own land and labour needs (Mulaudzi, 2000:252). In some cases, land was not 
unduly limited and tenants indicated that their access was limited only by their ability to utilise 
land. According to Elias and Mhlaba Khosa, they had livestock (cattle, goats and pigs) and 
everyone had enough land to use until 1968 when they were forcibly removed. In all the time 
they lived there, they never moved off the farm.46 Access to labour became an important 
variable in determining the extent of available land. Household labour, especially of women, 
became critical to maintaining access to land (Mulaudzi, 2000:255). However, over time access 
to land became more limited, and was constrained to a hectare or so immediately around the 
homestead and some grazing land but with strict limits on the number of livestock that could 
be kept on the farms.47 These, combined with labour requirements, led many inhabitants to 
leave the farms. White owners also used the labour tenancy laws to forcibly move inhabitants 
from the farms. By the 1970s, there were very few African inhabitants on the farms apart from 
a few farm workers and their families. 
 
The state’s desire to assert a representation of space that consisted of white settlement and 
production with subordinated black inhabitants (invisible to the greatest extent possible), was 
materialised in spatial practice through the provision of extensive support over a long period 
of time to assist whites to use the land productively. The early settlers farmed on a small scale, 
mainly for household consumption. The state sought to provide support to settlers who could 
do commercial farming, and bailed them out on many occasions over decades to ensure first 
that they stayed on the land and second that they were able to start producing surpluses. 
Ultimately, however, the occupation farms were not primarily intended for agricultural 
development but for military purposes, in particular as a buffer between the white settlers and 
the relatively independent chieftaincies (Mulaudzi, 2000). However, in some places, 
commercial agriculture did take root as a result of state investment. That is, resources were 
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directed towards the materialisation of the dominant representations of space, with the 
Levubu irrigation scheme being a key example in the region (Fraser, 2006, Hellum and Derman, 
2006). Even though the primary purpose of Vleyfontein and the neighbouring farms was as a 
buffer zone, pockets of commercial agriculture took root as a result of broader state 
investment in the agricultural economy. At Vleyfontein: 
 
“The so called ko-operasie, the co-operatives, were here all the time. If these 
whites came here, they went to the co-op at Louis Trichardt, they got some fences 
to fence the area, they got some pipes free. I don’t know how they paid it back, 
they got some manure, they got everything to come and farm here.”48 
 
To reiterate, then, the construction of private property was a slow process and highly 
contested. Even though whites occupied the land, began farming and gradually subordinated 
the African inhabitants to the system of private property and capitalist production, Africans 
retained a different conception of the land, different representations of the space. But their 
resistance was gradually whittled away through the combined pressure of laws, physical force 
and economic compulsion, forcing changes in the lived space. A cadastral grid was placed on 
top of indigenous systems of tenure and land use that were based on an abundance of land.  
This grid became the framework for controlling the African population and developing 
capitalist relations of production on the land. Unsurveyed land was brought under the control 
of the state, then surveyed and parcelled out to white men on condition that they occupied 
the land. Occupation eventually turned into ownership. Ownership gave rights to collect rents 
from African inhabitants on the farms, converting Africans into tenants. Early attempts to 
restrict the number of Africans on white private property failed. This was an outcome of the 
inability of the state to enforce laws, benefits white occupiers got from rents, and African 
resistance to removal and changing conceptions of the land.  
 
White occupiers were then given extensive state support to stay on the land and gradually to 
be able to start producing agricultural goods for sale on the market. As the capitalist economy 
grew, access to wage labour became more important both on the farms and off. To regulate 
the flow of labour, white owners of private property were granted powers to demand free 
labour from African tenants and to issue passes for Africans to work off the farm for a time. 
Amongst those who chose to use this tool were those who met resistance with physical 
violence, including the burning of houses.49 Many African inhabitants chose to leave rather 
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than submit to labour tenant requirements. However, links to the land as home, as a place 
where ancestors remained spiritually present, as a material resource unjustly and violently 
taken, and as a connection to systems of social organisation, stayed with African inhabitants. 
Past lived spaces lingered on in memory if not in practice. The explicit reduction of rights and 
forced imposition of labour tenant arrangements signified a defining point in memories of 
dispossession, which in turn shaped future restitution claims. This illustrates how 
representations of space and their materialisation in spatial practice converged with lived 
spaces. 
 
The establishment of firm boundaries was not necessarily totally ignorant of the social context, 
but over time these boundaries became fixed and unable to adapt readily to changing social 
dynamics. Through restitution after 1994, farms were transferred with boundaries that were 
created in the 1890s, with various subdivisions along the way. These boundaries were 
produced in the particular social context of white occupation and generated large farms that 
could ensure all land was covered by a white landlord (whether productively used or not, 
whether the owned by state or private individual or company). A key purpose of this was to 
create and maintain buffer zones between white and black. The original boundaries, 
transferred more or less intact through restitution, were not constructed in the interests of 
black inhabitants. 
 
Ownership of land conferred the right to produce what the owner wanted, the right to control 
inhabitants on farms, and ultimately the right to secure the labour of those the owner found 
on the land. In the heyday of apartheid, in the 1960s and 1970s, the proxy authority of white 
land owners was almost absolute on the parcels of land under their control. They could decide 
the fate of those living on their land on a whim. When coupled with an ideology of white 
supremacy, lived space could be almost intolerable for Africans who remained on the farms: 
 
“In 1967 there was a certain white person here called Schoeman. This guy was 
very ruthless towards blacks. My own mother, my own uncles, they were working 
here, and with very little money, sometimes they worked without not even getting 
a cent from the master. Because you’re working five days, two days they say you 
are paying because you are residing here in the farm. So in 1967 my uncle refused 
to come and work here and went to Pretoria without notifying the master. And Mr 
Schoeman became very angry, extremely angry. He was having a motorbike, riding 
around here. So he came to our home, and he wanted to see the uncle. And my 
grandfather said, no, the uncle’s not here. He’s gone to Johannesburg, to Pretoria. 
He became very angry. And we were given trekpas. Trekpas, we were given 72 
hours to pack and go from this farm. And we spent the first day, our parents did 
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not have money, because we should go and hire a truck to come and collect our 
goods. And we have to go and look for a place. So first two days, they were still 
looking for a place. They went to Riverplaats, they never got a place. They went to 
the next village called Mbokota, we got a place there. So during the third day, the 
truck came to carry our goods. And then during the fourth day the truck came 
again to carry part of the goods. On the fifth day we were still there. This man 
came, and he burnt the houses, those huts. They were burned down. He fired a 
gun that he does not want to see us there. That night we never slept because 
everything was burnt down. We slept with our brother, to one of our uncles. And 
then we were forcefully removed. Some of our animals, like cattle, we came there 
after, just to come and collect it, during the night. And he had instructed one of his 
supervisors that he did not want to see any member of that family here. That was 
1967. It was terrible. It was extremely terrible and miserable to see my own 
grandmother, who was sick that time, trying to stand, staggering, trying to move, 
help wherever possible. But the guy, the white man said ‘no, no, no, you have to 
move, we don’t care.’ We tried to explain the condition of our grandmother: ‘that 
is none of my business. I am giving you 72 hours. You have to fokof here. You are 
no longer needed.’”50 
 
But even these rights to dictate terms of tenancy – which secured white domination down to 
the lowest level - were not absolute. They were regulated by the state, which was able to use 
its overarching authority to restructure spaces as it saw fit. For example, it could expropriate 
land in the ‘public interest,’ and on occasion there was contestation between white 
landowners and the apartheid state over expropriation. White landowners were not against 
homeland formation as such, but did not always agree with the state on which farms should be 
expropriated and where people should be removed to – especially when they had a direct 
material interest in it. This indicated differences within the dominant representations of space, 
reinforcing the idea that the hegemonic bloc was by no means unified in all respects. The 
forced removal of the Vhavenda from Tshikota to Vleifontein is a case in point. According to 
Arthur Henning, who owned Vleyfontein farm which was targeted for state expropriation to 
expand the Venda homeland: 
 
“We flew down, my brothers and myself, to see [Ferdie] Hartzenburg [a Minister in 
the National Party at the time]. We had a lawyer, a bloke called Jackie Kruger, he 
was in the Broederbond [the Afrikaner ‘cultural’ organisation that had control over 
the National Party]. So we had to take him along to open some doors for us, and 
we went to see Hartzenburg… We said look here, this is silly having a township 
here. Why don’t you make it halfway to town, if you want to get them out of 
town? And he said, no, no, it was far too close to town. I said there’s a tarred road, 
you could ride it with a bicycle if you wanted to. We were suggesting Ballymore. 
There’s that big river running through Ballymore and there’s any amount of 
space.”51 
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But his pleas were unsuccessful because the big picture for the state was homeland 
consolidation, not spatial efficiency. The state materialised its representations by expropriating 
all the farms in the research site for the purposes of connecting two fragments of the Venda 
homeland into a contiguous unit, with Vleifontein established as a new settlement. In doing so, 
the state altered the conceptions of the space from private property to state owned property 
with the objective of reintroducing indigenous tenure on the farms under traditional authority. 
The forced removals and relocation of blacks and expropriations of land from whites indicate 
the extent to which the state played an active and leading role in structuring the production of 
space. Although the outcomes were not always as planned, the state’s plans and translation of 
these plans into reality – the materialisation of these representations in spatial practice - had a 
material impact on the production of space. The settlement of the Vhavenda from Tshikota to 
Vleyfontein farm fundamentally altered the space of the area, over time resulting in the partial 
urbanisation of the space which was to have major implications for land reform efforts in the 
post-1994 era. 
4.4.2 Constructing African ‘locations’ and the subordination of traditional authority 
Alongside the construction of spaces of private property under the authority of whites was the 
creation of native ‘locations’ where indigenous inhabitants who were not needed on the farms 
could be relocated, under the authority of the chiefs. Both the space of the locations and the 
authority of the chiefs were to be subordinated to the overarching control of the nascent 
capitalist state. As early as 1858 the Volksraad (the Boer ruling council) passed a resolution 
laying down that “all land assigned to Chiefs is granted them for perpetual use, but not as their 
property”, which was vested in the state (Newnham, 1908:10). Gradually, and not without the 
use of force, private land was closed off to Africans and locations were set aside for their 
settlement and use. According to Newnham (1908:6): 
 
“While the land was being quickly beaconed off into farms it became evident that 
trouble would eventually arise unless provision was made for the Native tribes 
found in occupation… The Natives were first on the ground and what would in 
these days be called their ‘vested rights’ were entitled to some measure of 
consideration.” 
 
Despite the state’s attempts to structure the space, by the end of the century, “out of the 
320,000 Natives residing in the northern district a large number were living in haphazard 
fashion, some on Crown [state+ land, some on private, some paying rent and some not…” 
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(Newnham, 1908:16) The space was fragmented, and the apartheid system had as one of its 
key objectives the rationalisation of these fragmented spaces into two entirely separate 
spaces, with white private property on the one side and a contained form of black indigenous 
tenure on the other. This was the rationale of the policies of forced removals and black spot 
removals, the latter which were attempts to eliminate patches of black privately-owned land 
from the zones of white private property. Lived spaces were entirely destabilised through 
forced removals and the social fabric was ripped apart. New spaces of everyday life necessarily 
re-emerged over time wherever people found themselves, but these lacked the social 
coherence and freedom of movement of historical lived spaces. 
 
Early on, the locations were represented as spaces for the reproduction of labour, rather than 
productive zones in their own right: 
 
“The reasonable idea of the object and extent of a location is that a Native should 
possess a place where he can build his hut and raise enough produce to support 
his family so that he can leave his people in safety while he goes out to earn 
money – on the farms, in the towns or on the mines and other works – to supply 
his other wants and luxuries and to meet the taxes due from him to the 
Government for protection” (Newnham, 1908:20). 
 
The general processes of settlement and production across the country, described in Chapter 
3, were applicable to the locations surrounding the research site too. The ‘betterment’ 
programme was applied in the area, i.e. dispersed settlement was eradicated and inhabitants 
were brought together into dense rural settlements with a spatial separation of land for 
settlement and for production. Restitution reintroduced these spatial arrangements into the 
mix on the transferred farms, which is part of the story told in the following chapters. 
 
The chiefs were granted authority over the locations, and were more or less permitted to 
continue practising land governance in the same way they had in the past, on condition that 
the “existing Native laws and customs *were+ not repugnant to the general principles of 
civilisation.” However, in 1885 they were stripped of some of their authority, which was placed 
in the hands of state-appointed officers, and the “President of the ZAR was made Paramount 
Chief of all Natives in the Republic” (South African Native Affairs Commission, 1905:7). Chiefly 
authority was ossified and subordinated to the overarching authority of the white state. It was 
possible to make such interventions only because of the physical subjugation of Africans 
through force. This was the first direct regulation of structures of indigenous authority by the 
white state. 
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The systems of governance and authority that had emerged historically, however, were based 
on abundance of land. They could not work in the same way in the context of land scarcity, 
which the creation of the locations imposed on these systems. The extent of the locations was 
based on 5-10 English acres per family (Newnham, 1908:5), far less than African inhabitants 
historically had access to. So on the one hand, the white state removed some of the authority 
of the chiefs, and on the other they diminished the extent of land under their authority. This 
could not fail to reduce their overall standing, and they became more pliable in the hands of 
the white state. Inhabitants encountered new constraints in their lived space, as they were no 
longer able to move from one chief to another with the relative ease they had in the pre-
colonial era. This was a core mechanism for accountability in indigenous tenure systems 
(Claassens, 2008b, Delius, 2008), and its weakening gave traditional leaders greater authority 
over inhabitants and undermined accountability.  
 
The chieftaincy remained an important institution of control, but it was manipulated in the 
interests of white power, as indicated in chapter 3. According to SANAC (1905:42&44): 
 
“Many of the existing Native laws and customs are so interwoven with the social 
conditions and ordinary institutions of the Native population that any premature 
attempt to break them down or sweep them away would be inadvisable… The 
Chiefs continue to be recognised as a means of government of the Native races as 
it has not in general been desirable to dispense with them, but their 
jurisdiction…has been, and is being, gradually transferred to European Magistrates 
and Commissioners.” 
 
In 1962 the Venda Territorial Authority was established and Nthabalala constituted as a local 
council under it. The Mashangana Territorial Authority was also created to the north and east 
of the research site (Figure 8). In 1972 the Mashangana Territorial Authority came to be known 
as Gazankulu. In 1973 Venda was declared a ‘self-governing’ homeland, and was granted 
‘independence’ in 1979. However, the homelands were never fully integrated into 
consolidated national units in accordance with the apartheid vision. All the farms in the 
research site (Vleyfontein, Diepgezet, Zwartfontein and Syferfontein) were expropriated by the 
state in the late 1970s and early 1980s and were earmarked for transfer to the Venda 
homeland. This happened in 1986. Vleifontein township was established. The door was 
opened for Nthabalala to reclaim the land under the Venda government,52 but the claim was 
never settled.  By the end of apartheid, the area remained a patchwork of small and large 
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settlements of Venda, Shangaan and Sesotho on fragmented pieces of land that were 
ostensibly part of one homeland or the other. Despite the state’s active structuring of the 
space through forced removals, selective investment in production and settlement and 
manipulation of traditional authority in the interests of white power, it was still unable to 
produce the space it sought. This indicates the limits of state intervention, even while its 
interventions substantially and fundamentally altered the space in the area. 
 
 
Figure 8: Former homeland boundaries 
4.5 Conclusion 
By the time land reform was introduced, the farms had layers of historical sedimentations that 
shaped the space. The settlement of ethnically diverse households and loose groupings with 
structured traditional authority in some parts and independent settlement in other parts was 
replaced over time by white authority and private property, with the land carved into separate 
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parcels held together by the state. State intervention in the form of land expropriation and the 
construction of Vleifontein replaced this in turn. Each of these layers left physical and symbolic 
sediments – the embedding of historical spatial practices in the land - that were to shape 
competing representations of space in land reform. 
 
White land owners called forth a history of over a century of occupation to stake their claim to 
the land. They relied on discourses that asserted that whites had turned the land to productive 
use and where the only ones able to do so. Traditional authorities, for so long subordinated to 
white authority, stepped forward to claim a different version of the spatial history. They 
asserted indigenous systems of tenure and authority over the land and its inhabitants which 
advanced a version of pre-colonial history viewed through the prism of colonial and apartheid 
distortions. The chiefs sought to assert their centrality to both ownership and territorial 
authority (Lund, 2010) in controlling the land. However, other subordinated inhabitants also 
got an opportunity to express their own historical memories of lived space and spatial 
practices. These were based on experiences forged by individual and family dispossession, the 
imposition of labour tenancy, and the struggles waged against these. They stood somewhere 
between indigenous relations and capitalist relations of property and authority. Each of these 
representations, these memories of lived space and spatial practice constructed into narratives 
of restitution framed by state discourses, had a role to play in shaping the way land reform 
unfolded in the area, and its limits and possibilities. The following three chapters look at how 
these historical sedimentations and their interpretations constructed the land reform process 
on the basis of authority and land governance, property relations and land uses in the area, 
and in so doing, produced the space anew. 
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CHAPTER 5: SPACE, AUTHORITY AND LAND GOVERNANCE 
5.1 Introduction 
Land governance in essence is about the production of space. Governance systems are taken 
to mean the institutions – both formal and informal – through which social power is 
channelled to produce space. Control over land allocation functions is the key to power and 
authority in rural areas, and land ownership confers rights to control and determine access. 
Lund (2010) distinguishes between land control as territory and as property. The former 
relates to governance while the latter relates to ownership. In and of themselves, systems of 
authority and governance do not alter space. They might better be understood as the ways in 
which power is channelled in order to materialise representations of space. But institutions of 
land governance and the authority associated with them have particular spatial orientations 
built into them as a product of the social forces that imbue them with meaning. They are thus 
inseparable from property relations and land use, since these are both channelled through 
institutions of land governance and authority. 
 
This chapter considers how land reform since 1994 altered relations of authority and land 
governance, and the spatial implications of this. It follows Lefebvre’s triad of the material, the 
conceptual, and the lived and their interconnections, looking at how relations of authority and 
land governance were conceptualised or represented in the land reform process, how these 
translated into spatial practice and what effect they had on lived space. Sikor and Lund (cited 
in Cousins, 2011:1) point to the importance of “territorialising strategies” in efforts by different 
social actors to legitimate their authority. These include “control of spatial ordering through 
classification, mapping and registration, regulation of land use and the making and enforcing 
of external boundaries” (Cousins, 2011:1). The focus is on land governance with brief 
reference to broader governance changes (e.g. local government). Both sought to introduce 
democratic forms into the rural areas for the first time. But they were formulated as separate 
processes and there was little practical connection between them. Democratic local 
government had limited authority on privately-owned land, including land reform farms, and 
democratic land governance institutions had no institutional connections to local government. 
 
The chapter first looks at the representations or conceptions of authority and land governance 
that accompanied the land reform programme. Following this is a deliberation of how these 
representations materialised in practice, focusing on efforts by white land owners and 
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traditional authorities, and the differentiated responses of inhabitants to the changes in 
relations of authority introduced by land reform. Reflections on the implications for spatial 
practice of the rearrangement of the institutional architecture of land governance follow this. 
Spatial practice integrates the institutional framework – considered to be part of the second 
nature that is one constitutive element of spatial practice – and the lived space of everyday 
life. Integrated into the story are reflections on how the alterations in relations of authority 
and land governance affected the lived space, the daily experiences of inhabitants in relation 
to authority and governance. 
5.2 Changing rural authority: new representations entangled in old practices 
Land reform introduced democratic institutions into the rural areas for the first time. An 
important part of the struggle against apartheid was around local political representation and 
participation in decisions that directly affected the lives of local inhabitants. The construction 
of local systems of democratic representation in the state was therefore a key component of 
the political reforms in the early 1990s. However, the stated objective of introducing 
democracy into the rural areas was hedged by a number of constraints. National-level 
compromises in the political transition from formal apartheid included the retention of 
authority vested in private ownership of land. This allowed whites, who held the vast majority 
of privately-owned land, to retain significant authority, especially in the rural areas. 
 
Even after 1994 some of the democratic rights of inhabitants living on land privately owned by 
someone else were suspended or adapted to take into account over-riding private ownership 
rights. For example, although new rights to tenure security were established after 1994, these 
were regulated in such a way that owners could still evict tenants under certain economic and 
social conditions (Wegerif et al., 2005). There was a continuation of the authority of land 
owners to dominate spatial practice within farm boundaries. Consequently, lived space was 
not likely to be altered in any fundamental way. However, land reform was geared towards 
providing those who had never had private ownership with full ownership rights. This had 
potentially profound implications for the distribution of power in racial terms. However, it also 
gave exclusive rights to these new owners, potentially reproducing power inequalities 
between owners and non-owners. 
 
A second constraint that hedged the extension of democracy into rural areas, which also 
emerged from national level political compromises, was a continuing role for traditional 
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authority. Traditional authorities were able to secure formal recognition for the continuation 
of hereditary rule, and this recognition was elaborated on and deepened as the ANC’s rule 
progressed after 1994 (Ntsebeza, 2005). At the local government level, divisions between 
traditional authorities and the municipalities were less about who should constitute the 
supreme authority and more about the appropriate allocation of functions. Berry (2006, 2007) 
suggests that post-colonial states elsewhere in Africa used a similar strategy which allowed the 
central state to position itself above local conflicts, to intervene selectively and to buffer itself 
against struggles around land and local authority. Representations of authority in central 
government policy and legislation required co-operative governance between traditional 
authorities and municipalities. But in practice the relationship was more fractured. According 
to Wilfred Mashele, ward 17 councillor, “We do have difficulties with tribal authorities, 
especially around the distribution and ownership of land…the issue of land is vested in the 
tribal authority.”53 According to Chief Nthabalala, to whom the headmen of the area reported: 
 
“There is a poor relationship between the tribal authority and the municipality. 
Nthabalala does not know how to engage with Vleifontein, we don’t know how to 
be involved. The municipality does not consult with the Nthabalala Tribal 
Authority on development. Maybe there is a new system in place now where 
people don’t care about the chief… The problem now is that people don’t want to 
be controlled by the chief.”54 
 
Control over land governance was at the core of these pre-existing authorities. The land 
reform programme proved to be one point of intervention where the state attempted to bring 
democracy into land governance. The rights of private owners protected by the state meant 
that the state would not intervene to ensure that tenants would have any rights to participate 
in decision-making on farms, unless the owner permitted that. Lived space on white-owned 
farms would not be altered. But on the land reform farms, the state took the opportunity to 
establish a framework that required democratic decision-making structures to be put in place 
on collectively-owned farms transferred using public resources. Lawmakers had to decide 
“where to vest rights to land and the associated powers of decision-making.” A key issue is 
whether rights “should be vested in the group as a whole or in the members of the group” 
(Cousins, 2008b:10). The Communal Property Associations (CPA) Act55 vested ownership in 
defined groups and, very significantly, gave authority to elected committees. In Lund’s (2010) 
terms, territory (governance) and property (ownership) were combined explicitly and formally 
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in the mechanisms of land control. Annex A of the Act required CPA constitutions to specify 
the precise mechanisms for how representatives would be elected, their terms of office, the 
functions of the various positions, how decisions would be taken and a list of other details that 
ensured that the CPAs took account of issues related to democratic functioning and 
accountability. This had potentially significant implications for lived space, since inhabitants 
who previously had not owned private land would become private owners and thus occupy a 
completely different location in relations of authority. 
 
The CPA constitutions were drawn from a standard template structured by the CPA Act, 
defining membership rights, the powers and functions of CPA committees, meetings and 
procedures, and dissolution. In the research area, each of the three CPAs granted authority to 
a CPA committee.56 Although the constitutions specified that the committees had to include 
youth and women, only the Mavungeni constitution specified numbers (at least three women). 
In reality, women were only marginally present in the formal leadership structures on the 
three farms. There were just two or three women in each committee, and men heavily 
dominated decision-making on the farms. As in Levubu (Hellum and Derman, 2010), women 
represented on the committees tended to come from the more powerful families in the 
claimant communities. 
 
Membership of the CPAs was based on claimant lists, a definition that was too narrowly 
defined to incorporate all overlapping claims and historical use rights. The Vleifontein farmers, 
for example, were completely excluded from membership, even though they had a valid claim 
to using the land. In this sense, the CPAs did not align with indigenous systems of control and 
management as defined by Okoth-Ogendo (2008). Coupled with the private property 
framework, membership was narrower, exclusive and more rigid than indigenous systems 
might offer. At the same time, the CPA structure borrowed from indigenous tenure regimes by 
incorporating a segmented authority that associated levels of authority and control over land 
with spatial scales. Individuals or families had control over cultivation and residence. 
Theoretically the CPA committees had authority over grazing and hunting, and over “territorial 
defence and dispute settlement” (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008:101). But in practice, these higher level 
functions were open to contestation, and the CPA committees found themselves in 
competition to exert this authority. 
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registered 5 January 2001; Mavungeni CPA constitution, signed 29 April 2001; Shimange CPA 
constitution, registered 10 May 2002 
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Prior to the transfer of the land, CPA members elected committee members, who were drawn 
mainly from those who led the claims process. So, while their authority was conferred by the 
central state through statutory constitutions, it also came from the historical role those 
individuals played in the claims process. The basis of their authority was therefore rooted 
amongst the inhabitants in a way that the authority of white land owners was not. CPA 
members undoubtedly accepted the legitimacy of these institutions and were content to give 
them the authority to shape the direction of development on the farms, with the expectation 
that functioning systems of accountability and participation would operate. The committees 
thus included relative elites from the claimant groups; individuals who were seen as being able 
to articulate the interests of the claimants and who knew the history of the land and the 
claimants. Other individuals were elected to the committees where CPA members felt their 
presence might facilitate access to government resources in particular. In some cases these 
were individuals with political connections; in other cases, they had specific types of skills, 
especially legal skills.57 Teachers, lawyers and other professionals were in the majority on the 
committees, while the broader membership produced a mixed class base. The dominance of 
the committees by middle class professionals had implications for spatial organisation, 
because the land use plans they adopted tended towards commercial agricultural production 
and sought to replicate middle class settlement patterns found in parts of the homeland 
townships. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
The statutory requirement for a CPA with an elected committee to represent members’ 
interests was a significant democratic advance in land governance, which previously was 
dominated by individual land owners and traditional authorities. But the CPAs were 
constrained by the property form, where they exercised exclusive rights contained on 
fragments of land spatially separated from other pieces of land. This reproduced private 
property relations and was geared towards the reproduction of inherited spaces. At the same 
time, on the farms, it had the potential to significantly alter lived space, by giving inhabitants 
decision-making power and the freedom to define spatial practice. This opened opportunities 
for the articulation of space based on the experiences of those historically subordinated both 
to ossified traditional authority structures and to private owners. 
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But the institutional framework was conceptualised without considering the possible conflicts 
that could emerge from this tension in the land reform programme, of democratic institutions 
of land governance on islands in a sea of imposed authority. A homogenous notion of land 
reform communities with common internal interests underpinned the new land governance 
institutions. This notion was deployed in various ways. On the one hand, it was used to 
obscure the class-specific development plans for the farms (see Chapter 7). By default, a 
nascent capitalist class sought to reproduce productive capitalist spaces, fragmented from one 
another, but fitting neatly into a broader unity - or homogeneity, in Lefebvre’s (2009a) terms - 
held together both by central state regulations and by capitalist circuits of accumulation. This 
nascent class did not have a unified spatial vision or representation of space. But a 
combination of state pressure, the private ownership model of land reform, the contingent 
way that the institutional arrangements played out in practice and, for some, their own 
interests in commercial production, induced representations of space that reproduced 
substantial aspects of the dominant conceptions of space.  
 
For their part, traditional authorities sought to offset the threat to their authority posed by the 
CPAs by claiming a role in on-going governance (both in land and more generally). They made 
some claims to ownership (property), but emphasised claims to control over territory (Lund, 
2010). This would give them a hand in shaping on-farm space, structuring both lived space and 
broader spatial practice. They took the opportunity presented by collective land ownership to 
assert claims about their historical role as defenders of the general ‘community’ interest 
against the specific, individualist interests of the middle classes: 
 
“The government could release the land, that person is no longer the owner of 
the land, they must leave the land. But the chief will still be there to look after the 
land… Because if that person can go bankrupt or no longer have the money, they 
can sell that land to somebody with deeds of grants and everything, he can sell 
that land to someone, which is not good… The chief will be there to solve internal 
structures, problems like some disputes, some fighting, some problems 
concerning the people. But the CPAs are…there to assist. If they want to cut the 
stands they must know that the government wants to involve the chiefs… You will 
find the CPAs are divided into three parts. One to have their own stand this side, 
one to have their own stand this side, so you see… But if it is monitored by the 
chief you will only be having one group of people cutting the stands… As an 
example, see Mavungeni. Two people are fighting to cut the stands…and the 
government is failing to resolve the problem… But if that land was returned back 
and they said Mr Nthabalala the chief you are the one who holds the title deed of 
the whole area… Make sure that these people get development… Long ago there 
were these people around the chief. They were supposed to pay a certain 
amount, maybe R10 or R15. And that R10 or R15 is going to go to developing the 
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same area… *Now+ the chiefs’ rights have been reduced so they cannot even say 
the right to raise rent so they can develop the place themselves.”58 
 
According to Boysie Baloyi, the CPA President at Shimange: 
 
“*The traditional authority] will make sure, ex officio, the things that will have to 
be driven by the CPA will have to be for every member. That’s why I said it 
mustn’t simply be available for the people who have got means to do things here, 
and suddenly those who don’t have means will not be catered for. We will try to 
remain custodians of their cause.”59 
 
An interpretation of ‘community’ was used in opposition to the individual interests of those 
who had control over the CPA committees, and who posed a challenge to on-going traditional 
authority. At Munzhedzi the chief-designate, Simon Rambau, indicated the desire for external 
support to establish agricultural projects, but in the name of the community: “We want to 
have such projects, but for the community. It won’t be for an individual but for the 
community.”60 He set up ‘the individual’ in opposition to the community, and argued for 
projects with benefits that went beyond individual accumulation. The traditional authorities 
implied they were the only force able to prevent the marginalisation of the poorest in the face 
of capitalist modernisation.  
 
CPAs were therefore faced with a situation where they had to compete with traditional 
authority claims to territorial authority over the land. At the same time the CPAs were granted 
exclusive rights to private ownership, but which they could only exercise in a contained space. 
The way authority was conceptualised under restitution opened the space to claims by 
traditional authorities while simultaneously retaining the fragmented spaces of private 
property. This set the scene for open contestation over property and territory. 
5.3 Materialising representations of governance and authority in spatial practice 
Transformation is not a single event, and while the establishment of democratic, collective 
land governance institutions (even if only on individual farms) was an important milestone, it 
only marked a stage in broader processes of transformation, which by no means led inevitably 
towards functioning democratic systems of land governance or fundamental changes in the 
structure of rural authority or their underlying power relations. This section considers how 
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changing conceptions of land governance and authority induced by the CPAs were materialised 
in practice. It focuses on the three ‘local’ forms of authority in land governance, viz. white land 
owners, traditional authorities and the CPA committees. It also considers the way the central 
state’s interventions and failures to intervene supported or diminished the authority of these 
different authorities, and the consequences for lived space and spatial practice. 
 
Efforts to translate the new institutional framework into practice produced uneven results. The 
CPA committees undoubtedly reconfigured the structures of authority on the individual farms 
where they were established. The authority of white property owners was almost entirely 
eliminated where they lost ownership of the land, although the power of property owners 
(now black) remained in place (albeit mediated by its collective character, as Chapter 6 shows). 
The Nthabalala and Munzhedzi traditional authorities were forced to concede authority 
around land governance to elected CPA committees, which were dominated by members who 
did not come from the traditional authority structures. The traditional authorities had to 
reassess their “territorial strategies” of land control (Cousins, 2011:1). 
 
However, processes of shifting relations of power, structures of authority and systems of 
governance did not happen overnight with the establishment of the CPAs and their 
committees. The inertia of existing systems, the weakness of the central state in rooting the 
new institutions, the contradictions embedded in conceptualisations of rural authority, the 
reproduction of fragmented spaces with distinct systems of land governance, and the inherent 
obstacles in translating ideas into practice without distortion meant there was a great deal of 
continuity in the structure of authority and land governance despite the democratic 
interventions. Limited changes in the representations of authority, and the representations of 
space (or spatial visions) related to them, meant limited changes in the institutional forms that 
channelled efforts to materialise representations of space into spatial practice. 
 
The CPA committees became the focal point for interventions by the pre-existing proxy 
authorities in their efforts to influence spatial practices on the farms. At Mavungeni, as shown 
below, the former white owners of the farm sought to recoup some of their losses through 
negotiating land use agreements with the CPA committee. At Munzhedzi the traditional 
authorities usurped the authority of the CPA committee, and at Shimange there was an 
attempt to constitute a new traditional authority to control the committee, but mainly in order 
to channel spatial practices onto a capitalist path. The impact on lived space on each of the 
farms differed amongst inhabitants. CPA members had a new power to shape spatial practices 
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which meant the possible transformation of their lived spaces. Even for those who were not 
formal claimants and hence members of the CPAs, land reform altered lived space. Yet these 
remained constrained by broader relations of authority structured from above.  
5.3.1 White land owners: holding their ground, but ceding authority 
The introduction of democracy in South Africa broke the tight connection between white land 
owners and the state that historically underpinned white rural authority. Land reform removed 
the other pillar of their authority - that of private land ownership. But the loss of white 
authority was spatially confined to the fragmented spaces of the individual farms transferred 
through land reform. Overwhelmingly, white private owners retained the authority of private 
ownership on those farms they continued to own or have control over. A localised white 
presence had already disintegrated to a large extent in the Vleifontein area following the 
expropriation of the farms by the SADT in the years of formal apartheid. At Shimange and 
Munzhedzi, white farmers were absent for two decades before the restitution claims were 
settled and there was no direct white presence on these farms. But at Mavungeni, the 
neighbouring Hennings had a stake in trying to influence developments on the farm after 
restitution. They had invested resources in an orchard and irrigation infrastructure, and they 
retained a glimmer of a hope that they might reappropriate the farm in future. Mavungeni also 
bordered on Moddervlei, where the Hennings ran commercial farming operations61. They were 
concerned about what restitution on the neighbouring farm might mean for their own 
commercial activities: 
 
“Anything you give a bloke, has no value. That’s why these farms don’t work. If I 
don’t pay my debts, what happens? They sell my farm out of under me. But that 
doesn’t happen to him. You’ve got to have something like that, that you must have 
some responsibility… That bloke has no responsibility. He’s got this farm. OK, he 
had nothing, now he’s got this farm. So what? He can lose nothing. Start a shop. 
Plant some mielies… That’s going to be turmoil now. You’ve got a township on this 
side and a township on this side, what’s going to happen?... These Mavungeni will 
be inundated. They’ll be a township in fifty years’ time.”62 
 
Since the Hennings’ historical authority was not based on consent, they were unable to lean on 
that to shape the space of the restitution farm. Instead they attempted to reassert their 
authority on the basis of their technical knowledge of commercial agriculture. That is, they 
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attempted to revive spatial practices based on representations of authority rooted in ideas 
that only whites were able to use land productively. This was part of the historical narrative 
used to justify land dispossession, as shown in Chapter 4. They thus made a concerted effort to 
revive Mavungeni as a large-scale commercial farm under their control. During the time of 
SADT ownership they had leased some parts of the land from the state and kept those parts 
under production, in particular a macadamia orchard which the Mavungeni claimants took 
over when the land was transferred. Immediately following the restitution of the land, they 
proposed to lease 340 ha for cattle grazing for three years. The CPA committee forwarded the 
proposal to the RLCC, which suggested they wait until the completion of a formal land use and 
development plan being sponsored as part of the restitution settlement agreement.63 Later, 
the Hennings proposed an altogether more detailed strategic partnership agreement64 to 
establish an operating company with a 50% shareholding each for the Mavungeni CPA and 
Mununzwu Newco, the Hennings’ management company at the neighbouring Moddervlei. The 
operating company would lease the land for 25 years and the shareholders would split any 
profit or loss. The operating company would pay an annual rental of R20,000 to the CPA as the 
land owner, with an additional monthly rental of R3,000 for grazing rights. 
 
Mununzwu would have full management responsibility of the farming operation65 on both 
Vleyfontein and Lovedale Park farms (the Mavungeni redistribution portion), excluding the 
broiler operation but including the macadamia orchard. Ploughing fields and grazing could be 
sublet to Mavungeni CPA members (or others), but only if it did not interfere with commercial 
operations. The agreement also laid down conditions for grazing (not more than one large 
stock unit per four hectares). It explicitly prohibited “other persons who are not presently in 
occupation to reside on the farm” although residential properties could be rented out. 
Handwritten onto the draft were further suggestions: that no person would be allowed to 
reside on the property without the consent of the operating company; and that the CPA would 
guarantee that it would ‘relocate’ any of its members currently residing on the property within 
one year of the start of the lease. Lived space was thus to be constrained by authority as in the 
past. The operating company would have the responsibility to maintain all infrastructure and 
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equipment on the farms. The CPA was to be responsible for repairing all fences and water 
provision points before the start of the agreement. In essence, for R23,000 a year, the 
Hennings would have use of the entire farm for 25 years. They would have absolute control 
over financial and production decisions, meaning they would have leeway to structure the 
finances for their own benefit. On seeing the agreement, the RLCC proposed that an initial 
period of three years would be better than jumping into a 25 year lease.  
 
The Hennings sought to pre-empt any other plans, hoping that the middle class CPA committee 
members would act in their own class interests to secure the farm as a space of commercial 
production. But they overplayed their hand. Instead of trying to establish an arrangement 
whereby they could facilitate the creation of a stable black commercial farming collective on 
the farm, the Hennings sought to take control (and to profit) for themselves. Members of the 
CPA committee saw through this attempt and Sam Shirinda, one of the committee members, 
mobilised 57 claimants against the plan, which saw the agreement being abandoned66. 
Shirinda was explicit about his fear that the lease was an attempt to try to replicate the past 
organisation of space and his opposition was based on this interpretation: 
 
“This arrangement of leasing the property back to Mr Henning definitely is totally 
against the whole purpose of the lodgement of the restitution claim, and is 
strongly objected… People specifically myself lodged the claim as I wanted to go 
and stay at Mavungeni and I do hope that this was what was in other people’s 
minds as well… What I am aware of is that the Restitution Act caters for those 
who were dispossessed of their rights in land after 1913 by the apartheid laws. I 
do not know or remember that Mr Henning, at any stage, was dispossessed of any 
right in land during those past discriminatory laws period… The inference to be 
drawn is that Mr Henning is not happy that the land has been handed back to its 
rightful owners.”67 
 
Resistance to the Hennings’ proposed agreement was against the reassertion of white control 
over the land, but also very explicitly to a representation of space that sought to secure the 
space purely for production, to the exclusion of claimants settling on and using the land in 
ways they saw fit. It was successful in forcing the abandonment of the plan. The power of 
white land owners, using technical expertise as a way of reinserting themselves on the land, 
was rebuffed. The authority of white land owners in determining what inhabitants could do on 
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the farm, a concept built into historical definitions of the rights of property, was challenged 
and made way for inhabitants to make decisions for themselves about how to use the land. 
 
In this challenge, Shirinda and his group not only came up against former white land owners 
but also against the dominant group in the CPA committee. It sowed the seeds of division 
within the CPA committee as the majority in the committee were not in principle opposed to 
working with the Hennings: 
 
“Shirinda’s attitude stems from his [personal] relationship with Henning. He 
expects the whole Mavungeni not to work with Henning. But why should we fight 
with our neighbours?... Twenty five years is very long… [But+ why can’t we do a 
five year period, renewable, with him?”68 
 
In this they were supported by the DoA, who had earlier told the CPA committee it should 
establish a partnership to run the farm.69 At stake here was precisely the spatial arrangement 
on the farm, between a structured plan for commercial production and a more laissez faire 
approach to settlement and production. Setting this dimension aside for more detailed 
consideration in Chapter 7, and also setting aside for later the implications of the division in 
the CPA committee, this rebuffing of the Hennings’ efforts to control the space at Mavungeni 
signalled the end of white authority on the restitution farms themselves. This did not 
automatically mean the end of their spatial vision, their representations of space, for the farm, 
since both the CPA committee and the DoA remained committed to a similar vision of 
commercial production with contained settlement. But it was out of white hands as to how 
spatial practice on the farm would unfold. 
 
The spatial practices of white authority also disintegrated on the farms after land reform. This 
refers to the spatial arrangement of authority, with the white homestead at the centre of 
authority. Orders were issued from this space and it was treated as an exclusive space where 
black inhabitants subordinated to white authority could only enter when summoned. At both 
Mavungeni and Shimange, the physical infrastructure of this space of authority was 
‘reappropriated’ (Lefebvre, 2009b:248) for other uses. At Mavungeni, the former white 
homestead, the seat of authority, was converted into workers’ housing. At Shimange it was 
converted into a combination of inhabitants’ housing and a collective meeting place. In this 
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sense, from the point of view of authority, lived spaces on the farms were almost completely 
transformed. The details of these appropriations are dealt with further in Chapter 7. At 
Munzhedzi, there was no white homestead at the time of restitution, and the centre of 
authority was located in the chief’s kraal. The impact of land reform on the spatial practices of 
traditional authority at Munzhedzi is considered briefly later. 
 
At the same time, the spatial and economic structure that underpinned white authority 
historically – private property ownership rights and concentrated control of economic 
resources – remained intact. While the new land governance institutions did constrain the 
authority of white land owners, this was in the context of a fragmented capitalist space, where 
democratic forms of governance and authority were limited to the spaces of individual farms. 
This new authority did not spill over in any way onto contiguous fragments of space. The 
broader ideology of private property rights, detailed in Chapter 6, continued to hold sway, 
permitting white land owners with their historical concentration of economic power to retain 
significant authority in the commercial farming areas as a whole, even while they had to step 
back from the land reform farms they no longer controlled. 
5.3.2 The influence of traditional authority 
Unlike with local government, a relationship between CPA committees and traditional 
authorities was not a statutory requirement. However, in practice CPA committees needed to 
take traditional authorities into account to the extent that their claims to continuing authority 
over land governance were recognised (both by the state and amongst inhabitants). The 
Nthabalala Tribal Authority laid formal claim to a large area which incorporated Vleifontein 
township, Mavungeni and part of the Munzhedzi restitution lands (Figure 6). According to the 
Tribal Authority: 
 
“Nthabalala was a chief in the Venda homeland. In 1979-1981 when Venda was 
proclaimed, the Venda government said they should get the land back from the 
whites and Nthabalala should be restored for the area from Elim to Nthabalala… 
Nthabalala put in the claims. The headman [Munzhedzi] did his own claim 
because he was around and alive, but Nthabalala put in a claim for the other 
subjects who were not around to do it themselves. Two claims were lodged. Then 
we saw it was on the same land, and Munzhedzi was given the go-ahead.”70 
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The restitution claim was seen as a continuation of claims to the land that was part of the 
consolidation of the Venda homeland under apartheid, and therefore of a reassertion of 
traditional authority following the state’s forced removal of the chief. Even after the Venda 
homeland government had ceased to exist, the content of the claim was not altered. This 
signalled a continuation of the representations of space that the late apartheid state had 
begun materialising in spatial practice in the area with the establishment of Vleifontein and 
the transfer of the land to the Venda homeland. But in the face of many smaller claims on the 
same land71, the Tribal Authority was forced to adjust its approach. It could no longer claim full 
authority over the land because the CPAs were granted legal ownership to the land. As Cousins 
(2011) shows in Msinga in KwaZulu-Natal, the transfer of title to a ‘community’ of labour 
tenants posed a potential threat to the territorial bases of traditional authority. Unlike in 
Msinga, however, by no means all claimants in the Vleifontein area saw themselves as part of a 
larger tribal entity, making this potential threat greater. The Tribal Authority responded by 
seeking to structure the relationship with the CPA committees to put the latter in a role 
equivalent to that of headmen: 
 
“Even though other people want to claim, that’s not a problem, they must claim. 
But the chieftaincy belongs to Nthabalala… Nthabalala does not worry when 
somebody claims the land and got it. Because even if he got it, that area of land 
still belongs to the Nthabalala territorial chieftaincy… To allocate stands, the 
headman must apply to the chief, then there is a process of approval and then it 
goes to the magistrate. The CPA committee may get a portion of land, but must 
report to the chief. All developments must go via the headman and the chiefs.”72 
 
This might be considered as a case of shifting from a conception of land control based on 
property (ownership) to one based on political territory (governance), in the distinction 
established by Lund (2010). There was added complexity in the Nthabalala claim, since the 
chair of the local Communist Party (an organisation aligned with the ruling ANC) was also a 
prominent member of the claims committee. This signifies that the claim had the support of a 
range of different forces, but which united behind the chief in order to ensure the success of 
the claim. This was very similar to the Mojapelo case presented by Levin (1996). The 
chieftaincy could use the claim process to bring differing, and potentially competing, social 
groups together behind its own leadership. 
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At Munzhedzi the claim was led by the chief who also led the pre-emptive occupation of the 
land to prevent the municipality from taking it over for the extension of Vleifontein housing. 
This simultaneously bolstered the chief’s authority amongst his subjects and gave him direct 
control over the land. As a result of his leadership, the CPA constitution ensured a permanent 
ex officio position for the chief on the committee: 
 
“There was this rumour that the municipality of Louis Trichardt is going to take 
over that space [Munzhedzi] to allocate the RDP houses. So Munzhedzi, he took it 
upon himself to come and cut some places that we can come and stay there, in 
order to avoid that. People were not certain they would be given that land back, 
there was no guarantee they would be given that land, so in order to make sure 
they would get their land they mobilised even people who are not beneficiaries to 
make government see how serious they are with their claim… Because he was the 
chief he was automatically elected a member of the committee… Even if they were 
to change members every now and again, he would still be a member of the CPA 
committee.”73 
 
The materialisation of representations of space at Munzhedzi was thus significantly channelled 
through the institutional structure of the chieftaincy. Chapter 7 reveals the fundamental 
impact this had on lived space, on the daily experiences of inhabitants. It altered spatial 
practice and the relationship of inhabitants to the space. The traditional authority secured 
control over the production of space although, once again, only within the limited boundaries 
of a fragmented space of private property. 
 
Although the CPA committee was initially formed in alliance with the chief, when the old man 
died and Simon Rambau, his son, replaced him, the positive relationship fell apart. The chief-
designate imposed his authority over the CPA committee, effectively neutralising it. According 
to one committee member, soon after the formation of the committee, “when the makhadzi74 
took over, she felt ‘OK, I can no longer work with this CPA that was working with the late chief 
Munzhedzi. I will elect my own CPA that I will work with’,”75 indicating that the royal family felt 
it was their right to choose who they wanted on the CPA committee. Simon Rambau also 
indicated this: “I need to disband the committee and start afresh and work with new 
people.”76 The reason he gave for over-riding the CPA committee was its failure to lead: 
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“I am the CPA and the chief. In fact I am everything to the people… If there is an 
issue at Munzhedzi that needs to be attended to, I have to stand up myself. There 
is nothing they are doing… I cannot say the CPA has much authority. The authority 
belongs to the chief. But I do not do things without consulting the CPA. Before I 
can take decisions I sit down with the CPA first.” 77 
 
In 2003 the chair of the CPA committee resigned from his position, stating that: “The Royal 
Council of Munzhedzi is above the laws of the CPA… The Council has violated the constitution 
of Munzhedzi by stopping all the activities of developing the land and the improvements of the 
life of Munzhedzi community.”78 If the spatial structuring of the restitution farm was not 
already sealed following the land occupation in 2000, the chief-designate’s imposition of 
traditional authority control over the committee ensured this was the case. He followed in his 
father’s footsteps by allocating stands to all-comers, which had the effect of closing off the 
possibilities of materialising the dominant representations of space in the form of a 
commercial model of agriculture with limited settlement on the farms: 
 
“The way the new chief came in, he disrupted everything. Because even the place 
where we wanted to build schools, that place is no longer there. Some of the 
space was taken over by the new chief when the father died, that young boy took 
over and I think he messed up. We even had a certain company from America, 
they wanted to come here and develop this place agriculturally. But I am telling 
you, the young man started to disrupt that programme which was meant for 
Munzhedzi.”79 
 
Despite the language of ‘community’, the chief-designate took personal advantage of the 
authority to allocate stands that he had usurped from the CPA committee. A number of people 
stated that the chief-designate was pocketing the money rather than using it for development 
purposes. According to one, “there were only 600 claimants, but over 1,000 stands have been 
cut. People are coming from outside, they are paying R300/stand to Simon [Rambau]. He 
pockets the money and the CPA committee does not hear about it or see it, and there are no 
transparent development plans for the area that he is doing.” Another said, “Simon [Rambau] 
just wants more land to allocate stands to get money.” One person who was allocated land for 
agricultural production said he paid “plus/minus R600” to the chief for it, “but every time you 
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meet him he wants more, so you have to hide from him… He keeps reminding me the land is 
not mine.”80 According to the committee: 
 
“As the CPA committee we don’t have power to allocate stands or business stands. 
We don’t know how many stands have been allocated so far and how much is he 
[Simon Rambau+ charging. We are told that we don’t have such power to allocate 
stands and that we know nothing about the soil.”81 
 
However, the fact that these complaints found no formal outlet signified the extent to which 
the traditional authority at Munzhedzi had succeeded in capturing the institutional space and 
using it to structure the space for its own benefit. This is not to say there was no overlap 
between the interests of the chieftaincy (allocation of stands for financial gain) and those of 
inhabitants (who wanted a place to settle near Vleifontein). These overlapping interests 
produced a rapid shift in the spatial arrangements on the farm, and in the lived space. The 
chief brought with him the betterment model from the homelands, allocating 50x50m stands 
to individuals in close proximity to one another, more or less in a formal grid pattern. 
Agricultural lands for commercial production were to be allocated geographically separate 
from the settlement, again with the chief determining where these would be located. The 
traditional authority’s representations of space, its spatial vision, were more closely aligned 
with the immediate interests of inhabitants than representations as a space of commercial 
agricultural production, shared by the DoA and elements in the CPA committee. This does not 
mean inhabitants necessarily favoured the institutions of traditional authority above other 
institutional forms, but they found a contingent channel for ways to alter the lived space in 
their own interests, to some extent, in the institutions of traditional authority.  
 
The relationship between traditional authorities and inhabitants was complex. There was an 
undercurrent of recognition in principle for the institution of traditional authority in 
governance in general, including land governance. This accords with a number of other studies 
of the chieftaincy in South Africa. Even though there was sometimes disagreement about the 
specific activities of the traditional authority, inhabitants held fast onto the institution as a 
core part of rural identity (Levin and Mkhabela, 1997, Oomen, 2005). Despite resigning in 
opposition to the chief-designate, the former chair of the Munzhedzi committee said: “The 
CPA is supposed to be in control of land allocation and development, but in co-operation with 
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the chief in that place. You cannot just wish him away. He is the sole leader of that 
community.”82 One of the current members of the CPA committee described the relationship 
thus: 
 
“We take the tribal authority as a father figure, where you find that we as the CPA 
and all those committees that come under, we are the children. If there is 
something that needs to be done we go and report to them… The main role of the 
tribal authority is to play that father figure.”83 
 
In some instances, then, the traditional authorities were able to use the restitution process in 
an attempt to reassert their authority, including their direct authority over land governance 
and the structuring of spatial practices. But elsewhere, the lack of a statutory requirement to 
include the traditional authorities in land governance structures posed a threat to traditional 
authority – but once again only within the fragmented confines of the individual spaces of 
restitution. The chiefs’ historical role as custodians of the land on behalf of the community and 
their practical role under apartheid in land allocation and governance was formally removed 
from them and placed in the hands of elected CPA committees. Unlike at Munzhedzi, at 
Mavungeni and Shimange, the presence of traditional authority was weak, or even non-
existent, despite claims by Simon Rambau that the Munzhedzi chieftaincy historically had ruled 
over those farms.84 
 
There was an obvious ethnic dimension to this. Shimange and Mavungeni claimants were 
mainly Shangaan, while Munzhedzi and Nthabalala were Vhavenda. Although both groups, 
together with Sesotho-speakers, lived together fairly peacefully in the past, there were some 
historical tensions over land access, as Chapter 4 showed, and the apartheid state made a 
concerted effort to separate inhabitants spatially into ethnic groups. When inhabitants were 
forcibly removed from the farms, the Vhavenda were sent to Nthabalala and Mulima while 
Shangaans were sent to Riverplaats, Mbokota, Bungeni and further afield in the Gazankulu 
homeland. When the RLCC was faced with separate claims for the same land – Nthabalala, 
Munzhedzi and Shimange/Mavungeni on their separate pieces – it requested that the claims 
be split up to allow Shimange and Mavungeni to claim portions of the land: 
 
“At the time of the claim, it was agreed with the old chief Munzhedzi that 
Shimange and Mavungeni should claim part of the land under their own names, 
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since they had been forced from those places and were living there previously. 
We need to distinguish between the chieftaincy and claims that people lived there 
once.”85 
 
The traditional authorities recognised that claimants at Shimange and Mavungeni were not 
claiming the land as traditional authorities, but as people who had lived on those farms in the 
past and who had a legitimate claim to return to the farms. But this was understood to mean 
they would move back to the land as subjects of the Vhavenda traditional authorities. At 
Mavungeni and Shimange, where the majority of claimants were Shangaan, the Vhavenda 
traditional authority was excluded. However, since the area was incorporated into the Venda 
homeland in the 1980s, there was also no Shangaan tribal authority presence in the area. This 
partly related to the historical settlement of the area, shown in Chapter 4, where the Shangaan 
had a very loose authority structure and tended more towards independent clans that were 
only later constituted as a tribe under white domination. At Shimange, there was outright 
rejection of the idea that Munzhedzi or Nthabalala had any authority over them: 
 
“During those times, the tribal authorities were not effective. They were not being 
given authority. Like Nthabalala, the one who claims Efrata 
[Syferfontein/Shimange+ belongs to them, that’s not true. Nthabalala was due 
west of Efrata. Then later on he was removed from that place down to where he 
is now. If he was a chief he would not have been removed.”86 
 
“Some of the people, the Munzhedzi people here, the Venda, they were claiming 
this area, with the support of Nthabalala and other people from Vleifontein here… 
Until the [Land Claims] Commission, coming from Pretoria, coming to verify, and 
then they were called, ‘if this is your area, if this is Munzhedzi area, we want to 
see evidence, proof.’ We showed them our graves here, ‘Here’s our graves, we 
were staying here.’ And then those other people retreated, because there was 
nothing to prove.”87 
 
Claimants at Mavungeni did not deny that Munzhedzi was the traditional authority of the area, 
but downplayed the relationship: 
 
“We never had a tribal authority here. It was only the better known families to run 
the community. Like my family here was a big family. It was the Vukeya family, the 
Baloyi, and the Maluleke family. They were running this community, and they 
were families… It was like this before. If we got some matters which were not so 
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serious in Mavungeni, we tried to resolve them here, and if we failed, then we 
would involve the chief Munzhedzi for assistance. Not that we were under them, 
no. The community here would call Munzhedzi to come and help, or the 
Mavungeni would go up to Munzhedzi seeking help, saying we’ve got a problem 
like one, two, three… It was the agreement between the olden-aged people. It was 
just an agreement, that you are not listening, we are going to take you to 
Munzhedzi, so that Munzhedzi will help us… This [land] was under white, this was 
state land.”88 
 
The formally recognised traditional authorities lost ground as a result of the transfer of legal 
ownership of land to claimants organised into the CPAs: 
 
“I can say one or two *CPA committees] are still with the chief. Others they don’t 
consider the chief whatsoever. They just say they have their own thing. The chief 
has said those CPA committees and their chairpersons should resolve their 
problems and come to the chief and report every month or every quarter for the 
development that they are doing there, so that they can move together. Some are 
not even considering the chief… Because they [government] gave them title deed 
of the land they thought everything is on their power now, they are just doing 
whatever they want… On some areas which have claimed, headmen have been 
there, who were controlling. For example, Shimange and Mavungeni were 
included, they were staying together, they were moving together all the time. But 
now because they have purchased the land, they no longer go to Munzhedzi or 
Nthabalala.”89 
 
Even at Munzhedzi, where the chief had played such a major role in the return of the land, 
support for the institution of traditional authority was lukewarm at best. This was evident in 
the disintegration of historical spatial practices of authority which, as Chapter 4 shows, were 
centred on the chief’s kraal. Although the chief had re-established his kraal at Munzhedzi after 
the occupation, by the time his son took over the role, the kraal resembled little more than 
another half-built house in the settlement. Putative subjects certainly did not contribute 
money or labour to assist in building the house, and the chief-designate was forced to live in 
Maila with his family until such time as the house at the chief’s kraal could be completed. The 
absence of a spatial centre of authority highlighted the weakness of the formal institutions of 
authority, whether CPA committee or traditional authority, at Munzhedzi. It also indicated the 
extent to which inhabitants were able to mediate claims to authority in an indirect, passive 
way. Even though this did not produce new institutions of authority they could mobilise to 
channel their own representations of space in a co-ordinated, collective and conscious way, 
their effective boycotting of existing institutions of authority created a vacuum that allowed 
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for a more diverse range of spatial practices, and hence of lived spaces. The rapid deterioration 
in relations between inhabitants and the traditional authority when the chief-designate came 
in illustrates “the contingent character of the power wielded by traditional authorities and the 
degree of popular support they enjoy” (Claassens, 2001). 
 
Support was also conditional on the proper protocols being followed. When the chief died 
shortly after the claim was settled, his son came from Polokwane to claim the chieftaincy. But 
the son’s brash approach and apparent self-interest alienated inhabitants as well as the 
traditional authority hierarchy. The Nthabalala Tribal Authority, under whom Munzhedzi fell, 
refused to recognise the chief-designate on the grounds that the Munzhedzi royal council had 
not followed the necessary procedures. Nthabalala insisted that the only reason they were not 
recognising Simon Rambau was because the Munzhedzi royal council had not followed the 
protocols of formally presenting him to the tribal council as the candidate. Nthabalala 
suggested internal divisions in the Munzhedzi royal house were preventing this from 
happening.90 Rambau and the royal council at Munzhedzi rejected this argument and insisted 
they had made the decision and had already presented his name as the chief-designate.91 
Others at Munzhedzi felt it was a power play: 
 
“The main reason behind this thing is they want Simon to submit himself as a 
headman under the chieftaincy of Nthabalala. They are just giving him time to 
make up his mind. They are still punishing him so that he can come around, 
change his behaviour. Because he does not want to submit himself under the 
tribal authority of Nthabalala, he wants to be independent… After the death of his 
late father, the Nthabalala people appointed the aunt to be the one representing 
Munzhedzi. The aunt did attend the tribal meeting where all the headmen come 
together at Nthabalala tribal authority. So that’s one of the things that Simon is 
not doing. He’s not submitting under their authority… Once he has submitted 
that’s when maybe they will appoint him as headman of Munzhedzi.”92 
 
Whatever the case, the struggle within the traditional authority related directly to authority 
over land governance on the restitution farms. Although Nthabalala did not immediately claim 
direct authority over land allocation at Munzhedzi, the Tribal Authority called on Munzhedzi to 
report to them first before making land allocation decisions. Later the Nthabalala Tribal 
Authority intervened more directly by calling a meeting of Munzhedzi’s inhabitants and 
demanding a R50 PTO fee from each of them. Later still, Nthabalala hand picked his own 
                                                          
90
 Interviews, Solomon Thovha, Peter Makhubele and Chief Nthabalala, 11 June 2009; Solomon Thovha, 
1 October 2009 
91
 Interview, Simon Rambau and Violet Rambau, 1 October 2009 
92
 Interview, Mpho Patricia Ngobo, 12 November 2009 
108 
 
headman at Munzhedzi.93 These are obvious attempts to assert claims to authority over the 
territory. Munzhedzi also faced pressure from a neighbouring headman, Keith Nthabalala, who 
fell under the Nthabalala Tribal Authority, and whose kraal was in Maila on the neighbouring 
Duikershoek farm. “*He] invaded when the chief died. He claimed there was an agreement 
with the old chief Munzhedzi that he could occupy the land, but there is no evidence of that 
agreement.”94 The CPA sent a letter to the RLCC in 2003: 
 
“We of the Munzhedzi CPA would like to bring to your attention that our 
honourable chief is currently invading our proclaimed Diepgezet farm that was 
claimed and awarded to the abovementioned CPA. We have great honour and 
respect to our chief per se, but presently the chief is allocating stands to 310 LS 
[Vleyfontein] farm and has ploughed maize on Diepgezet farm. We humbly would 
like you to intervene in this matter…”95 
 
The Nthabalala Tribal Authority recognised that at Munzhedzi support for the traditional 
authority was not necessarily support for the incumbent, and they used this to drive a wedge 
between the chief-designate and inhabitants at Munzhedzi. The CPA committee argued that 
“at Munzhedzi we don’t have a chief and we have not nominated someone to act as a chief.”96 
Committee members were exasperated by the failure of inhabitants to stand up to challenge 
the chief. “The community can say they don’t want to be ruled by a chief but by the CPA 
committee… [but+ it is difficult to convince the elders to challenge the chief if necessary.”97 
This was read by Nthabalala as an indication not of lack of support for traditional authority in 
principle, but precisely the opposite: a lack of support for those who sought to undermine the 
customs and protocols attached to the institution. 
 
The spatial implications of this battle within the traditional authority structures were muted, 
since both Nthabalala and Munzhedzi had similar representations of space, structured around 
settlement and use of the land by many people whom the chief would protect from land 
alienation, and in return who would support the chieftaincy materially and politically. 
Nevertheless, it revealed the destabilising effect of the introduction of restitution and the new 
                                                          
93
 Telephone conversations, Simon Rambau, 7 December 2010; 4 April 2011. The PTO system was a 
permit-based land access system for areas with traditional authorities, regulated by the R188 
regulations of 1969. Although the regulations no longer had legal force, they remained in routine use in 
Limpopo and elsewhere because no alternative regulations were put in their stead. 
94
 Interview Lawrence Mushandana, 28 October 2008 
95
 ‘Invasion on Diepgezet farm by the local chief’, letter to the Commission of Land Affairs and Nkuzi 
Legal Entities, signed by M.B. Malaka, 10 April 2003 
96
 ‘Problems encountered by Munzhedzi CPA (community)’, letter to Nkuzi Development Association, 
signed by L.S. Mushandana (CPA Chairperson), 10 January 2005 
97
 Interview, Lawrence Mushandana, 28 October 2008 
109 
 
structures of land governance that required an adjustment by traditional authorities to the 
new realities. For Nthabalala the long-term stakes were high because the Tribal Authority 
could see the land it considered to be unified under its authority fragmenting into smaller units 
outside its control. Despite the collective form of the CPAs, they posed the challenge of private 
property as an alternative to Nthabalala’s representations of space of the recreation of an 
indigenous tenure regime under its own authority. For twenty years the restitution farms had 
been neither private property nor indigenous tenure. The restitution process opened up the 
space for renewed contestation. 
 
The Nthabalala Tribal Authority stated that it was prepared to coexist with independent CPAs 
as long as the latter were prepared to work with it, suggesting that it was willing to cede 
aspects of day-to-day land governance to elected committees on fragments of land under its 
overall jurisdiction. It sought to reintroduce an indigenous tenure regime to farms 
expropriated by whites and the state and converted into private and then state property, but 
at the same time asserting its own authority over the land and the inhabitants. 
 
In essence, the traditional authorities sought to channel spatial practice into advancing the 
encroachment of the former homeland boundaries into the spaces opened up by restitution. 
This represented an absolute continuation of the late apartheid spatial agenda. Munzhedzi had 
a similar view, except the royal family was not averse to using the CPA structure – a structure 
locked into a framework of private property – in order to further its own authority. But 
whatever their tactics, the traditional authorities could not ignore the introduction of the new 
institutions of land governance, and were forced to accommodate them. In some places they 
were relatively successful in neutralising the power of the CPAs (Munzhedzi), but in others 
traditional authorities lost power and authority (Mavungeni and Shimange). 
5.4 The CPA committees and a nascent capitalist class 
The CPAs opened the ground for the emergence of democratic participation in land 
governance, even if this was contained within fragmented parcels of space separated from one 
another. The CPA committees were the official channels for the translation of representations 
of space into spatial practice. The CPA constitutions stipulated the need for regular elections of 
committee members by the majority of members, at Munzhedzi and Shimange every five 
years, and at Mavungeni every three years. However, the systems of accountability collapsed 
on the farms, resulting in individuals and small groups entrenching themselves in the 
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committees and using the latter as a power base to further their own interests. At Shimange, 
the first election of members to the CPA committees in 2002 was also the last election. When 
committee members died or resigned they either were not replaced, or ad hoc replacements 
were made through the authority of a President-for-life. Although this was unconstitutional, 
there was a patent lack of understanding amongst members about the contents of the 
constitution.98 
 
At Munzhedzi, the inaugural elections in 2002 also marked the end of the democratic selection 
of representatives. Although the CPA committee members changed substantially in 
subsequent years, this was through the authority of the chief-designate who subordinated the 
CPA committee to his authority. Mavungeni was the only one of the three restitution farms to 
hold a second set of elections for representatives to the CPA committee. But the 2005 
elections were the last to be held. After this, the divisions between the group that had 
opposed the lease agreement with the Hennings and those that had supported it turned into a 
split. The possibility of transforming lived space for the majority of inhabitants was reduced as 
the relative elites who had captured the committees sought to reproduce dominant 
representations of space based on a particular model of commercial production and control 
over the space. The failure to follow the procedures of the constitutions and the capture of 
committees by relative elites was a common experience in restitution around the country 
(Lebert, 2005, Hall, 2009b, Hellum and Derman, 2010), signifying a larger structural problem. 
 
Two factors led to the rapid collapse of the election system that opened the way for those 
initially tasked with leading the CPAs to retain their positions unelected, and hence to gain de 
facto control of the committees. First, at Mavungeni and Shimange the vast majority of 
members did not return to the farms on settlement of the claims, leaving only a handful of 
active members. Other claimants were spread across Limpopo and even into Gauteng and 
KwaZulu-Natal, making regular meetings impossible, especially where members had no real 
interest in returning to the farms. Realising the required quorum of up to 75% of members on 
the beneficiary list to make binding decisions proved impossible. In any case, it was 
increasingly impossible to verify whether there was a quorum (based on a percentage of 
overall members) even if a meeting was called. Membership lists were supposed to be 
maintained by the CPA committees, but were not. This made the version registered with the 
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RLCC at the time of settlement the authentic one. If members died or new members came in 
subsequently, this was not recorded. 
 
Secondly, the state’s failure to provide the start-up resources that were part of the restitution 
package led to disillusionment amongst many members, who felt there was no point in coming 
to meetings to talk if no practical action to follow up decisions was possible. At Mavungeni and 
Shimange, inactive claimants lost interest in travelling long distances to attend meetings: 
 
“On the positive side, we are very happy to get this place. But on the negative side, 
we never got support from government. If ever, very minimal indeed. How do you 
give a person a tractor without diesel? Farming without water? How do you farm 
without electricity? How do you go around without roads? How do you do 
irrigation without pipes? And many other things. So it made us very difficult. We 
tried to go to the municipalities, to go to the province. We’ve written them many 
letters, to try to raise our issues here. Those bureaucratic channels. So many 
people here lost hope. There were lots of people here… But because of lack of 
support, they lost hope and they left… The others are down there, but they are no 
longer interested in coming here. Coming to do what? Even if you tell them to 
come they are no longer interested. No, they are completely discouraged.”99 
 
At Munzhedzi, although the majority of members had moved onto the farm, they also became 
disillusioned with meetings that produced no practical actions. The result was a decline in 
attendance at community meetings, including the fortnightly tribal gatherings, as inhabitants 
disconnected from formal governance structures, away from structured involvement 
altogether. In a settlement of thousands of households, meetings seldom gathered more than 
seventy or eighty people together. The collapse of ‘traditional’ spatial practices of authority 
alluded to above was reinforced by this disinterest in supporting chiefly claims to authority. 
Channels for the formal participation of inhabitants to define the space were narrowed. The 
potential for the transformation of lived space was reduced as the democratic structures of 
authority stagnated. 
 
Underpinning the possibility of capture of the new institutions of land governance by small 
groups was the incapacity or unwillingness of the central state to carry through the logic of 
democratisation into practice. One key facet of this was the core contradiction between efforts 
to democratise land governance on the one hand, and the retention of private property rights 
and the statutory recognition of traditional authority that was embedded in the conceptions of 
authority and land governance from the outset on the other. So even if the central state was 
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able to carry through its conceptions into practice, the conceptions themselves were 
contradictory, inevitably leading to contradictory outcomes. The central state’s inability to 
provide consistent support to the establishment and rooting of democratic land governance 
institutions reinforced the power of private land owners and traditional authorities, and 
increased the influence of local power dynamics in shaping the practice of land governance. 
 
The statutory requirement to set up the institutions was the easiest part of introducing 
democratic land governance onto land reform farms. The Minister would only sign off on CPA 
constitutions if they met a list of criteria defined in the CPA Act. But an on-going role in 
supporting the effective functioning of these institutions, with accountability to their 
members, was essential to their success. Ostensibly this role was assigned to the Post-
Settlement Support Unit in the RLCC. However, members of the Unit itself were unclear of 
their precise roles in this regard, the Unit confronted numerous crises in dealing with poorly 
executed settlement processes, it suffered from extremely high staff turnover which meant 
the loss of institutional memory, and lack of resources and staff numbers prevented staff 
members from going out into the field to provide practical support.100 The RLCC was practically 
absent from the area. In short, the RLCC was simply unable to provide the support required to 
strengthen and root the new institutions of land governance. 
 
The state’s lack of investment in institutional support for democratic structures of land 
governance suggested this was a lower priority than other forms of governance. For example, 
in 2009 ‘senior traditional leaders’ (chiefs) each received an annual package of R154,282 from 
the state (Republic of South Africa, 2009:5). At the same time, over R5.3m in grants that were 
part of the restitution packages on the three restitution farms in the research area, meant to 
assist CPAs to begin working, remained unpaid eight years after the settlement of the claims. 
Even acknowledging that the funds travelled through different departments with their own 
budgets and processes, from the point of view of the state as a whole, resources were directed 
towards the institution of traditional authority, rather than towards bolstering democratic 
institutions of land governance. If investment is taken to be the directing of resources towards 
the materialisation of particular conceptions of space, this indicates the state, in practice, 
reinforced the spaces of traditional authority over the spaces of democratic land governance. 
At the very least, it revealed the internal disconnections in the state and the plethora of 
contradictory policies and processes that reinforce the idea of the state as a “contradictory 
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and disunited ensemble of overlapping relationships of power”, in the words of Bayart 
(1993:196). 
 
The state did provide support in assisting in the formulation of business plans that took as their 
starting point commercial agricultural production on the farms. Chapter 7 elaborates on the 
spatial implications of this in some detail. From the point of view of land governance and 
authority, this practically meant support for the agenda of a nascent capitalist class, including 
some small-scale capitalist farmers, who gained authority through the establishment of the 
CPA committees. A clearly defined representation of space underpinned this agenda: the farms 
should be used to produce spaces of commercial production and contained settlement, rather 
than dispersed or mass settlement and/or small-scale production. Although the state was 
unable or unwilling to invest extensively in the materialisation of these representations of 
space in any consistent way, the mere support for commercial plans gave this nascent class an 
advantage in being able to use the ‘official’ spatial plans to support spatial arrangements that 
favoured their interests. These interests were not consciously opposed to the interests of the 
broader membership, but in practice dominant representations of space favoured those who 
could invest their own private resources in commercial production. The fragmented and jerky 
involvement of government in the research area mirrored much wider dynamics of the state 
withdrawing “from any clear accountability toward the claimant communities in particular and 
to its wider rural political constituency” (Hellum and Derman, 2006:10). 
 
However, failure to support the functioning of the democratic institutions could not be laid 
entirely at the door of the state. At Shimange deeper dynamics prevented members from 
challenging the leadership, even when the latter were not acting according to the constitution. 
The apparent rejection of traditional authority was merely a rejection of Venda authority over 
the Shangaan. The dominant Baloyi clan favoured the introduction of a traditional authority-
type governing structure on the farm. According to members of the Baloyi clan, Shimange 
(from whom they were direct descendants) was a chief in the area. The land use plan was 
done in the name of the “Shimange tribal community” (Northplan, 2004) and the constitution 
stated that “the community comprises predominantly the offspring of Chief Xitlhangoma 
Baloyi who occupied the area South West of Elim Mission.”101 
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Those with interests in constituting themselves as hereditary leaders at Shimange managed to 
get provisions into the constitution that allowed for an unelected President whose authority 
was derived from heredity. The President, a leader of the Baloyi clan, was given oversight of 
the committee and had authority to make certain types of decisions regarding the community. 
The Shimange traditional authority was not formally recognised by the state at the time of 
writing. Nevertheless, there was a fairly deeply rooted sense that the Baloyis were the primary 
clan in the claim. According to one claimant, whose allocation of a piece of land at Shimange 
was later rescinded, “if the chief speaks, we can’t question. They are the land owners.”102 Lived 
spaces remained constrained by the imposition of authority from above. 
 
There was, nonetheless, disagreement from other quarters to this, signalling an element of 
contestation around the role of traditional authorities in the institutions of the CPA. According 
to Eric Tshabalala, who was a principal at Efrata school and the last of the claimants to leave 
the farm: 
 
“What I know is there’ve been some recognised leaders, mind you it was within a 
farm, so leaders in a sense, recognised, but not officially recognised. They were 
just amongst ourselves as blacks… Shimange came from some other place which I 
am not very sure, with his group. Then they had somebody within their family 
who was recognised as their leader… But they are now claiming that Syferfontein 
belongs to the Shimanges which is not, it’s not appropriate… In practice it had no 
meaning, because the owner of the farm was in charge in all respects. The only 
thing is it’s amongst we blacks, sometimes there is a mutual understanding 
between the families, something of that light…but practically there was not that 
effective…because that farm belonged to the owner of that farm… [When the 
whites introduced labour tenancy] I personally organised people to get ourselves 
somewhere as a group. It was not the Shimanges who were organising. I did it… 
By then if at all the Shimanges were a strong leadership, they would have gone 
out and asked for a space to take their people. But that did not happen.”103 
 
Despite these individual voices of opposition to the dominance of the Baloyi clan and its 
attempts to control the CPA through claims to traditional authority, most CPA members found 
it difficult to challenge the leadership. Sipho Baloyi, an active CPA member, but also a 
youngster and therefore in a subordinate position, explained that Shimange had seven 
wives.104 The status of all descendants was based on a hierarchy with descendants from the 
first wife having greater status than descendants from the second and so on. This structure of 
traditional status meant it was difficult for someone lower down the hierarchy to challenge 
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someone higher up in the hierarchy, regardless of the merit of their case. The result was that 
at Shimange individuals in the committee took top-down decisions, with limited participation 
from members and weak systems of accountability. This reflects Hellum and Derman’s 
(2010:218) finding at Levubu of a tension between “the principle of equal membership status 
and the customary norms that apply within the group.” According to Berry (1993), and also 
Whitehead and Tsikata (2003), land access in indigenous systems continues to hinge on social 
identity and status. In the case of Shimange, where status was a more pronounced feature 
amongst the claimants than on the other farms, these factors influenced access to decision-
making authority, but it was not apparent that this translated into access to land. It may be 
that the constitutions defined the membership and rights of members in a way that indigenous 
tenure regimes did not. But whether this was the case or not, this disconnection between 
status and land access indicated another way in which the collective private ownership model 
differed from indigenous tenure. 
 
Recognising the limits of having so many committee members living far from the farm, in 2005 
Shimange committee members agreed to establish a ‘local action committee’ consisting of 
members who were regularly on the farm. Authority was devolved to this group to implement 
decisions taken by the CPA committee, but it had very limited authority to make decisions 
about land allocations or any other developments on the farm on its own. Tensions emerged 
between the local committee and the CPA committee around the extent of authority ceded to 
the local committee, even though some of the members overlapped (Lahiff et al., 2008:49-51). 
Despite their lack of formal authority, however, local committee members were amongst the 
most active on the farm, and played a key role in constructing spatial practice on the farm 
through their settlement and production activities (detailed in Chapter 7).  
 
Despite these tensions, it was apparent that local committee members continued to defer to 
the authority of the CPA committee and in particular the President, who seemed to retain his 
grip on decision-making despite his lengthy absences from the farm. Any decisions about land 
allocations and uses continued to be channelled through the CPA committee before being 
finalised. Spatially, the dominance of the President (the unofficial ‘chief’) did not result in the 
kinds of tensions that emerged at Munzhedzi between the traditional authorities (who created 
settlement with small stands along the model of the betterment villages in the former 
homelands) and the capitalist modernisation vision (of commercial production with contained 
settlement) favoured by the nascent capitalist class who populated the CPA committee. At 
Shimange the President himself had a capitalist modernising outlook and therefore used his 
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authority to support the construction of a commercial farming space with restricted 
settlement. Anyway, regardless of the representations of space that the Shimange CPA 
committee attempted to materialise, it had limited power to realise this, and the CPA 
committee only partially functioned as a channel for spatial practices. Chapter 7 shows how 
those inhabitants who stayed on or near the farm, and were actively involved, were far more 
significant in shaping spatial practice. 
 
Other tensions swirled under the surface at Shimange. The claim was originally meant to be on 
two farms, Uitschot and Syferfontein. Although the farms were treated as one claim, and the 
claimants were put together, claimants or their ancestors historically lived on one or the other 
farm. The CPA committee and the local committee included people from both farms. 
Bureaucratic bungling meant the Uitschot claim was not processed, with the result that only 
Syferfontein was returned, with a promise by the Commission to deal with the Uitschot claim 
after the transfer of Syferfontein. However this did not happen. The result was that some 
Uitschot claimants found themselves on the Shimange CPA committee. Tensions later arose 
amongst some CPA members who questioned why people from Uitschot should be making 
decisions about how Syferfontein land was used. On the other hand, the Uitschot claimants 
questioned why no effort was being put into following up on the Uitschot claim now that 
Syferfontein had been returned.105 From a spatial point of view, the memory of where people 
used to live continued to shape the kinds of authority they had in a situation of legal/formal 
equality as members of the CPA, even when they were no longer living in the exact physical 
places they lived in when they were removed. Historical spatial relations structured present 
relations of authority and influenced spatial practices, again shown in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
At Mavungeni, Sam Shirinda was able to use the dissatisfaction generated by the proposed 
agreement with the Hennings to lead an occupation of a portion of the land. The challenge to 
the authority of the CPA committee was rooted in competing representations of space. The 
conflict had its source in an agreement in a CPA members’ meeting held in September 2003 
where “all the members unanimously agreed that the people of Mavungeni should start 
resettling at Mavungeni despite the lack of water, roads and electricity. This will deter illegal 
farmers from destabilising our area.”106 When Shirinda was elected Deputy Chair in 2005, he 
began asking questions about the non-settlement: 
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“This land, we got it the very same day as the Munzhedzi and the Shimange. The 
government organised it one day, a joint handover ceremony. So we wanted to 
know, ‘Munzhedzi’s land is already full. Why is ours empty?’… Then my research 
came to the following: that those people, they don’t want us to come and resettle 
here.”107 
 
It was then, he claims, that he discovered the proposed agreement with the Hennings. He also 
identified tendencies within the CPA committee to hold collective resources for the benefit of 
some individual families: 
 
“There are two tractors, two ploughs, two trailers, and everything. The 
government said the list is too much, so what we must do, we must give you two 
tractors, two ploughs, so that people can be enough to plough. Now, this group, if 
I go now and say I want the tractor, I will never get it. Even before the 
division…when they wanted to plough, they would go and plough. They’ve got 
fields somewhere there. When they are finished there then they will go and 
plough for ordinary members of the public at Mbokota, because they stay at 
Mbokota, most of them. And they are getting money… You will even notice with 
Shimange, Munzhedzi, what-what, when they start a project like a poultry project, 
the chairperson will take his family to go and work there. No other family will be 
allowed to go and work there… From the behaviour of the CPA [committee] you 
could see they don’t want any other person there than their family to work there… 
There’s a poultry project, macadamias which are being harvested every year. 
There is a guy they leased on the redistribution farm, there is an old farm house 
there. There is a guy leasing the whole of that area. He’s paying R1,000 per month, 
I think since 2003, he is paying R1,000 per month. They don’t want to disclose who 
that money is going to… There is no money, there is no accounting for it.”108 
 
Shirinda led some members away from the CPA committee and formed a separate group he 
called the Xikopokopo group. The name came from a small river that cut across the restitution 
farm, which Shirinda claimed marked a historical boundary between the Xikopokopo families 
and the families that retained control of the CPA committee. The group consisted of 
disaffected CPA members, including a few from the CPA committee. Other non-claimants from 
Vleifontein and beyond later swelled its ranks, mainly to take advantage of access to land. 
Shirinda constructed the division into a historical antagonism between the families which 
meant there was no possibility of coexistence within one authority structure: 
 
“Those people, before they moved out of the farm, they were not united, those 
people. You can ask Munzhedzi and Shimange what used to happen. My group will 
be staying in this area. That river will be the boundary. That other group will be 
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staying there. But when the commission has to hand over the farm, they hand it as 
a whole farm, they don’t hand it in pieces. So we here in this farm, we were two 
groups always.”109 
 
Opposition rested on explicit disagreement with the representations of space being proposed 
by those in control of the CPA committee. CPA members aligned with Xikopokopo asked 
whether it should be that all families were pushed together into a ‘community’ on one farm or 
whether it would be better to restore smaller pieces based on individual families and where 
they had stayed historically.110 Although this version of history was rejected by members of the 
CPA committee,111 they could not prevent the split and occupation. The Xikopokopo group 
proposed a radical sub-division of the land and the dissolution of the imposed cadastral 
boundaries.112 But according to the CPA committee, “the way we settled before can not 
happen now because we want to use the land productively, not just randomly. The land does 
not belong to Shirinda. He does not know anything about the land, that’s why he settles 
anywhere.”113 
 
Two specific points of concern were that the unauthorised settlement was located in an area 
that would cause pollution of water in the dam, and that the settlement was placed right next 
to an Anglo-Boer War gravesite and monument that was considered to have tourism potential. 
“If maybe they give a good reason why they must go and resettle up there, giving a good 
reason and not just going to disturb a tourist attraction there, and not disturbing the 
Vleifontein graveyard. It’s a disturbance. All those people are vandalising this portion up 
there.”114 The remaining committee members thus aligned themselves with the dominant 
representations of space, and its associated commercial land use plans, as a way of 
undermining the authority of the Xikopokopo group. But whatever the argument, there is little 
doubt that the lived spaces of those in the Xikopokopo group were significantly transformed. 
They shaped the space for themselves and did not bow to any authority other than the 
authority of the group, which by all accounts was not heavy-handed. 
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The Xikopokopo group had no formal authority structure, and decisions appeared to be made 
by Shirinda with a handful of others around him. In reality, they hardly constituted a ‘group’ at 
all, and were more a collection of individuals united only by Shirinda’s protection of their 
occupation of the land. It was difficult to tell to what extent Shirinda or those around him 
benefited materially from the occupation. There were suggestions that the land was being 
sold, but no tangible evidence was found. Some occupiers denied having paid anything to 
anyone, while others indicated they had already paid and others understood they would have 
to pay at a later stage: 
 
“We were not paying anything. What they are saying is, as we are going they want 
the municipality to come and cut sort of plots where we have proper stands. 
That’s when we can start paying rent…after they’ve cut they should send those 
measurements for title deed.”115 
 
The state played an ambivalent role in the conflict. David Baloyi of the CPA committee said,  
 
“There is no-one to intervene and advise. The Land Claims Commission says there 
are departmental lawyers to help, but they are failing to come. Our lawyers say it 
will cost R40,000 to evict the invaders, but we don’t have that money to pay. We 
wrote letters up to the Minister, but they don’t respond.”116 
 
The Xikopokopo group also sought state support for their own actions: 
 
“*The CPA committee] went to the regional land claims commissioner, and then 
he came here on 3 Dec 2006. He sent his deputy. We sat there and then he said, 
no, those people are complaining that you are establishing shacks here, and this 
area is not meant for resettlement… Then we gave him that resolution and said 
we agreed we should stay here.”117 
 
They also approached the DoA to provide them with material support for ploughing. The 
Limpopo Member of the Executive Council (MEC, the provincial equivalent of a Cabinet 
Minister) for Agriculture sent a local delegation to the Xikopokopo group following a letter 
requesting a meeting.118 However the delegation made no firm commitments, primarily 
because the broader dispute about group recognition and sub-division of land was outside the 
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mandate of the DoA. This was despite the occupation on the Mavungeni restitution farm 
producing a direct challenge to the authority of the CPA committee, and indirectly to the 
authority of the state that stood behind it. Even though the state was only sporadically 
present, both parties to the conflict continued looking to the state to provide a resolution. This 
indicated the extent to which the “idea of the state” (Abrams, 1988) remained intact. 
 
Why did the central state not respond more directly to these local failures of governance and 
authority? There were two possible answers to this: one was that there was no necessity for 
intervention in local disputes that threatened neither the state’s control over political space as 
a whole, nor the smooth flow of circuits of capital accumulation. The second possible answer 
was that the central state itself did not have adequate power or authority to intervene in the 
ways it would like to. Both of these had an element of truth to them. As much as the 
Mavungeni CPA committee or the Munzhedzi traditional authority struggled to assert their 
claims to authority in the face of competing claims, the central state’s presence also frayed at 
the edges the deeper it went into the areas marginal to the capitalist economy. Lack of state 
presence itself may be a contributing factor to the definition of these areas as marginal.  
 
Central state resources were not channelled into these areas, resulting in local level resource 
constraints (i.e. lack of investment in materialising specific representations of space). Rural 
development and land reform were important rhetorically at a national level as, increasingly, 
was smallholder production (African National Congress, 2007). However, this dissipated at 
local level in the face of more pressing national priorities as determined by the ruling party and 
the government. State actors might ideally have liked to intervene in a more proactive way to 
materialise their own representations of space, but were unable to. This did not constitute a 
crisis for the central state as long as it did not threaten priority circuits of accumulation and 
there was no immediate threat to its control over political space. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The introduction of the CPAs as democratic institutions of land governance had the potential 
significantly to alter the relations of authority and power, and of spatial relations in the 
Vleifontein area. However, the new institutions found themselves operating on islands, 
demarcated by inherited cadastral boundaries. They were shaped by the two forms of 
authority that survived South Africa’s political transition relatively unscathed: the authority of 
private land owners and traditional authority. The result was a tussle to define who would 
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have authority over restitution land and what the relationship between the different 
authorities would be. 
 
CPAs found themselves caught in the crosshairs of this struggle. From outside, both white 
landowners and traditional authorities attempted to exert their historical authority, built on 
different representations of space, and to subordinate the CPAs to this authority. These efforts 
were not fully successful, and only at Munzhedzi did traditional authorities gain some real 
ground. Internal to the CPAs, the middle class professionals who had led the claims initially 
found it relatively easy to take control of the institutions, relying both on their historical role as 
leaders of the claims and also on the lack of articulation of spatial conceptions that presented 
an alternative to the dominant commercial plans supported by government. 
 
But over time, internal tensions came to the fore. At Mavungeni, representations of space that 
relied heavily on experiences of labour tenancy and dispossession – represented by the 
Xikopokopo group - came into conflict with the dominant conceptions. This led to spatial 
practices and lived spaces that differed significantly from that proposed by government and 
supported by elites in the CPA committees. At Munzhedzi, the contingency of a pre-emptive 
land occupation led by the chief boosted traditional authority, resulting in the production of a 
‘betterment’ space and allowing the royal council effectively to usurp the power of the 
committee. The Nthabalala Tribal Authority was forced onto the back foot when its claim to a 
large swathe of land began disintegrating in the face of the transfer of pockets of land to 
private ownership under CPAs. It was compelled to renegotiate the terms of its authority, 
away from claims to ownership and towards claims to territorial authority. These dynamic 
processes were still unfolding. 
 
On all the farms, the historically centralised spatial structure of authority was dissolved, and 
the CPA committees were not entirely capable of asserting their own authority in the vacuum. 
This signalled a fragmentation of authority on the farms, with spatial implications that are 
developed in Chapter 6 on property relations and Chapter 7 on land use. 
 
Conflicts internal to claimant groups and between claimants and their neighbours have dogged 
land reform in South Africa. Although the claimant groups in the research site were relatively 
cohesive during the claims process, this cohesion gradually fragmented. A primary reason for 
this was a lack of resources to materialise post-transfer plans. This opened the way for growing 
frustration amongst claimants and increasing distrust of leaders. At Mavungeni and 
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Munzhedzi, CPA members questioned how resources were being allocated and used, with 
suggestions of financial impropriety arising. Those individuals who had their own resources 
were able to start using them on the land, while others were unable to advance their interests 
because of a lack of personal resources for production or settlement. Historical class and 
gender inequalities amongst claimants thus emerged as a growing point of contention. These 
aspects of the internal conflicts were similar to those experienced elsewhere in South Africa 
and in Africa more broadly (Zartman, 2000, Manji, 2001, Bosch, 2003). 
 
The issue of lack of access to land itself – a key point of conflict in Africa (Peters, 2004, 
Sietchiping, 2010) – manifested unevenly in the research site. It did not appear to be a major 
cause of conflict within claimant groups, but was already becoming a point of contention 
between claimant groups (e.g. the Munzhedzi royal council’s feeling that the land they had 
was not adequate for their needs) or between formal claimant groups and other ‘informal’ 
claimants (e.g. the loss of access to land by Vleifontein residents following land restitution to 
the claimant groups). 
 
The state responded by using the internal conflicts as a reason for not providing resources. 
Chapter 7 shows this in relation to the DoA’s reticence in providing resources at Mavungeni 
and Munzhedzi in particular. The grants were originally part of the restitution package. But as 
the state reassessed the extent to which it wanted to invest in group projects in marginal 
areas, the discourse changed to one where the grants were discretionary and dependent on 
CPAs formulating acceptable plans which were in line with the state’s own priorities for land 
reform and agricultural production. In addition, claimant groups had to prove they had the 
institutional capacity to absorb and productively utilise those resources119. So a downward 
spiral developed, of lack of resources generating or inflaming internal conflict, and conflict 
producing lack of resources. 
 
The state’s failure to provide the promised resources reignited underlying ethnic tensions that 
had been hidden for a time in the latter stages of the claims process. These re-emerged as a 
point of conflict between the different claimant groups,  manifesting in growing counter-claims 
based on traditional authority (especially from Munzhedzi) as well as intimations of ethnic bias 
by state actors. For example, at Munzhedzi there was a belief that the grants were being 
delayed and the state was not providing support because the RLCC was dominated by 
                                                          
119
 Comments by Lazarus Lepako, Manager: Restitution Systems and Support, Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture, at PhD research report back session, Elim, 17 June 2011 
123 
 
Shangaans. Likewise, at Mavungeni, individuals suggested that DoA support was not 
forthcoming because the Department was Venda-controlled. Old conflicts, which may have 
been overcome with a successful transfer of land and resources, re-emerged on the back of 
unreliable state support for land reform. Chapter 6 on property relations, and Chapter 7 on 
land use, show how some of these dynamics unfolded in practice. 
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CHAPTER 6: PROPERTY RELATIONS, LAND REFORM AND SPACE 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 showed how the space of Vleifontein was shaped by indigenous systems of property 
and authority, by the private property of white commercial farms, and by homeland 
consolidation and the establishment of Vleifontein. These generated sedimentations of 
authority, property and land use. Chapter 5 shows how authority and land governance after 
land reform arose on the back of these sedimentations. This chapter shows how property 
relations in processes of land reform were also shaped by these historical sedimentations. The 
first section of this chapter considers how representations of space were manifested in 
concepts of property in the land reform programme, both nationally and at the research site, 
where land claims were already under way prior to the land reform programme. I then turn to 
look at how representations of space and property were translated into spatial practice and 
how lived spaces were affected. 
6.2 Property and representations of space: a tension at the heart of restitution 
A “master narrative of loss and restoration” (Walker, 2008:12) underpinned the restitution 
sub-programme. The programme was a product of this narrative rather than its cause. 
Organised efforts to reclaim the land started prior to the official programme of the post-1994 
government. The roots of restitution lay in the actions of dispossessed groups and individuals 
in the 1980s to return to the land and to resist forced removals. At a national level, the 
emphasis of restitution on the restoration of rights for ‘black spot’120 removals biased it 
towards a middle class who had previously owned land (James, 2007). The national 
programme established institutional structures framed by this bias. Where restitution was 
based on labour tenant and farm dweller claims, as with the Vleifontein farms, the claims were 
manipulated to fit into the prevailing format, i.e. the return of whole farms based on the 
cadastral boundaries and the logic of private land ownership. In the research site, no claims 
were based on regaining lost rights to private property. 
 
Chapter 5 shows how traditional authorities at Munzhedzi and Nthabalala played a role in 
leading claims to land. This introduced a different element into the restitution process. These 
claims sought to reproduce indigenous tenure regimes rather than to restore private property. 
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To add complexity, the content of indigenous rights was contested. Traditional authority relied 
on a historical narrative that placed them at the centre of land control. Other inhabitants, as 
revealed in the opposition to the CLRA (Claassens and Cousins, 2008), argued against this 
notion. The state was faced with a dilemma about whether to secure group rights through 
forms of private property or through the recognition of customary forms of land rights 
(Cousins, 2008b:9). The outcome was an official framework that sought to combine the two in 
a sometimes uneasy relationship. While private property was retained as the overarching 
framework, some leeway existed within these boundaries to structure rights and obligations 
more in line with indigenous practices. 
 
On all the farms, the claims were led by an educated, professional layer who enrolled less 
educated claimants into active support of the claims. Historical class, or proto-class, 
differences lurked behind the apparent unity of the claims. Hellum and Derman (2010:204) 
identified a weakness in restitution being that insufficient attention was paid “to local 
communities’ complexities and divided interests.” Different representations of space were not 
consciously articulated at this stage, and the claims were constructed in such a way that no 
claimants felt excluded. Those who had ideas about commercial farming could co-exist with 
those who just wanted a better place to stay. Nevertheless, as Chapter 7 shows, a dominant 
conception of commercially productive spaces lay at the base of the way claims were 
formulated. The principles established by government on fairness and equity encouraged 
initial co-operation between claimants who may have had different representations of space 
underpinning their claims. According to Chris Baloyi of Shimange, a nascent small-scale 
capitalist farmer (Cousins, 2010b), and one of the leaders of the claim: 
 
“We never forgot about this place, because this is the place of our forefathers. 
Our ancestors are here. Our spirit, our love for this country never died. We are 
like the people of Israelites… Then our uncle, somewhere in 1986, my late uncle, 
Marks, he started a movement of going back to Efrata, like the Israel… When the 
new government came in and saying that all the people who have been forcefully 
removed, that are ready and are willing to claim their land back, the government 
are ready to support. That was a very ample opportunity for us. And we received 
that with two hands, and immediately we claimed the land.”121 
 
According to Boysie Baloyi, Shimange’s hereditary President who was also a middle class 
professional: 
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“This is about people being returned to the land from which they were driven… 
We are talking about the people who were once here and we want that land back 
for those people who can prove that the graves of their grandfathers and the 
graves of their parents and everybody are here. That’s first prize.”122 
 
These conceptions combined various historical experiences of labour tenancy, forced removal 
and dispossession regardless of class, gender or social status. As Chapter 5 shows, the 
Munzhedzi occupation was led by the traditional authority, which produced alternative 
representations of space that sought to replicate a chiefly version of the indigenous tenure 
regime. The lands of Mavungeni and Shimange were included as part of Munzhedzi’s original 
claim, because the entire area was considered to have been under the rule of Munzhedzi in 
the past. The RLCC facilitated an agreement for the chief to drop the claims to allow other 
claimants who had lived at Mavungeni and Shimange to claim them. However, these unwritten 
agreements later produced tensions over representations and their materialisation in spatial 
practice, especially after the arrival of Simon Rambau at Munzhedzi, the chief-designate who 
manifested an expansionist agenda (see Chapter 5). Unlike Nthabalala, who at least tactically 
agreed to a separation of territorial authority and ownership (Lund, 2010), the chief-designate 
insisted on pursuing claims to both, creating tensions with the CPAs at Mavungeni and 
Shimange. 
 
These various formulations of restitution within claimant groups significantly shaped the 
official programme by ensuring there was a collective aspect to restitution, and by placing 
redress of historical injustice at the centre of the notion of restitution. The collective nature of 
the claims pushed against dominant representations of private property as being individually 
owned. The very claim to a right to land based on past inhabitation and use, and not legal 
ownership, destabilised the core notion of the exchangeability of private property. 
 
However, these potential threats to private property were contained by the larger and more 
powerful forces of capital. These forces secured the protection of private property in the Bill of 
Rights in the 1996 national Constitution. If land reform – and even restitution – was to take 
place, the rights of current property owners would have to be bought from them at market-
related rates. The representation of space based on private property was imposed from 
outside as part of a broader political settlement. The property clause clearly leaned towards a 
conception of property aligned with the production of capitalist space. However, the national 
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Constitution also incorporated elements of redress of past injustice, including the imperative 
for land reform and security of tenure for all citizens. The land reform process incorporated 
these divergent goals in its conceptions of property, producing contradictions that were to play 
themselves out in practice. On the one hand was the notion of private property as an 
economic asset. On the other hand was the importance of collective ownership, and of equity 
in distribution of land amongst claimants. Other non-economic values, including notions of 
ancestors, home, memory, past and future, were also included in representations of property.  
 
The outcome was a representation of space that emphasised the fixed, clearly-defined 
boundaries of private property and the exclusive rights that accompanied ownership, but 
which incorporated a notion of collective ownership more closely identified with indigenous 
tenure systems. Principles of equity and fairness were written in to the individual CPA 
constitutions, limiting individuals from accumulating more land than others within restored 
properties. This produced a hybrid that could be termed collective private ownership (Cousins, 
2008b). The collective character of ownership did not draw explicitly on indigenous tenure or 
land rights systems. This was left open to contestation. Collectives, in the institutional form of 
the CPAs, owned the land and had authority for land governance, but within the fragmented 
spaces of private property and with rights to exclude others from the land. 
 
Wrapped within the dominant representations of space based on private property were 
conceptions of what that property should be used for. Commercial (capitalist) use of the farm 
spaces had long become a core component of the meaning of privately-owned farm land. As 
far back as the enclosures in England, private property was represented as “an inevitable 
response to the need for greater efficiency in agricultural production” (Peters, 2007:4). In this 
logic, return of the land is impractical. Instead, redress should be provided on the basis of a 
continuation of existing forms of production, but extended to incorporate those who were 
removed from the land. Lived spaces were not to be altered. When questioned about how the 
production model – the spatial practices of apartheid agriculture - could be kept intact, based 
as it was on the dispossession and super-exploitation of the black population, a Makhado land 
reform advisor justified it in these terms: 
 
“I know there was exploitation of workers before, when they were earning very, 
very less. But maybe we can just check in terms of production. Those previous 
owners were earning a lot of money. It’s just that there was a bad side, where the 
workers were being exploited. But in terms of production itself, they were gaining 
a lot and they were contributing… These [white commercial] farms, before the 
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restitution, they were providing enough for the entire economy of South Africa. 
Which means, that’s the responsibility of the government to make it a point that 
those people employed there, they must remain there… So those people, they 
must remain…in order to feed their families, and at the same time contributing to 
the economy of the entire country. That’s why I say it’s very, very important for 
the department, the government to maintain what was before.”123 
 
According to the advisors: “You can never take away the pain and loss that people have 
experienced, no matter what you do. So the best thing to do is improve people’s lives.”124 This 
lay at the heart of the debate about the role of land in development and was based on the 
logic that it is impossible to realise a radical, egalitarian redistribution of the land and also have 
a strong economy and food production. They were set up in a binary relationship to one 
another. The implicit, and sometimes explicit, relationships were between collective or 
‘communal’ property (egalitarian distribution but with a weak economy) and individual, private 
property (unequal distribution but with a strong economy). The concept of property was 
integrally connected to the organisation of economic activity within the fragmented spaces. 
There was an assumption that any private farm land was automatically profitable and 
productive. 
 
This was further entrenched in the way restitution was formulated to respond to racist state 
actions after 1913, but which left exploitative capitalist relations untouched. The conception of 
restitution was narrowed to exclude the injustice of dispossession resulting from capitalist 
relations of production. This would have necessitated a more radical questioning of private 
property relations, and the social relations of production. Remedying the injustice of ‘super-
exploitation’ of black farm workers (Marcus, 1989) was not part of the redress envisaged in the 
restitution programme. This was made explicit in the Popela restitution claim125 appeal, where 
the court ruled that evictions or removals made on the basis of ‘business’ decisions fell outside 
the ambit of restitution (Supreme Court of Appeal, 2006). The Constitutional Court later 
overturned this judgement, arguing that the existence of labour tenancy itself was the product 
of racist laws and practices (Lahiff, 2008a). Despite the Constitutional Court ruling, white 
farmers used the logic of dividing political from economic actions to argue that some claims 
were not legitimate: 
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“If they’ve been evicted for political reasons, that’s fine, they’ve got a claim… 
There are a lot of claims. We accept that. We accept that, it’s no problem… [But] I 
know there are blokes here who they don’t even know, who’ve come to settle 
here [at Mavungeni+… As far as we are concerned, people who moved off on their 
own, there’s no claim.”126 
 
The private property framework is built on the cadastral system of demarcating farms. Some 
farms were divided into portions over the years. Subdivision of agricultural land was prohibited 
by a 1970 law127 that remained on the books in 2010 despite a repeal Act being passed in 1998, 
but which was not promulgated (Hall, 2009b). The underlying purpose of the Act was to 
prevent the fragmentation of agricultural lands into units not considered to be viable for the 
kind of agriculture practised in South Africa, viz. large-scale mono-cropping. This meant that 
when the farms were transferred, portions or whole farms had to be transferred intact. This 
led to a mismatch between the access people had in the past and the access they had after 
land reform. This opened the possibility for the transformation of lived space for claimants. 
Claimants recognised this, and grasped the opportunity to widen their claims: 
 
“*The cadastral boundaries are] why we would be able to claim this [land] back. 
Otherwise what would we claim? Even if I show you the monuments for these old 
graves here, where can I claim? I cannot claim a small portion here (laughs). So we 
have managed to claim from up there [points to the east+ down to the tar road.”128 
 
The Hennings, who previously owned the land, saw this as unjust: 
 
“On this farm…there was a small little hamlet there, there was a small hamlet 
there. They could hardly even call themselves a community. They were probably 
occupying how many hectares, maybe 10 or 15 ha?... Now this farm was pretty 
much developed when those people were kicked off, when they eventually got 
kicked off in the 80s… So people who lived there, they had specific areas where 
they stayed. Their rights were pretty limited. I mean they maybe planted a bit of 
maize and stuff, you know? But there was not wide-scale traversing of the farm for 
cattle, or herding or whatever. I mean, I can’t remember anyone having cattle 
when I was young here on the farm… So it is a tricky one. And now they are 
claiming the whole farm, or they were told to claim the whole farm… We’re 
claiming that we lost our business on the whole farm. They’re claiming, or they 
should be claiming for loss of residential rights.”129 
 
There is some logic to this, but only if one accepts that the squeezed informal ‘rights’ to land 
that black inhabitants had at the time of their forced removal in the 1970s or 1980s were the 
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basis on which restitution claims were being – or should be - made. But, as Chapter 4 shows, 
these rights were all that was left after a long history of struggle by inhabitants to retain some 
land access, and the not insubstantial efforts of land owners to diminish these rights. Even if 
1913 was the official cut-off date, claimants were not merely claiming the informal rights they 
had at the time of removal, but were reclaiming their entire historical relationship to the land, 
which was far more expansive. In the conceptions of some claimants at least, restitution 
sought to revive the lived space of pre-colonial times, while white land owners sought to 
restrict the lived spaces to a tenant relationship. The land reform programme intervened by 
squeezing this expansive relationship into the inherited cadastral boundaries, reproducing 
fragmented spaces structured with exchange in mind. 
 
These boundaries were produced historically in a particular social context and that became 
ossified over time and inflexible, unable to adapt readily to changing social dynamics. The 
boundaries were created in the 1890s, with various subdivisions along the way. They were 
large farms to ensure all land was covered by a white landlord (whether productively used or 
not) and these particular farms were constructed to serve as buffer zones between white and 
black, as Chapter 4 shows. They were not constructed in the interests of black inhabitants. 
Restitution transferred the farms with their boundaries intact (although Vleyfontein 310LS was 
effectively subdivided between the two land claims and Vleifontein settlement), regardless of 
the relevance or not of those boundaries. 
 
The result was that land reform produced a hybridised merger of different representations of 
property, with collective redress of past injustice manifested in collective ownership sitting 
uneasily with private property based on fixed, clearly-defined boundaries and exclusive rights 
of ownership. The resulting model could be considered to be one of collective private 
ownership (Cousins, 2008b). The private character of property relations hinged on two 
fundamental representations and spatial practices: fixed, clearly-defined boundaries; and the 
content of the exclusive rights of ownership, mediated by the collective nature of the 
ownership. Before turning to the way these representations were materialised in practice, and 
the contestations that surfaced as a result, more detail is provided on the ways the exclusive 
rights of ownership were shaped by collective ownership. This shows the point at which 
private and indigenous conceptions of property intersected, producing unique micro-spatial 
arrangements. 
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6.3 The structure of property relations within the fragmented spaces of land reform 
6.3.1 Collective ownership 
Although property relations reproduced a macro-spatial framework of fragmented spaces 
dominated by representations of private property, land reform was a decisive intervention in 
transferring land ownership to those historically subordinated in the prevailing social relations.  
Commercial farm boundaries were retained as far as possible, and land reform aligned with 
these boundaries. Sometimes this made sense. For example at Shimange, the land was 
historically named Vudyodyodyo. The boundaries were seen as more or less contiguous with 
what later became Syferfontein. Says a claimant: 
 
“I can show you the whole Vudyodyodyo when we are standing there [at my 
home]. From there right up to that mountain standing there, you come around 
until here and join the rondavel again [on the border of Vleifontein township+… 
This Syferfontein, according to us, it’s Vudyodyodyo. It’s what the Europeans have 
given us, yours will be Syferfontein. And we said what’s wrong with Vudyodyodyo, 
we are from Vudyodyodyo. They said no, we cannot pronounce that thing, so it’s 
better to say Syferfontein (laughs).”130 
 
In other cases the historical extent of land and the formal farm boundaries did not align so 
directly. Chapter 4 shows how the location of the chief’s kraal moved when a new chief was 
inaugurated, which meant the space shifted over time in relation to the chief’s kraal. But when 
the Nthabalala Tribal Authority formalised its claim, it did so on the basis of existing farm 
boundaries (Figure 6). This made the space static instead of dynamic, with flexible and moving 
borders. Lived space was constrained by these imposed boundaries. The Mavungeni claim was 
the opposite: it was a collation of individual household claims merged into a single group claim 
encompassing a full farm. The land was not necessarily held ‘in common’ (the way the 
Restitution Act defined ‘community’), and individual households had only used portions of the 
land. Lived space was thus liberated. Instead of a tightly controlled space from above where 
movement and daily activity was severely restricted, land reform opened the entire space to 
claimants. This merging of individual claims came at the cost of creating possible tensions 
within claimant groups. At Mavungeni: 
 
“You know the Commission is awarding a claim in terms of a farm. Those people, 
before they moved out of the farm, they were not united, those people. You can 
ask Munzhedzi and Shimange what used to happen. My group will be staying in 
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this area. That river will be the boundary. That other group will be staying there. 
But when the Commission has to hand over the farm, they hand it as a whole 
farm, they don’t hand it in pieces. So we here in this farm, we were two groups 
always. But we merged, because we were going to fight one enemy, which was 
the government, to give us the land. But immediately the government has given 
the farm, then that division started.”131 
 
Although this version of history was questioned by other claimants, it revealed that claimant 
‘communities’ were manufactured in order to permit the transfer of parcels of private 
property. The claims process thus sought to maintain the integrity of the formal farm 
boundaries. Restitution therefore did not produce a direct restoration of historical ties to the 
land. It converted the conventions and social norms that underpinned pre-colonial governance 
institutions, as well as the ‘informal’ rights that displaced these conventions and norms when 
private property became the dominant form of organising the land, into formal collective 
ownership of private property. The displaced conventions and norms included tenure 
arrangements, agreements on use of the land for crop production and livestock grazing, the 
location of burial sites and the associated spatial practices that accompanied them, movement 
across the land, and the utilisation of natural resources found on the land. Restitution 
transferred rights to (collective) exclusive control over material resources across the bounded 
space of individual farms to anyone who previously had any of these rights and could prove it 
in some way. 
 
All claimants were made equal before the law, regardless of the customs and conventions that 
previously structured their relationship to the land. Men and women, chiefs and commoners, 
all became individual members of CPAs with theoretically equal rights to the land. However, 
the precise content of these rights were not clearly defined. Cousins (2008b:10) warns that 
“codified versions of ‘custom’ can be a highly unreliable guide to current realities.” In the 
research site, this codification was weakly articulated. There was no formal embrace of the 
rights and obligations found in indigenous social orders which allowed for the definition of 
alternative mechanisms through which land resources might be controlled and managed 
(Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). Instead, the content of rights was defined by local contestations, 
shaped by inherently unequal relations of power.  
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The CPA Act132 allowed for the sale of collectively-owned private property, in part or in whole, 
with the consent of the majority of members present at a general meeting of members. This 
right to alienate the land for profit is one of the key entitlements private property gives to the 
owner. In practice, collective ownership made sale of the land difficult, but it was possible in 
theory. The government’s adoption of a ‘use it or lose it’ policy for redistribution land in 2008 
led some to believe it also applied to restitution land. The policy said that redistribution land 
was only given to beneficiaries on condition that they actively used the land for production 
and, indeed, made a profit from it. Failure to do so would result in the state repossessing the 
land and transferring it to another owner (Sapa, 2010). Minister of Rural Development and 
Land Affairs Gugile Nkwinti made it clear that production was expected to generate enough 
income to be able to pay taxes to the state (“the state loses revenue”), i.e. that it should be 
commercial: 
 
“Those who got land through redistribution, if they don't use that land, we will 
take it… More than 90% of those are not functional, they are not productive and 
therefore the state loses revenue… The agriculture sector's production as a 
proportion of the GDP is going down - this is part of the reason. That land has 
been given to people and they are not using it. No country can afford that” (Sapa, 
2010:1). 
 
The state had not yet transferred title deeds on any of the farms, and there were suspicions 
amongst claimants that the reason for this was to allow the state to reclaim the land if 
necessary. At Mavungeni, which had both redistribution and restitution farms, CPA members 
said: 
 
“SLAG *the redistribution land] belongs to government. If people are not working, 
they can be moved out and others will come in. The structures belong to 
government… None of the farms [redistribution or restitution] have title deeds. 
The land belongs to the government… Government plans must be carried out, or 
they can take it back.”133 
 
Demand for title is often an expression of “a desire for greater security and certainty of land 
rights rather than exclusive private ownership as such” (Cousins, 2008b:10). In the absence of 
any other clearly defined rights, the lack of title created insecurity of ownership. For some, like 
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at Mavungeni, it shaped spatial practice, since the belief was that claimants had to do what 
government wanted them to do otherwise they could lose the land again. 
 
Property rights from restitution were as strong as the rights previous individual private 
property owners had, although mediated by the need for the majority of the landowning 
collective to agree to sale of the land if this was desired. But even though rights ‘enable 
power’134 they are only as strong as the ability to enforce them. The state was reactive at best 
in its support of new land owners in their attempts to retain the integrity of their property, and 
the landowning collectives were fragmented and weak. Pienaar and Smith135 pointed to on-
going lack of public administrative support for collective rights, and argued this was a result of 
an institutional bias in South African property law towards ownership at the expense of 
community-based property rights (see also van der Walt, 1999). In practice, lack of state 
enforcement meant rights and obligations transferred with land ownership were manipulated, 
ignored or defended in localised struggles for control over the land. 
6.3.2 Individual tenure 
“We still have to come back and tell the CPA what will happen to ownership at an 
individual level. The CPA does not provide for the individual. It provides for the 
collective. Constitutionally, the individual needs to be clearly defined. That 
legislation is going to be relooked at, because it’s nebulous to say the CPA. If I 
want to get a loan somewhere they will say what have you got? I can’t say I have 
got land, because I don’t. It belongs to the CPA. You [as an individual] are not the 
CPA.”136 
 
The relationship between individual property and tenure rights and collective rights is a major 
issue for indigenous tenure systems in Africa (Peters, 2007, Lund, 2010). The CPA constitutions 
varied in their handling of this question. The Shimange constitution stated that members of 
the association were entitled to individual ownership of the land in title. It suggested this 
would be for residential purposes and would belong to the member or their descendants 
permanently. Inheritance of an individual’s entitlements was explicitly permitted. The 
individually-owned land could be sold, but the CPA was to be given first option to buy, and any 
sale would be subject to ratification by the CPA committee. Land for commercial production 
would be allocated to individuals or groups, but the CPA would need to derive some benefit 
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from such activities. The exact benefits would be negotiated and CPA members would need to 
agree to the terms. For businesses, the constitution proposed a stake in the business for the 
CPA as a legal entity. Partnerships and joint ventures were acceptable but no portion of the 
property could be disposed of in such partnerships. Land would also be made available to 
members for ‘subsistence’ production on a use it or lose it basis. The constitution said that “all 
members shall be treated equally. Different classes shall not lead to different rights to land or 
resources.”137 
 
The Mavungeni constitution made provision for the allocation of specific sites for the exclusive 
occupation of members and for sites for any purpose other than agricultural use. Every 
member had the right to a plot for residential and agricultural production, and access to 
shared grazing land and communal facilities as allocated by the committee. Members were 
permitted to lease their rights on approval of the committee and agreement from 50% of all 
members. At Munzhedzi, individuals were entitled to individual ownership of the land in title 
(the same wording as at Shimange). The CPA would hold part of the land communally for 
activities to benefit the CPA as a whole, including for business and agriculture. A standard 
clause in the constitutions allowed CPAs or the committees to enter into arrangements that 
involved some differentiation between members, but on condition that a bona fide attempt 
was made to avoid disparity and to ensure broad equity and fairness amongst members. 
Generally, though, the precise mechanisms for land allocation and for profit sharing were not 
defined in the constitutions, and this was left up to the CPA committees to work out. 
 
In essence, individuals were granted individual rights to ownership of land nested in a 
collective framework. As much as the reproduction of the cadastral boundaries and exclusive 
ownership rights drew from private property, these nested individual rights in a collective 
ownership model replicated aspects of indigenous tenure. There were explicit constraints on 
some members acquiring too much land in relation to others, and men and women claimants 
got exactly the same rights in theory.138 The rights were compatible with a range of spatial 
possibilities, which were left open in the constitutions. 
 
The constitutions did not deal in any detail with the issue of the rights of members who did not 
immediately take up their entitlements in relation to those ‘pioneers’ who put effort into 
creating a material base on the farm that others could later use. The Shimange constitution 
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said members who were not planning to move onto the farm until “provision of basic 
infrastructure is well established” would have the same rights as those who came to the farm 
immediately, but on condition that they participated in the development initiatives. It did not 
state what rights would be granted those who did not first participate in this way. Given the 
framework of individual ownership within the collective, this did not seem to pose a difficult 
problem: 
 
“If other beneficiaries come to the farm after things are established, we show 
them the bush if they want to start, if there’s space. It should be that people 
contribute to the CPA committee if they are working or living on the farm. But 
there are not lots of people so we can’t work like that. That would be the ideal 
situation.”139 
 
At Mavungeni, where there were more collective projects with greater economic value, it was 
more of an issue: 
 
“There are lots of people who are not participating. We need people who are 
working. We have rules that if you don’t come to work on the farm, you can’t 
benefit… If people don’t contribute now, they can’t take advantage later. We are 
suffering now to build the place.”140 
 
In response to allegations that a handful of claimants organised through the CPA committee 
were keeping collective projects to themselves, David Baloyi retorted: 
 
“Who is doing that production? Who is doing it? Those who are busy working, 
they are getting some… You see, we have started down in that chicken shed [on 
the redistribution portion of Mavungeni], attending some meetings, doing some 
application forms. So [when production starts+…then you come and say you need 
some shares now. We have done all the job. Who has done all the spadework 
there?”141 
 
Where people invested their own resources it was reasonable to suggest they should profit 
from the results. But where public funds were invested on collectively-owned land (as with the 
poultry project at Mavungeni, detailed in Chapter 7), there was a case for arguing that the 
collective should benefit, in the form of money going to the CPA for use in developing the farm 
in ways that members agreed on. But in the absence of transparent agreements about how 
projects in the name of the collective were started, it was very difficult for ordinary CPA 
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members to know what was due to them as a group. At the Mavungeni poultry house, built 
using government funds and with a commercial supply contract, the benefit of the business to 
the CPA was unclear apart from project members paying the CPA committee R10,000 for 
leasing “now and then.”142 
 
Tenure rights of non-claimant individuals, whose access to the land was approved by the CPA 
committee, were neglected in the constitutions. This created a category of inhabitants with 
less secure tenure rights, since these were open to withdrawal. In practice, access to the land 
varied from farm to farm. At Munzhedzi the land was open to all, but subject to approval by 
the chief and (ostensibly) the CPA committee. The occupation of the land two years before the 
settlement of the restitution claim opened the way for a flood of people, claimants and non-
claimants alike. In 2008, 80% of stands were inhabited by non-claimants, although the number 
of non-claimants dropped off sharply from 2007 (Aliber et al., 2009b:68). According to the 
chief-designate, “Before I was here, my father was accepting everybody, even though a person 
is not a beneficiary. For me, I concentrate too much on the beneficiaries. The movement onto 
the land has declined drastically.”143 At Shimange, access was limited to claimants, except for a 
few invited individuals who had historic links to the farm, including the da Gamas whose 
ancestors taught at Efrata, and Clement Baloyi who worked with one of the claimants on the 
farm, but who was originally invited by the late Marks Baloyi, the former chair of the CPA. Of 
tenure security Clement said: 
  
“I feel more than secure, but I don’t know what is going to happen if they get 
money. You see, money is the root of evil. Maybe they can handle me well during 
this time of suffocation, but after they get money maybe they are going to reject 
me. I don’t know. But I don’t think so… I feel as part of them because they already 
showed me a sort of love.”144 
 
However, this sense of security was not always as real as non-claimants might have felt. In 
another case at Shimange, the former CPA chair, the late Marks Baloyi, allocated Jimmy and 
Rita da Gama a piece of land for production. They used their own resources to clear the land, 
only to be informed after the death of Marks in 2009 that they were not part of the claimants. 
The land they were clearing was earmarked for a collective olive tree orchard and they were 
no longer permitted to plant there. They either wanted compensation for the work they had 
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already done or a formal agreement that they could settle there.145 It appeared that the issue 
was resolved because Rita da Gama was later elected onto an interim CPA committee. 
However, this revealed the possibility of less secure tenure for non-claimants, where informal, 
verbally-agreed access could be withdrawn on a whim. This was especially so in the conditions 
of lack of accountability and transparency that characterised the CPA committees, as Chapter 5 
shows. 
 
At Mavungeni, only claimants were permitted to settle on the land, although the Mavungeni 
constitution did allow for the granting of membership to other people beyond the official 
claimant list, if approved at a special general meeting of the CPA. Nevertheless, the breakaway 
Xikopokopo group invited non-claimants to settle on the farm when they decided to occupy in 
defiance of the CPA committee. This inflamed tensions with the CPA committee, who first tried 
to use the courts to interdict Shirinda and other Xikopokopo members from occupying.146 The 
case failed to prevent the occupation of the land, leading the CPA committee to ask why 
Shirinda was giving the land away. The CPA committee approached the occupiers and warned 
them to dismantle their shacks.147 The warnings were ignored and the conflict escalated to the 
extent that CPA committee members talked about burning dwellings down if the occupiers did 
not leave. However these threats were not carried out, and the unauthorised settlement 
expanded further. Some of the non-claimants expressed surprise that their plots might be 
unauthorised. According to them, they were invited onto the land legitimately by Shirinda.148 
One of the non-claimant occupiers understood there were tensions and that he could be 
evicted, but this did not deter him: 
 
“I am not the beneficiary of the claim. I was just put as a community to add into 
the farm, to benefit from the farm… I don’t think they will do that *evict me], 
because that community is very small and I don’t think they will use the whole 
land that’s available according to them… For the meantime I think it is fine… That 
insecurity is the thing which delayed us to use the land before. But now, at times 
if you hear things daily, you just tend to develop thick skin and say ‘no…let me 
continue’, because you see that thing *the conflict] will last four or five years, and 
you will just stagnate. So if it lasts four or five years, you will be somewhere else 
by that time.”149 
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The uneasy merger of differing conceptions of property had contradictory effects on spatial 
practice. On the one hand, at the macro-spatial level, land reform was contained within the 
homogenous and fragmented space of private property carved up into discrete exchangeable 
parcels, as Lefebvre characterised capitalist space. Although the collective nature of ownership 
under restitution – and also redistribution in the case of Mavungeni – mediated the character 
of the specific rights transferred with private ownership, it was structured to retain the private 
farm boundaries relatively intact. On the other hand, at the micro-spatial level, internal to the 
bounded farm units, rights were flexible enough to incorporate many different spatial 
trajectories, the subject of Chapter 7. It opened opportunities for changes in lived space. The 
material transfer of resources to collectives, and the weak institutional structures that 
accompanied this transfer, gave rise to contestation over the meaning of property rights and 
ownership and over the way ownership was formulated and emerged in practice. The 
everyday spatial practices derived from the lived spaces of inhabitants thus reflected back on 
conceptions of property and on the spatial practices on the farms. 
6.4 Collective private ownership and spatial practice 
The emphasis on private property required the securing of the boundaries, which relied 
heavily on inhabitants accepting the legitimacy both of the boundaries and of the property 
rights of the new owners, and behind that, agreeing with the principle that property should be 
fragmented and owned. These were materialised in spatial practice in two fundamental ways. 
The first was the securing of the fixed, clearly-demarcated boundaries established by the 
cadastral system. The second was the practical expression of the exclusive rights given to the 
new land owners. Contestation around these two dominant spatial practices – practices built 
on the basis of the dominant representations of space that privileged private property – 
indicated the extent to which inhabitants questioned the validity of these dominant 
representations and practices. 
6.4.1 Contesting boundaries 
Despite the superficial sense that inhabitants recognised the fixed, clearly-demarcated 
boundaries and the exclusive rights of the new owners, there were a number of cases of 
deliberate encroachment of boundaries. This led to fairly high levels of individual and group 
encroachment, which in turn forced land owners to accommodate these unofficial claims. The 
result was an unofficial intrusion on private property rights in practice. A key issue for any 
landowner, especially in conditions of land scarcity in the population, is how to secure the 
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borders of their land. Unauthorised encroachment onto the land undermines their authority 
over the land, and prevents them from realising their rights of ownership. This applies to 
individual private owners, collective owners and traditional authorities alike. The question of 
the integrity of private property rights and what reproduces them came to the fore in the 
practical challenge to, and in some cases the dissolution of, boundaries between parcels of 
land historically clearly demarcated and separated from one another.  
 
Some of the encroachments were relatively benign, suggesting a mutual recognition that the 
cadastral boundaries had become irrelevant. The Uitschot farm was a case in point. It was 
originally included in the Mavungeni claim, but was dropped when the claimants realised that 
the Shimange claimants had also included it. However, a bureaucratic error saw the farm 
excluded from the Shimange claim, even though people who had historically lived on that farm 
were included in the Shimange claimant list. This did not prevent individuals from moving on 
to the land, building houses, clearing fields and engaging in agricultural production. Samuel 
Vukeya had a portion of land on the boundary between Mavungeni and Uitschot allocated to 
him by the Mavungeni CPA committee.150 
 
Ms Mdluli, whose family lived on the farm historically, occupied a portion of the land without 
receiving authorisation from anyone. This poses the question of who would be in a position to 
authorise her occupation. It could only be the state as the legal owner of the land. But her 
right to occupy and use the land was recognised tacitly by local inhabitants as legitimate, 
based on prior habitation. The acceptance of her occupation was not because she had power 
over others, but because her right to be on that land was collectively recognised by people 
who historically inhabited the area. Inhabitants were able to recuperate historical lived 
experiences to determine spatial practice. The boundary was questionable: on all its sides – 
Mavungeni, Uitschot and Shimange – inhabitants were from the same clans and were 
intermarried. Historically they did not live entirely separately from one another.151 Boundaries 
and fences were imposed between them for purposes that were not in their interests. This 
reinforced the statement made by Jim Khosa from Shimange that “fences are a colonial 
invention.”152 The cadastral boundaries between Uitschot, Vleyfontein and Syferfontein farms 
were arbitrary divisions, serving the interests of white domination on the land. 
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At a broader level, going well beyond the five farms, some individuals hunted and collected 
indigenous herbs for healing, with no regard at all for the individual farm boundaries or even 
the boundaries of game reserves.153 There was no malice in these actions. Rather they offered 
completely different conceptions of space and ownership, unhindered by fences and 
boundaries. Moore (2005:101) refers to these as “transgressive spatial practices,” which is apt 
in this context as long as spatial practices are understood in terms of private property. As soon 
as alternative practices and conceptions of property are considered – for example, natural 
resources as the common property of all inhabitants – these practices cease to be 
transgressive. Private property, by arbitrarily fragmenting land for the purposes of control and 
accumulation and putting it under the exclusive ownership of individuals, is the transgressive 
practice. 
 
But not all intrusions across boundaries were quite so benign or universally accepted. In some 
places, previous users of the land and the resources found on it were not so keen to relinquish 
their access. The Vleifontein residents, who used land for cropping and grazing on all the farms 
before land reform, grudgingly acknowledged the legitimacy of the restitution claims, but were 
dissatisfied that their own access had been curtailed. 
 
“Here started Maila. He started to bring his people from Nthabalala. He brought 
them, and he says this is his own land. Alright, we did not complain because we 
were brought here. We were brought here! OK, no complaints, if somebody is 
now wanting their land back, we did not complain. OK. Then came Munzhedzi… 
He also claimed his land. They took the other side, that whole side there [west of 
Vleifontein], they took it from us… When we started to hear that the Mavungeni 
are claiming this place, this side, we went, ‘the headman gave us that place, and 
the President [of the former Venda homeland+ also gave us that place’. They said 
‘no!’, so from now there is a wire *fence+ there, it’s an old wire… The government 
sent Miyelani [Nkatingi, from the Limpopo RLCC, before he became the Acting 
Commissioner+… He said, ‘from today you people from Vleifontein, until this wire, 
it’s their *Mavungeni’s+ place’… Look, we are on an island now.”154 
 
Since Munzhedzi had filled up with residential stands, the Vleifontein residents turned to 
Mavungeni for land for production. The Mavungeni CPA committee was able to contain this by 
asking for small rentals to use the land, although others continued using the land for grazing 
without any agreement.155 However, in doing so the committee invoked the urban-rural 
frontier: 
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“Since 2002 when we were given this land, we have tried to avoid people from 
Vleifontein using this farm. All people from Vleifontein were doing grazing here. We 
cannot blame them. It was before we claimed and they did not know that it 
belonged to some other community. They thought maybe it was no-man’s land, 
because AgriVen came and used this farm for many years also… [What should they 
do with their cattle?] They know the by-laws don’t allow them to farm. In a 
township, no. The by-laws are there. That’s why when we got this farm, 
immediately we went and informed them, that the by-laws, you are not allowed to 
farm. Otherwise you must go and buy a farm or a plot where you can farm or 
lease.”156 
 
While restitution opened space for some inhabitants to alter their lived spaces in ways they 
chose, it simultaneously threatened the lived spaces of Vleifontein residents and other 
inhabitants without formal claims. The Vleifontein residents’ struggles to keep cattle and 
engage in cropping were struggles to retain rural, land-based livelihood options in conditions 
where they were unable to rely fully on urban wages. “The urban frontier”, said Cross et al. 
(1998:643), “is located where people succeed in establishing it.” Definitions of urban and rural 
were mobilised in the social conflict over land to produce “stricter definitions of those with 
legitimate claims to resources” and to define group boundaries more exclusively (Peters, 
2007:17). The Mavungeni CPA committee defined Vleifontein as urban in order to protect their 
own rural assets, while the residents of Vleifontein fought for the recognition of their own 
rural livelihoods. This was partly to keep alive rural livelihood options, but also to keep the 
memories of their own land dispossession alive. Some Vleifontein residents found other ways 
onto the land: by participating in the Xikopokopo group’s occupation at Mavungeni, or through 
a few leases on available land at Munzhedzi. At Shimange, one cattle owner from Maila 
continued using grazing camps he had previously established for 300 cattle, despite neither 
requesting nor receiving permission from the CPA committee. Other Vleifontein and Maila 
inhabitants continued harvesting firewood at Shimange even after restitution.157 Lived space, 
memories and necessity combined to shape responses to dominant spatial practices. 
 
The more deliberate, aggressive attempts to destabilise boundaries came from two quite 
different sources. On the one hand, individuals who had previously used land for production 
and whose access was curtailed sometimes felt unfairly constrained by this. The Vleifontein 
residents were one example. Mike Malehase, with a stand in Munzhedzi on Shimange’s 
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boundary, who was prevented from grazing cattle on Shimange land after land reform, was 
another: 
 
“Now those people *the Shimanges+… Ah, they fight too much! They said we must 
go. We said to them, no, how can you come here, say you are a king, a chief, 
what. Even a chief can’t survive alone. You must live with others, so that you must 
share. That’s why I see with these Shimange people, they’ve got a problem… You 
look at the place today, it’s still like that. If it was that time, they allowed us and 
we become a partnership, by this time there would have been some job creation, 
plenty of things… At the end of the day you find that some people are suffering 
because of other people. They are just taking the land and doing nothing with it, 
knowing that there are guys who have got cows, there are guys who are 
interested.”158 
 
He respected the boundary by not grazing his cattle there, although he also expressed interest 
in accessing land at Mavungeni through participating in the Xikopokopo occupation. Others 
were not as circumspect in transgressing the boundaries. And their logic was similar to his: the 
land is standing empty and we need it for production. 
 
“I had plus-minus 15 ha of land at Mavungeni for maize before the claim. We also 
each had our own kraal and land for grazing the cattle [open access]. Now that is 
taken away. Our cattle just roam around Mavungeni… I still keep a kraal for my 
cattle at Mavungeni, though they are fewer, but I don’t have an agreement with 
them to do that.”159 
 
The argument was that property was of value if it was productively utilised. Otherwise it had 
to devolve to others to use. In this sense, property was contingent on use, an attitude 
reflected in government’s ‘use it or lose it’ policy. Even though the official policy did not apply 
to restitution land, the discourse it established reinforced ideas about the link between land 
ownership and productive use of land. In short, dominant representations of space, and their 
materialisation in dominant spatial practices of maintenance of fixed boundaries and exclusive 
ownership rights, were questioned on the basis of a lived experience of using the land. 
 
The second motivation for aggressive acts to destabilise boundaries emanated from the 
traditional authorities, specifically at Munzhedzi. The royal council was dissatisfied with the 
separation of the individual restitution claims and the subsequent loss of claims to authority 
over the land and inhabitants, who did not pledge loyalty to Munzhedzi. Simon Rambau, the 
chief-designate, was vociferous in his claims that Munzhedzi was short-changed in the 
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restitution process, and that the Munzhedzi chieftaincy was the legitimate owner of the land. 
He deliberately began encroaching on land belonging to other restitution groups by cutting 
and selling stands on the western boundary with Shimange,160 with threats to do the same on 
the Mavungeni redistribution portion. The chief-designate was advancing his own claims to the 
land of Shimange and Mavungeni, rooted in different representations of space that precluded 
recognition of the cadastral boundaries of private property.  
 
Contestation of boundaries was also evident between Mavungeni and the Hennings, their 
white neighbours at Moddervlei. If one thing united the warring groups at Mavungeni, it was a 
common dissatisfaction with the boundary relations with the Hennings. Early on the Hennings 
were accused of taking advantage of the relative confusion that accompanied the claims 
process to encroach on Mavungeni land by physically shifting the fence.161 Later this was 
reversed, but it set the tone for an on-going dispute over the boundary between the farms. 
This was not only about its physical location, but about its maintenance and meaning. That is, 
it incorporated both the materialisation of representations of space in spatial practice and 
those representations themselves. Cattle were at the centre of on-going contestation over 
space across this boundary. According to Arthur Henning: 
 
“They’ve stolen all the fences. We’ve just put up new fences now. They *the cattle] 
come into our orchards, and they strip the trees of leaves, they scratch their heads 
and break branches and throw fruit on the floor and do a lot of damage. So we’ve 
been catching them here and asking for damage, which we’ve put aside, and we’ve 
said we’ll use that money to build a fence. But in the meantime we’re becoming 
very unpopular. Because people don’t look after their cattle. They leave the cattle 
and then in two weeks’ time they look around and say ‘where are the cattle?’ and 
go and look for the cattle.”162 
 
Sam Shirinda suggested that the cattle tended to drift towards Moddervlei because of the 
availability of water and trees: 
 
“These cattle, when they stray, they always go to the east, to his farm, because we 
always get them arrested there. You know, a cattle is a cattle, he does not know 
that there is Mr Henning. Why does he not stray to the west, and to the south, and 
to the north? The only thing which is there at Mr Henning which is not here, maybe, 
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I don’t know what I can say. Because the avocadoes they are there. The macadamia 
nuts, they are there. The water at the dams, there they are. Unfortunately I cannot 
ask a cow, why do you stray to Mr Henning? (laughter) Because that is a question I 
ask Carl [Henning+, ‘why do our cattle always stray to your place?’”163 
 
Cattle did not only go from Mavungeni to Moddervlei. Research Ngobeni, a claimant at 
Mavungeni who was trying to get a 17 ha macadamia orchard going, was forced to reconstruct 
the fence to prevent Moddervlei cattle getting into his orchard and eating the leaves off his 
young trees: 
 
“From this boundary here, there’s no wire… Mr Henning’s got a dam here, a very 
big dam. So our stock, our cattle, when they come from that side, as long as they 
can pass here and have some water there, they arrest them. And then we must go 
there, kneel down and negotiate so we can get our cattle back… Theirs, if they 
come from that side and get here, they can come for a week or for a month, but 
no problem. They do come sometimes… But they are not being kept in the kraal 
and report that side that we’ve got your cattle, come let’s negotiate. No!... This 
wire here, I put up this fence. Because cattle were coming from that side and get 
inside here and eat the leaves off these macadamias.”164 
 
At one level, the movement of cattle across the unsecured boundary between the farms 
revealed how past inequalities in resources, which enabled the Hennings to maintain 
flourishing orchards and construct a dam for their own use, produced new tensions over space 
which created a new cycle of antagonism. Dominant representations or conceptions of space 
were materialised in specific spatial practices in an attempt to reproduce capitalist space in 
historically embedded forms. The idea of private property as a bounded, exclusive space once 
again came into conflict with the idea of common property where access to certain resources 
(grazing land, water) are held in common and shared. Shirinda suggested there was a 
deliberate ploy on the side of the Hennings to exacerbate divisions at Mavungeni: “They only 
arrested the cattle belonging to us, not the other group. And those cattle were herding in one 
camp. But it’s only our group whose cattle were arrested.”165 Again, dominant spatial practices 
sought to constrain alternatives from emerging outside of the dominant representations of 
space. Whether true or not, there were strong perceptions of bias and undue intervention by 
the Hennings in an apparent attempt to influence the course of development at Mavungeni in 
their own interests. 
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The way the Hennings handled the issue of stray cattle compared with the way the Mavungeni 
group handled the issue provides an insight into the way the space of Moddervlei was 
reproduced as a commercial farm where boundaries should not be breached, and where 
damage to orchards was a serious offence. Conversely the Hennings represented Mavungeni 
as a space lower in the hierarchy – a characteristic of capitalist space in Lefebvre’s analysis - 
where breaches of the boundary were not as serious and where damage to orchards (unless 
previously planted by the Hennings) was acceptable. This potentially had the long term effect 
of undermining private property as a concept, and of reinforcing its ties with apartheid and 
racism, because it proposed differential rights for different owners even in the face of legal 
equality. 
 
The contestations over boundaries affected all the farms, and led to significant variations in 
the impact of land reform on lived space. Contestation signalled dissatisfaction with the 
dominant representations of space that were materialised in fixed boundaries inherited from 
the past, and in exclusive rights of ownership. This dissatisfaction manifested in spatial 
practices that challenged these boundaries and exclusive rights. In doing so, these spatial 
practices presented alternative representations of the space less constrained by the dominant 
framework of private property. One of the ways the new land owners sought to contain the 
impact of these challenges to their exclusive rights was through the leasing of land. But this 
was a two-edged sword. 
6.4.2 The contradictions of land leasing 
The new land owners sought to contain encroachment through selectively authorising access 
by leasing portions of land to unofficial claimants. Leasing was a significant practice that both 
reinforced and undermined private property relations and the spatial practices that 
accompanied them. In some cases it permitted the land owners to benefit financially from the 
land and to retain the land unit as a commodity with a value. However, leasing was not part of 
the formal plans and was a compromise in the face of external demands and unofficial claims 
on the land, resulting in the narrowing of land owners’ exclusive rights. Land owners were 
forced to concede ground by allowing leases of the land, against their own plans, in order to 
contain and control alternative claims and the representations of space inherent in them. This 
occurred after restitution, revealing a more negotiated process of rights and access to the land 
than envisaged in the restitution process, which saw private ownership of the land 
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unambiguously being transferred to groups with a clearly defined membership for their 
exclusive use. 
 
There is evidence that rentals leading to individualisation of land is increasingly occurring in 
indigenous tenure systems (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006). This signifies the hybridity of 
living tenure systems as indigenous and private systems interact with one another over time 
(Cotula, 2007, Cousins, 2008b). It also signifies the encroachment of norms of private property 
into indigenous tenure systems. At its base, land rental or leasing generates private property 
relations by formalising land as a marketable commodity that produces unequal relations of 
power between owners and tenants. 
 
Land leasing had a long history in the area, starting in the early twentieth century with rent 
farming. For example, Mrs Cooksley, who owned nine farms including Vleyfontein and 
Zwartfontein, earned most of her income from rent farming in the early part of last century 
(Mulaudzi, 2000:231). Rents played an important role in the process of commodifying land 
through linking the amount of rent to be paid to the quality of land and the proximity to water 
and markets (South African Native Affairs Commission, 1905:29), which started to place a 
value on the land in relation to its commercial potential. White farmers leased these farms 
between themselves for the whole period up to the state expropriations in the 1970s.166 Even 
after expropriation the state continued leasing the farms, to the Hennings, to Schoeman at 
Syferfontein, and to others. 
 
Leasing was always a way of keeping a white presence on the land, even when land owners 
were unable to utilise the land productively themselves, and of generating income from the 
land without having to invest too much in the land. This constant occupation was important 
historically in the process of moving from occupation to title deed, and in the conversion of the 
land into a commodity. Leasing is built into the conception of private property and the 
parcelling of space. Owners lease land to and control tenants; and people will usually only 
lease for production if they calculate that it is commercially viable to do so. However, after 
restitution the character of leasing changed. There were some attempts to reproduce past 
spatial arrangements on the farms, especially at Mavungeni where the Hennings proposed the 
25 year lease of the land under their authority, discussed in Chapter 5. Embedded in the 
argument against that agreement was that the purpose of restitution was first and foremost to 
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allow people to return to their land, regardless of what the land may have been used for or 
how it might be used economically in future. 
 
The Henning lease proposal was a spark that surfaced differing conceptions of what return to 
the land meant and the way space was to be organised. The Xikopokopo occupation, discussed 
in Chapter 5, altered spatial practices considerably. Most of the outsiders who participated in 
the occupation claimed to believe that Shirinda was the lawful authority of the land.167 Land 
owners’ control over the property was destabilised, as were representations that sought to 
present the space as an unsullied commercial farm, as Chapter 7 shows. While these practices 
could still co-exist, the occupation restructured spatial practices that effectively limited the 
reproduction of a commercial farm as envisaged in dominant representations of the space. 
Land that was designated for grazing and tourism at Mavungeni was reconstructed as land for 
settlement and homestead production. A portion of the farm was cut off from the authorised 
owners’ control and exploitation. 
 
The scale and length of the Hennings’ proposed lease was a factor in its abandonment, as it 
sought to capture the entire space and reproduce old spatial arrangements on it. But the CPA 
committee agreed to other, smaller, leases. Many of these were forced on the committee out 
of necessity, in an attempt to contain a proliferation of land occupations and uses outside their 
control. Vleifontein residents used Mavungeni land for cropping and grazing prior to the 
settlement of the restitution claims. Residents from Maila had used the redistribution portion. 
In order to keep this under control, the committee made concessions to allow the continued 
use of the land on the basis of rentals: 
 
“All people from Vleifontein were doing grazing here. We cannot blame them. It 
was before we claimed and they did not know that it belonged to some other 
community. They thought maybe it was no-man’s land, because AgriVen came 
and used this farm for many years also… They can come and lease here, no 
problem. A portion for grazing, no problem. But we cannot sell these portions. We 
are not allowed. Only to lease so that the community may get something.”168 
 
There were also attempts to charge for natural resource harvesting, a historical spatial practice 
of residents of Vleifontein, Maila and even Elim. However, at times the new owners felt that 
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their ownership rights might begin disintegrating should they allow non-owners to continue 
using the natural resources: 
 
“It’s only people from Elim and Riverplaats down here giving us lots of problem 
for fishing. But we used to chase them and say no, you are not allowed. Otherwise 
you must get permission, give some little compensation to the community that 
you can come and fish here. Not just to get in here and fish. It’s like hunting. Why 
can we allow each and every one to come and hunt here? Because we’ve got a 
problem with this veld fire. These hunters come and burn the farm. Sometimes it 
goes up to the orchard, it’s a problem. We don’t allow them to fish and hunt.”169 
 
Efforts to contain the non-commodified, or at least controlled, use of natural resources did not 
always succeed. At Shimange, the CPA’s institutions were too weak to enforce demands for 
rent. Residents from Maila entered the farm to gather firewood, as they had previously done. 
Initially they were charged a fee but, because of accountability problems (who was to collect 
the money and what was to happen to it), this payment system collapsed and gathering of 
natural resources reverted to open access.170 
 
Although the allocation of stands and payment to the traditional authorities for this allocation 
was not entirely the same as leasing of land, there were similarities. As with the Xikopokopo 
group at Mavungeni, at Munzhedzi the chief-designate was not authorised to allocate land. 
Chapter 5 shows that the money he received for allocations was not channelled to the legally-
recognised land owners, the CPA. But the CPA committee struggled to challenge this, in large 
part because the late chief who had led the claim and pre-emptive occupation began allocating 
stands with the consent of the rest of the CPA committee from 2000. The late chief explicitly 
invited non-claimants to join the occupation and non-claimants eventually vastly outnumbered 
claimants. Later, stands were allocated to those who requested them even if they were not 
claimants, even by the chief-designate. Aliber et al. (2009b:67) provided evidence of this, 
showing that new non-claimant households settling at Munzhedzi increased by 80 or more 
until 2008, and only then did the numbers drop off. The chief-designate’s allocation of stands 
without CPA committee approval signified a direct challenge to the exclusive rights of property 
owners in the same way as Shirinda’s unauthorised allocation of stands at Mavungeni did. In 
both cases, however, the contestation was less about whether property owners should have 
exclusive rights to shape spatial practice, and more about who should have the authority to do 
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so. Therefore, challenges to these exclusive rights themselves remained contained within the 
framework of private property. 
 
Land leasing was therefore used by land owners in an attempt to limit and control 
encroachment both on their land and on their rights to exclusive use. Land owners sought to 
secure dominant representations of space against alternative spatial practices that emerged 
from the lived space on and around the farms. However in doing so, they conceded some of 
their rights to exclusive use of the land and to maintain fixed boundaries, resulting in the 
adaptation of both representations of space and spatial practices. By posing a direct challenge 
to their authority, unauthorised leasing by inhabitants took this one step further by openly 
challenging the rights of land owners to exclusive use and maintenance of fixed boundaries. 
These challenges thus threatened to undermine the fundamental basis of the dominant 
representations of space and hence their materialisation in spatial practice. Even though land 
reform was built on the basis of private property, inhabitants did not passively accept this. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In the Vleifontein area, land reform was initiated in the context of the layers of sedimented 
practices shown in Chapter 4. Land reform drew on the exclusive property rights in fragmented 
spaces where boundaries were sharply defined. This established the basic framework of land 
reform, imposed at a national level. But it also drew on aspects of pre-colonial, indigenous 
tenure systems. In particular, notions of collective land control and nested rights accompanied 
ideas about boundary flexibility. Added to these representations of space, the reality of 
Vleifontein as an essentially urban settlement in the middle of the farms added the dynamic of 
the urban-rural frontier (Cross et al., 1998), which was contested in discourse (i.e. as a 
representation) as well as in practice. Lived space changed significantly for many inhabitants as 
a result. Claimants who moved back onto the farm became owners with exclusive rights, 
where historically they were subordinate and the few rights they had were constantly being 
squeezed. The dominant representations of space were materialised in spatial practices that 
took the cadastral boundaries seriously and physically marshalled these boundaries to secure 
exclusive rights to use the land of the new owners. For Vleifontein residents, restitution for 
others meant the shock of suddenly losing whatever land access they had enjoyed in the area, 
as compensation for their forced removal. 
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These representations of space, and changes to lived space, underpinned the creation, in 
spatial practice, of hybridised property relations. This was similar to process elsewhere in the 
country (Kingwill, 2008), and indicated processes of fusion and mutual encroachment between 
indigenous and private tenure regimes. Land reform opened possibilities for contestation over 
land control and boundary definition alike. Dominant spatial practices based on securing 
clearly-defined boundaries between fragmented spaces, and on asserting exclusive control 
over access and use of land, were contested in practice. Although alternative or subordinate 
representations of space were not clearly articulated, they became visible through everyday 
contestations both of the boundaries which defined private properties in relation to one 
another, and of the exercise of exclusive rights of ownership. While relative elites, as Chapter 5 
shows, had the advantage in defining boundaries and manifesting exclusive property rights in 
practice, inhabitants who found themselves subordinated to these elites held their own and 
their practical activity played a significant role, both in mediating exclusive rights and (in some 
instances) in creating more flexible and negotiated boundaries. Numerous transgressions 
practically shaped the production of space in ways that differed from what went before and 
from the dominant representations of space. In the face of weak institutions of ownership and 
limited practical regulation of property rights by the state, there were some encroachments on 
boundaries - both benignly but also more deliberately and aggressively - that put pressure on 
the discrete parcels of land and blurred the boundaries between properties.  
 
Encroachments that dissolved or threatened to dissolve boundaries between discrete parcels 
of land signalled that the new land owners (or the, CPA committees, the institutions that 
represented them) did not have full control over their property. They were unable to retain 
the integrity of their land as a distinct parcel separate from other spaces both as a physical 
entity and as a space for defined land uses. The private property rights to exclusive use were 
thus narrowed in practice, in the face of widespread alternative claims and actions. Likewise, 
the spatial conceptions of privately-owned productive land for agriculture were limited both 
conceptually and in practice as it was transformed through these alternative claims and 
actions. These contestations over the boundaries of property and over the exclusive rights of 
private ownership, which were central both to representations of space and to its 
maintenance within a structured private property regime, had significant implications for the 
way space could and would be organised, as Chapter 7 shows.  
 
The hybridised forms of property that were heightened by the land reform programme raise 
questions about the adequacy of a conceptual framework based on the dichotomy of private 
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versus collective property. Conceptual binaries of this nature are often rooted in practical, real 
world oppositions and cannot be dismissed out of hand. For example, in the South African 
situation distinct tenure regimes, from the angles both of ownership and control over land and 
property, are manifested in the real world. These concepts can highlight key distinctions 
between different systems of tenure. Yet the application of conceptual binaries, if used too 
crudely, can also efface the more subtle complexities that lead to the practical intertwining of 
systems of tenure, creating an uneven blend, almost like dye injected into water. They may still 
retain their distinctiveness, but the edges blend into one another. 
 
The research site is located precisely on an ‘edge’ in spatial terms with regard to property 
relations (as well as systems of authority, as Chapter 5 shows, and land uses, as Chapter 7 
shows). This spatial location must necessarily produce conceptual adaptations. If private 
property is defined primarily by the rigidity of its boundaries and the exclusivity of the rights it 
confers on owners, land restitution as it has unfolded in practice on these farms has brought 
the features into question. Restitution in practice has forced a blurring of boundaries between 
fragmented parcels of land. Despite efforts to settle the question of land claims in favour of a 
clearly-defined group of owners, numerous counter-claims and spatial practices based on 
these claims have produced ongoing instability with regard to the exercise of exclusive rights 
of ownership. These practical responses to restitution combined with contradictions and 
tensions within the dominant representations of property in restitution thus raise fundamental 
questions about the character of property relations following land reform. 
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CHAPTER 7: PRODUCTION, SETTLEMENT AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF SPACE 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 showed the impact of land reform on systems of authority and land governance, and 
Chapter 6 showed the contestations around property relations as a result of land reform. In 
both cases, pre-existing structures held sway over efforts at reform, although they were 
destabilised to an extent and were forced to adapt to new circumstances. This chapter focuses 
on the third dimension of land reform, at how land use changed as a result of land reform and 
how this affected the production of space in the research site. 
 
This chapter considers conceptions of land use that underpinned land reform, and how these 
related to the ecological base and the built environment, that is, to the material basis of spatial 
practice. It then examines what land uses emerged as a result of land reform in practice, and 
how spatial practices and lived space changed as a result. There is some reflection on the 
social forces behind the different conceptions of land use and the spatial practices that 
emerged. 
7.2 Inherited material configurations 
Inherited land uses are the template for spatial practice, with ecological-social “co-
productions” (Goodman, 1999) shaping land use possibilities. Historically there were a range of 
land uses in the area, as Chapter 4 shows: 
 
i) Dispersed settlement and production, common grazing, and indigenous tenure, often under 
some form of traditional authority; 
ii) A racially constructed space with a central zone of white residence with relatively small 
pockets of commercial production, with dispersed black settlement, limited homestead 
production and some regulated cattle grazing; 
iii) ‘Open access’ small-scale production on the edges near Vleifontein township and common 
grazing (after the state’s expropriation of white owners in the 1970s and 1980s); 
iv) Centrally organised small-holder production on parts of the Mavungeni restitution portion; 
and, 
v) Dense formal settlement on a portion of the land, after Vleifontein was established in 1982. 
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None of these historical spatial arrangements fit neatly into the conventional model of large-
scale, mono-crop commercial agriculture, which dominated representations of farming space 
at a national level. The ecological conditions, in particular the topography, ruled this out. 
Large-scale mono-cropping generally requires flat or gently undulating land, especially if crops 
are to be industrially harvested. The area is in a small pocket of relatively good rainfall for this 
region, and soil quality is also relatively good, but only patches of the farms were considered 
to be commercially viable for cropping.171 According to one study, the area was agriculturally 
best suited to sub-tropical fruit, livestock and forestry (Government of Venda and 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1986:7-7). Micro-conditions suggested the possibility of 
the production of maize, sunflower and sorghum.172 The original purpose of the farms to act as 
buffers dividing white from black lands combined with these ecological limits generated low 
levels of commercial production on the farms. 
 
This was especially so at Shimange and Munzhedzi, which had some low-level grazing and very 
small pockets of crop production mainly around the homesteads. The land fell into disuse after 
the state expropriations in the 1970s and 1980s. Shimange was used as a base for the Venda 
homeland Departments of Water Affairs and Agriculture. After 20 years of neglect, very little 
useable infrastructure remained by the time the land was transferred to claimants. While this 
meant greater freedom to reconceptualise the space and materialise these conceptions free 
from the weight of the past, it also meant little material base on which to build new spatial 
practices. 
 
The two portions of Mavungeni were a slightly different story. The redistribution portion, also 
known as Lovedale Park (Figure 9), had 48 ha of improved pastures and 12 ha of eucalyptus 
trees. It had comparatively well-developed infrastructure for intensive production, including 
irrigation infrastructure, an 8.5 ha earth dam and a dairy with a capacity to milk 30 cows173 
(Agriconcept, 2000). A white farmer was leasing part of the farm for commercial production 
until 2003. At the time of transfer, 18 farmers from Vleifontein were using part of the farm to 
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graze 122 cattle.174 Residents of Maila also used a small section for food plots, with access to a 
borehole for water. So the redistribution portion had some productive activity, even if only in 
parts. 
 
The restitution portion also had on-going activity even after expropriation, with up to 85% of 
the land under cultivation (Figure 9). Land was leased to white farmers and Venda politicians 
after the state expropriations. Reasonable rainfall and pockets of good quality soil combined 
with a gentler topography to enable commercial agriculture at a larger scale than at Shimange 
or Munzhedzi. This resulted in the development of infrastructure – the human overlay or 
second nature – to support commercial production. Most important on the Mavungeni 
restitution portion was the establishment of a 30 ha commercial macadamia orchard with 
internal roads, irrigation and a dam for water. But beyond this, the continued use of other 
parts of the farm by Vleifontein residents and the Hennings during the 1980s and 1990s 
ensured that the land was geared for production. It was debushed, ploughed and thus 
available. 
 
On being forcibly moved to the area from Tshikota near Louis Trichardt, Vleifontein residents 
were led to understand that the surrounding areas would be available to them to use for 
production and for eventual expansion of the township. After arriving in the area, recalls 
Esrom Mudau, a Vleifontein resident and spokesperson for the Masangani claimants: 
 
“I saw, this is water, water is flowing every time. I ought to make a garden… I told 
everybody, ‘let’s go down there [Mavungeni restitution+ and plough’. We started 
ploughing, and we did plough enough. Even Mr Ramatlodi [former Premier of 
Limpopo+ when he was still a Premier, he came here and said to us: ‘You people, 
we did not believe about you! From the location? To farming? That place is always 
green, and you’re doing a lot of ploughing!’... We were used to ploughing, and I 
fed my family. We did not buy a bag of mielie meal! Myself, no! I was busy with 
ploughing mielies. From that side, I did have two big yards. You see my tractor, I 
bought that tractor to plough. When I was given my pension…I bought the tractor. 
Because I knew I will feed my kids with everything. And it’s when I started to have 
a garden, at the river down here.”175 
 
Vleifontein residents estimated that up to 170 people were involved in an AgriVen project on 
the Mavungeni land starting around 1998 and only stopping when the land was transferred to 
the claimants. They each had an allocation of 10-15 ha: 
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“They said produce the things that don’t take long, because this place, we are only 
given it for a certain period. So they said we must only plough short-term things, 
like mielies, pumpkin, butternuts. You can also make a water what-what and 
plough cabbage.”176 
 
AgriVen provided inputs and linked the farmers to markets: “If you’ve ploughed and you don’t 
know where to take your mielies, then he [the project manager from AgriVen] can help you to 
find the ko-operasie, you take it there and they can give you a cheque and everything.” Other 
residents from the township also used the land for grazing and some allocated themselves 
small plots for crop production.177 Vleifontein residents also used small parts of the land at 
Shimange and Munzhedzi, mainly on the edges adjacent to the township for small-scale food 
plots, and more widely for grazing and natural resource harvesting. For them, the restitution 
process disrupted their land access, since the access they had enjoyed until 2002 was suddenly 
revoked when the restitution claims were settled. There was a sudden shift in the lived space 
of Vleifontein residents formerly using the land. This offers another instance of Rosalie 
Kingwill’s (2008) idea (developed in a different context of gender relations within families 
holding title) that titling can at times exacerbate tenure insecurity. 
 
The continued use of the land at Mavungeni, even after the expropriations, established a 
material basis for agricultural production that shaped claimants’ options. The inherited 
infrastructure formed a template for future land use, determining, to an extent, what could be 
done. But it also allowed the Mavungeni claimants to use the orchard to generate income as a 
basis for other activities. The inherited material base hence offered both opportunities and 
constraints for the production of new spaces. 
 
The greater the extent of infrastructure, the more the spatial organisation on the farms 
reflected a particular historical conception of a productive farm. The owner’s homestead was 
constructed to meet a particular white, consumerist lifestyle, and was spatially segregated 
from the living spaces of black workers (with housing for the latter taking the form of ‘non-
permanent’ structures). This produced the apartheid spatial structure at the micro-level. 
Infrastructure was geared towards commercial production, with sheds, internal roads, fences, 
etc., all serving to produce a particular type of commercial agricultural space.  
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Figure 9: Historical agricultural production and water infrastructure 
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In the run up to the transfer of the farms to the restitution claimants in 2002, asset stripping 
had an impact on the possibilities for how the land could be used and hence the production of 
on-farm space. According to the Vleifontein farmers who worked with AgriVen, the irrigation 
infrastructure was left behind when Mavungeni claimants took over, although AgriVen took 
back the tractors and implements the farmers were using. The Hennings were believed to have 
removed the irrigation infrastructure (drip lines and electric pump) from the macadamia 
orchard just before the land was transferred.178 At Shimange, where the Venda Departments 
of Water Affairs and Agriculture used the buildings as staff quarters prior to restitution, 
electricity lines to the farm buildings were removed back to the boundary with Vleifontein 
when the Department’s staff evacuated the farm. Water pipes were also ripped out of the 
ground and water supply to the farm was stopped.179 
 
In the midst of the farms was the construction of Vleifontein as a zone of settlement in 1982 
which, together with the construction of the Elim-Bandelierkop road and the provision of bulk 
water and electricity infrastructure, fundamentally altered the space and its relationship to the 
wider regional space. This had a significant effect on macro-spatial dynamics. Even before 
detailed plans were developed, settlement had spread onto a significant portion of Munzhedzi, 
creating a strip of settlement along the road from Maila through Munzhedzi to Vleifontein. 
Figure 10 shows this clearly. The whiter spots on the image are settlement, and the pinkish 
marks show land either ploughed or planted to crops and trees. 
7.3 Tensions embedded in conceptions of land use  
Conceptions of how the land might be used mirrored the tensions and contradictions 
embedded in the conceptions of property and authority. In the case of property, the core 
tension was between inherited models of private property and indigenous property regimes. 
The creation of a category of collective private ownership mediated the ‘pure’ rights of private 
property but also threw into question these rights. In the case of authority, the core 
contradiction was between the creation of democratic institutions of land governance on the 
one hand, and the retention of chiefly authority and private property on the other. In the case 
of micro-level, on-farm land use, tensions in the way agricultural production was 
conceptualised emerged from the same racially-based bifurcation. On the one hand was a 
conception of large-scale commercial agriculture historically associated with white production 
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on the large privately-owned farms, and on the other hand was a conception of micro-scale 
‘subsistence’ agriculture historically associated with black production in the former 
homelands. The latter was based on the allegation that “‘modern’ agrarian practices 
incorporating new technologies of production” were not possible under indigenous land rights 
systems (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008:100). The tensions stemmed from attempts to reconcile the 
reproduction of the white commercial agricultural model with the new collective ownership 
that incorporated elements of indigenous property and governance regimes. 
 
The narrative of ‘return to the land’ that drove the claims process, and drew on the knowledge 
and experiences of the elders with material support from a professional elite amongst 
claimants, was gradually replaced by a development narrative that rested on the belief that 
commercial exploitation of the farms was the best route to improve the livelihoods of 
claimants. This mirrored the more general shift in the discourse of development in the country 
as a whole, as the slogan of ‘growth through redistribution’ in the early 1990s was transformed 
into ‘redistribution through (capitalist) growth’ in the mid-1990s (Dollery, 1994). Other nascent 
groupings amongst the claimants – traditional authorities, poorer claimants with insufficient 
resources of their own to support systematic commercial production or accumulation on their 
own, and the elders – did not immediately oppose this new development narrative or the 
representations of space underpinning it. There was general agreement that investment and 
economic activity of any sort would be welcomed. The dominant assumption was that 
development was equated with business and commerce, a situation indicated even more 
starkly on land reform farms were existing large-scale production was at stake, for example in 
Levubu (Hellum and Derman, 2006). It was only later - when these representations stalled 
through the inability to materialise them in spatial practice - that alternative representations 
of how to use the land, and their materialisation in spatial practice, began to be articulated 
and practised. 
 
As part of the restitution agreements, consultants were allocated to each claimant group to 
formulate land use plans, which were the articulation of representations of on-farm space. 
These consultants came into the process with specific representations of space which drew 
from the prevailing representations in the state. One dominant representation, shared by DoA 
and DLA, and partially by the municipality, was that the farms were spaces of commercial 
agricultural production which had to happen at scale. Small-scale production was equated with 
subsistence, and was a welfare issue rather than an agricultural issue. According to a senior 
manager in the Limpopo DoA: 
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“The future for agriculture is on a commercial scale. We must change the face of 
agriculture from white to black but on the same scale as previously. We need to 
support farmers to go bigger. There is a continuous pressure on profitability, and 
the trend is that farming units get bigger because profit margins are declining and 
farmers can’t survive on smaller units. Subsistence is not viable in the long term. 
There is some limited space for subsistence, but it can’t replace commercial 
agriculture. Subsistence is now a welfare case, it’s not really for the Department of 
Agriculture. We don’t want to see the buying of commercial land for 
subsistence.”180 
 
The conception was that commercial land had to stay under commercial production, and that 
meant increasing scale over time. Although ownership of units of production would need to 
change from white to black, the character of production was not to change. White commercial 
farmers were in agreement with this view. Carl Henning argued that: “You can’t stop it 
[concentration in agriculture] now. You need those surpluses now, Africa is dependent on 
them. There is no time left to transfer skills.”181 Other branches of the state also concurred. 
According to Mr Livhebe, Agribusiness Economist at the district DoA, “agriculture is a 
business.”182 And the land reform advisors in the Makahdo DoA said: 
 
“These things, they are very new to our community. It’s not long since they’ve 
been introduced to this kind of environment, where they need to run this project 
as a business… We engage the strategic partners, at the same time they can 
employ the managers who are skilled… People need to grab what is supposed to 
be done. I know the thing is going to benefit the community. If the communities 
comply with the business plans, I know they will progress.”183 
 
There was thus general agreement amongst these individuals at three levels of the DoA, as 
well as amongst commercial farmers, on the necessity of reproducing the spaces along the 
lines of this particular model of commercial production. The consultants’ representations were 
structured in this framework. The decaying remnants of the infrastructure from the white 
commercial farming days formed the template on which land use plans were based. At 
Shimange and Munzhedzi this provided hardly any basis for an agricultural plan at all. 
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Figure 10: SPOT satellite image showing settlement and agricultural production, 2007 
(Source: Agricultural Geo-referenced Information System, http://www.agis.agric.za/agisweb/agis.html) 
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At Shimange, the land use plan (Northplan, 2004) was based loosely on the insubstantial 
template of historical commercial production, with some leeway for individual food gardens in 
a contained area. The plan identified 110 ha of arable land, mostly to the north of the farm 
around the homestead buildings. This was divided into 49 ha for crops (maize), 11 ha for 
intensive livestock, 25 ha for orchards (sub-tropical) and 25 ha for community gardens (either 
crops or intensive livestock). The remainder of the farm was divided into a ‘biodiversity and 
water preservation’ area of about 150 ha, and a grazing area of about 459 ha. The latter was 
also earmarked for potential game farming, but eco-tourism was ruled out because of the 
expense and Vleifontein’s proximity. Forestry was ruled out because of the ecological 
sensitivity of the area. No detailed business or financial plan was prepared. In other words, the 
concrete ways in which the representations of space were to be materialised in spatial practice 
were not considered. 
 
Munzhedzi’s land use plan (Kenneth Maluleke and Associates, 2004) was even less developed. 
By the time the consultants came to do the plan, about 50% of the Vleifontein portion of 
Munzhedzi and 20% of the other two farms was covered by informal housing. Alternative 
representations of the space were already materialised in practice before dominant 
representations were formally articulated. Forced to adapt to existing spatial practices, the 
plan proposed that the settlement be formalised, but made no detailed suggestions for 
agricultural production apart from saying the land might be used for cattle, goat and pig 
farming, and some cropping, especially at Zwartfontein. 
 
At Mavungeni, because there was some intact commercial agricultural infrastructure, plans 
were constructed on the basis of the activities this infrastructure was built for. On the 
redistribution portion, the land use/business plan (Agriconcept, 2000) was based on collective 
production of commercial crops, some irrigated, with the majority of the land for grazing. The 
plan, being materialised by the white farmer who was leasing the land, was adopted 
wholesale. The location of inherited irrigation infrastructure and land determined the plan – 
which can be considered to be the formal articulation of the dominant representations of the 
space. It attempted to smooth over the tensions within collective private property, between a 
model of private property inherently built on the basis of individual ownership and the reality 
of collective ownership. 
 
The plan proposed dry land maize - and potentially also sunflower, grain sorghum and soya 
beans – initially on 80 ha, irrigated vegetables on 28 ha mainly for commercial production and 
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retention of the 12 ha eucalyptus plantation. Maize production was targeted at 39 claimants, 
and vegetable production at 35 claimants. If the plan was fully realised, participating claimants 
would earn an average of R262/month for maize and R326/month for vegetables. The plan 
recognised the challenges in raising capital and proposed that grazing be used for cattle on a 
non-commercial basis. It rejected the use of the dairy, or poultry and egg production; the 
former because of “high capital demands and the management intensive nature of the 
enterprise,” (Agriconcept, 2000:38) and the latter because the local market was saturated. The 
plan hinged on securing a start up loan to the value of R828,200, over and above the SLAG 
grant, an amount representing 81% of the total farm value. The consultants doubted that 
financial institutions would offer such a loan, and claimants also were not keen to take large 
loans. So an unrealisable plan was written. There was no way to convert dominant 
representations of space into spatial practice. 
 
The land use plan for the Mavungeni restitution portion was not available, but included 
development of the macadamia, mango and avocado orchards already on the property, and 
areas designated for grazing and individual cropping. However, CPA committee members said 
the plan was “too big and we cannot follow that one.”184 Chapter 5 shows how the Hennings 
proposed a land use/business plan which sought to reproduce the space of white commercial 
farming, including denying claimants the right to live on the land. The plan was based on 
historical commercial land use. The initial land use plans were not integrated with the DoA’s 
plans at all, meaning that the DoA was not able to budget for any activities or interventions.185 
The original land use plans were downgraded and not treated as the ‘real’ business plans, and 
there was a recognition that the plans needed to be more iterative.  
 
The municipal DoA had a group of land reform advisors to assist new land owners with 
agricultural support through programmes like CASP. Working together with the Department of 
Labour, they targeted literate and numerate people for training in commercial agriculture. 
Three economists in the Makhado office of the DoA interacted with claimants to develop 
business plans. The logic aligned with commercial production here as much as in the land use 
plans conducted by the consultants, in using past commercial production as a template:  
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“When we see an opportunity, we go… [At] Mavungeni there are problems, and 
we are reluctant to move in because of the problems. But at the same time they 
do have 30 ha of macadamia. Together with the other division in the department, 
they’ve done the designs and everything for that 30 ha. So that in the meantime 
we don’t just leave those macadamias… Now we are going to put an irrigation 
system, if it is approved. So we are just saying, if it is existing, let’s just try to keep 
it alive… Because remember, we’ve also got the problem of promoting the 
macadamia production, especially in Vhembe. So we cannot just leave those 
macadamias sitting there.”186 
 
On the various farms, opportunities arose for members to combine individual production with 
the larger-scale group production. Commercial farming was never at the whole farm level on 
these farms, but was concentrated on a relatively small section of available arable land. Basing 
business plans on the commercial agricultural template identified the valuable land for 
potential production, but there was nothing in the plans that said this land had to be used for 
particular crops owned by particular people. Theoretically, claimants could choose what kind 
of production they wanted to do, even on the good land, as long as there was agreement from 
the CPA committee. Chapter 6 shows how this was built into the CPA constitutions. At a micro-
spatial, on-farm, level, this had significant implications for spatial practice. 
 
Collective private ownership threatened conventional notions of commercial large-scale 
agriculture because it resulted in the logic of collective production (Lahiff, 2008b, Hall, 2009b). 
Mass settlement was incompatible with large-scale commercial agriculture in the form that 
dominated the discourse on agricultural production and productivity. According to one of the 
Makhado DoA land reform advisers: “The people who were originally moved off the land were 
few, but the claimants are many: families, children, grandchildren and their families. They will 
occupy the whole land and there will be no room for agriculture.”187 
 
This set up a tension between two different representations of the space even within the land 
reform programme. On the one hand, the DoA emphasised commercial agricultural 
production, as indicated above. On the other hand the restitution programme, and even the 
redistribution programme until 1999, was structured to accommodate large groups of people 
settling on the land. This created a tension at the micro-spatial level when it came to actually 
moving onto the land and using it productively. At Mavungeni, after the transfer of the land, 
land use plans tried to control the way settlement occurred on the farm. The plans sought 
contained settlement spatially segregated from formally demarcated production zones. 
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Claimants intent on pursuing a commercial agricultural path for the farms supported such 
plans. The Mavungeni CPA committee argued that “the way we settled before can not happen 
now because we want to use the land productively, not just randomly.”188 
 
With this in mind, the Mavungeni land use plan set aside an area for the development of 200 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)189 houses. The municipality supported the 
notion of a formal settlement adjacent to Vleifontein and approved the establishment of a 
township called Mavungeni Park for members of the CPA in 2005.190 This appeared to be a 
reasonable compromise between the different representations of space. However, there was 
disagreement as to who the beneficiaries of a formal settlement were to be. Vleifontein 
residents were convinced a proposed RDP settlement on the boundary with Mavungeni would 
be for residents of the township:191 “They promised us 120 RDP houses for those poor people, 
knowing that we own that place. Then Mavungeni came and said no, that’s our place, here you 
don’t build a house.”192 According to civic association leaders in Vleifontein: 
 
“This road, from this line *Mavungeni side], we are not allowed to go and build 
our houses there. And there were supposed to be RDP houses for people who are 
suffering, who can’t establish their own homes. But because of that claim people 
have got nowhere to go. The same applies to Mavungeni on that side, and 
Munzhedzi. So you can see that we are ending up on an island. So if you want to 
have your own home, you just have to go outside Vleifontein and separate from 
your relatives and your parents… [The planned RDP settlement at Mavungeni] was 
for people from Vleifontein. But for now, because we don’t have land, what we 
were suggesting is if the Mavungeni people give us that land, so they will also 
benefit from these RDP houses. So which means they can also apply and then we 
stay together there… Munzhedzi is full… The place where we think there is 
enough space is Mavungeni.”193 
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Ultimately, the representations were not materialised in any case, rendering irrelevant the 
argument about who the houses were for.  
 
At Shimange, the land use and development plan indicated that “the Shimange community has 
decided that the farm Syferfontein will be developed and utilised as a commercial farm and no 
settlement, except for the normal settlement for farming purposes, will take place on the 
farm” (Northplan, 2004:9). However, this was later contradicted and a plan was developed for 
contained formal residential settlement on the border with Vleifontein. A needs assessment 
Nkuzi conducted in 2002 revealed a demand for a residential area of about 70 ha and a 
business area of another 10 ha, indicating the intention of the claimants to live on the land 
(Lahiff et al., 2008:52). The President of the Shimange CPA said they wanted a formal 
settlement on the boundary of Vleifontein “as a buffer” between the farm and the township. 
He said claimants should be able to settle where they want on the farm (for example, where 
their families had homesteads before removal), but that they did not want settlement to 
spread all over the farm.194 A map on the wall of the old farm house showed a formally 
designed “proposed middle income town” on the boundary with Vleifontein. The underlying 
representation of the space assumed that people with resources would come to live on the 
farm in an orderly and contained settlement, and carry out commercial agricultural and other 
activities on the remainder of the farm.  
 
At Munzhedzi the pre-emptive occupation resulted in the formation of a vast settlement 
stretching between Vleifontein and Maila village, covering the whole of the Vleyfontein 
portion belonging to Munzhedzi and over time encroaching on the other two Munzhedzi farms 
(Diepgezet and Zwartfontein). The result was that opportunities for commercial production 
were considered to be slim and the land use planning exercise was effectively abandoned. On 
all the farms, the dominant representations of space, formally articulated in land use plans, 
were mostly driven by the state supported by relative elites within the CPA committees. They 
sought to structure on-farm spaces to realise the commercial potential of the farms.  
 
A similar tension between settlement and production was replicated at the macro-spatial level, 
across the farms. On the one hand, the DoA looked at the farms as closed entities on which 
commercial agricultural production of a large-scale type should be encouraged. The land use 
plans consequently treated Vleifontein as a completely separate space from the farms, an 
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attempt (unsuccessful, as it turned out) to maintain a strict divide between residential space 
and productive space. In this context, it also sought to define the boundary between urban 
and rural, with ‘urban’ being understood primarily as residential, in the mould of the dense 
settlements in the former homelands. On the other hand, the municipality and district, 
bolstered by the NSDP, identified Vleifontein as a local service point (Vhembe District 
Municipality, 2007), a representation of the space that presupposed a growth in settlement. 
Yet, because the boundaries between the township and the farms were rigidly defined, there 
was no space for expansion of the service point, in particular for new housing. This set up an 
on-going tension between land reform and agricultural plans on the one hand, and municipal 
housing and service plans on the other. For their part, the restitution claimants simply rejected 
any alternative claims from Vleifontein residents to the land outside the strictly defined 
boundaries of the township. These contradictory conceptions of land use inevitably produced 
conflicting spatial practices. 
7.4 Changing spatial practices and land use  
The nail in the coffin for the land use plans, based on commercial agriculture and its spatial 
segregation from residence, was the failure to secure investment to materialise these 
dominant representations of space. Some ‘pioneers’ from amongst the claimants had already 
started moving onto the land, and when the plans did not unfold as expected they began to 
engage in alternative spatial practices. These did not necessarily arise from some clearly 
articulated, preconceived representations of space but from the lived spaces of everyday life. 
Increasingly explicit tensions and conflicts began emerging around land use and the 
arrangement of space. The most notable example was the Xikopokopo group at Mavungeni, 
who became dissatisfied with commercial land use plans that excluded the option of 
settlement integrated with production in the most logical places on the farm (e.g. next to the 
road). Chapter 5 shows how the group split from the CPA committee and occupied a portion of 
the farm that was planned for other purposes, and invited others, including non-claimants, to 
occupy with them. In essence, they materialised spatial practices than ran counter to the 
dominant representations of the space formally articulated in the land use plans. 
 
As a result of the failure to realise the commercial plans, a more differentiated space than that 
envisaged in dominant representations surfaced on the farms. Again, the ecological base and 
inherited human infrastructure co-produced the new spaces. Five distinct spatial practices 
emerged, viz.: larger-scale commercial production based on inherited infrastructure; new 
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large-scale infrastructure and state attempts to order the space and integrate with broader 
capitalist circuits of accumulation; dissolution or adaptation of inherited infrastructure; small-
scale production segregated or integrated with settlement to varying degrees; and dense 
settlement. The first two reproduced the dominant representations of space based on 
commercial agriculture. The last reproduced (in a modified form) the representations of space, 
developed and partially materialised in the late apartheid period of the expropriation of the 
land and the establishment of Vleifontein as a formal settlement. The remaining two indicated 
the emergence of new spatial practices on the farms, which brought with them new 
representations of the space. These spatial practices overlapped, sometimes competing and 
sometimes intersecting. 
 
A few small external investments – efforts at materialising representations of space - on the 
farms followed soon after the settlement of the claims. The DoA provided each farm with 
tractors and trailers which went to the CPA committees for collective use. However, no effort 
was made to establish rules of use and access was either restricted when they fell into the 
hands of individuals (as at Munzhedzi, where the chief-designate took control of the tractor 
and trailer and let them disintegrate through disuse) or where conflict about use arose 
(leading to no-one being prepared to maintain the assets). At Shimange, the tractor was 
broken. Although it did not seem that it would require a lot to repair it, claimants did not feel 
confident that the efforts of individuals to maintain collective infrastructure would necessarily 
be appreciated: 
 
“You see, the tractor belongs to the people, so there are different cliques of 
people who are planning. If [individuals] fix that one and they try to use it, the 
other people will say ‘hey, where is the money?’ If I fix it, when I try to use it, ‘hey, 
where is the money?’ So we still have some problem.”195 
 
At Mavungeni the tractor was still running and was being hired out for use in surrounding 
areas as well as by claimants at Mavungeni. There was an obvious link between the functioning 
of the CPA committee and the functioning of the assets, even if internal conflicts arose 
regarding who was receiving the benefit from hiring the tractor. According to Sam Shirinda: 
 
“This group, if I go now and say I want the tractor, I will never get it. Even before 
the division, not now that there’s a division, before the division. When they 
wanted to plough, they would go and plough. They’ve got fields somewhere there. 
When they are finished there then they will go and plough for ordinary members 
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of the public at Mbokota. Because they stay at Mbokota, most of them. And they 
make money.”196 
 
The tractor was also used to squeeze rents out of Vleifontein farmers who wanted to use 
Mavungeni land for production: “I must hire their tractor. I bought my own tractor. Everybody, 
if you want to plough in Mavungeni, you must hire that tractor.”197 In providing the assets, the 
DoA inadvertently strengthened the hand of one group from amongst the claimants at the 
expense of others. One step further, the use of the assets materialised representations of 
space by employing assets in the service of a particular spatial vision for the area. The 
authority in control of the assets had an advantage of using those assets in materialising their 
own representations of the space. This indicated one way in which the institutions of authority 
channelled spatial practices. 
  
Nkuzi made a few material interventions that played a role in shaping the on-farm space. One 
was the provision of a pipeline from one of the dams at Shimange to the lower fields, where at 
least six claimants were cultivating in 2009. In 2003 Nkuzi provided funding to build 
rudimentary poultry houses on each of the farms (Figure 11), for materials for the basic 
physical structure, initial training and some start up inputs. The intervention was structured on 
the basis of group production, with the CPA committees approving participants. Participants 
constructed the houses themselves, even where they had no construction skills. The houses 
had a capacity of between 650 and 3,000 chickens, but without drinkers or feeders and lack of 
storage for feed. No electricity meant no refrigeration for vaccines, and the necessity of using 
firewood and paraffin for heat and light. Together with lack of water and poorly built houses, 
this meant mortality rates were too high for the projects to generate profits.198 The projects 
limped along only because of the voluntarism of a handful of members. Despite the 
weaknesses of the interventions, they did indicate representations of space rooted in a more 
localised, smaller-scale production on the farms. These representations were closer to the 
lived experiences of inhabitants than the abstract representations of large-scale commercial 
agriculture. But the small interventions also laid the basis for a bigger DoA investment in 
poultry production (of which more below) which reimposed the dominant representations of 
space. Development trajectories certainly were not linear, and were heavily dependent on 
contingent practices. 
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Figure 11: Rudimentary poultry house, Shimange 
7.4.1 Structuring dominant spaces of production 
At the time of transfer, the farms were very weakly integrated into circuits of capital 
accumulation. Shimange and Munzhedzi were totally excluded from these circuits, and 
Mavungeni was connected into regional macadamia value chains at a very low level (i.e. only 
as a small-scale raw materials supplier). The state had identified both macadamia and poultry 
as two key focus areas for investment in agriculture in the Vhembe district.199 The state’s scan 
of the district picked up the macadamia orchard at Mavungeni as well as the small poultry 
houses on the three farms, and this formed the basis of their investment decisions. 
 
From a commercial point of view, the most significant existing agricultural activity on any of 
the farms was the 30 ha orchard on the Mavungeni restitution portion. As Chapter 5 explains, 
it was planted by the Hennings while they were leasing the land from the state before the 
restitution claim was finalised. Once the claim was settled, the Hennings removed the 
irrigation infrastructure and also sought to limit access to the dam water by moving the fence 
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between Moddervlei and Mavungeni so that the dam was within the Moddervlei property.200 
They were later compelled to move the fence back to its original place, but the CPA committee 
struggled to maintain the orchards without adequate water infrastructure. 
 
Initially the CPA committee leased the macadamia orchard to individual CPA members,201 but 
when questions were raised in the CPA, this was cancelled in favour of the CPA farming the 
nuts for the collective account (Aliber et al., 2009b:64). The CPA committee had a contract 
(unsigned at the time of writing) to sell nuts to Green Farm, a processor in Levubu.202 When 
quality was poor (usually as a result of inadequate spraying and lack of water), they sold to 
Royal Macadamia, also at Levubu, to be processed into oil. David Baloyi managed the orchard 
on behalf of the CPA, employing two security workers, two tractor drivers, five seasonal 
workers during harvesting and some temporary workers as and when needed. These workers 
came from amongst the claimants.203 The orchard had a turnover of up to R370,000 if quality 
was good. According to David Baloyi, the proceeds were paid to the CPA. Committee members 
said the orchard hadn’t made much profit since most was reinvested.204 According to David 
Baloyi, the macadamias generated R300,000 in the first year, but only R15,000 went to the 
CPA because the rest was reinvested.205 
 
The DoA had interacted with David Baloyi and the CPA committee over a number of years with 
promises to assist in rebuilding the irrigation infrastructure. David Baloyi had also approached 
a range of other potential donors for assistance, including finance parastatals, but with no luck. 
In 2010, the long delayed plan to rebuild the irrigation infrastructure for the macadamia 
orchard was finally approved by the DoA. Baloyi participated in the Vhembe Macadamia 
Farmers’ Co-op on behalf of the CPA. In this instance, existing commercial activity on the farms 
was replicated, smoothly materialising the dominant representations of space. But state 
support for this productive activity did not take into account the underlying power relations 
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and the inequalities amongst claimants. State actors assumed that the CPA committee was the 
legitimate representative of the CPA as a whole, and were prepared to provide investment and 
support to projects run by the CPA committee without probing into the internal relations 
between the committee members and the broader CPA members. This opened the way, as 
Chapter 5 shows, to the capture of collective resources by small groups of individuals using the 
CPA committees as their base. Although David Baloyi effectively managed the macadamia 
operation by himself, he indicated that he would be happy to let go of it and focus on his 
individual productive activities, suggesting that the benefits did accrue to the collective (even if 
the definition of the collective was disputed): 
 
“I have got farm management. That’s why I am managing this farm, I am here. The 
executive is getting something from me, otherwise this land would not survive if I 
am not here. No-one is looking after this farm… If I can manage this, the 
macadamia and the bees - the chicken farm I am out now, because I have put all 
these youth there, it’s something. I wanted to put another here, at this 
macadamia. If I can see this flourishing, I can take another part again.”206 
 
The macadamia orchard was the only case on any the farms where existing productive 
activities at scale resulted in the materialisation of dominant representations of space based 
on commercial agriculture. Apart from the proposed support for irrigation to the orchard, the 
state was only able to make one other concrete intervention in materialising the dominant 
conceptions of agricultural production, in the form of a large-scale environmentally-controlled 
poultry house (Figure 12). Nkuzi’s earlier interventions sowed the seeds for the DoA to invest 
millions in the house on the basis that the people were already doing poultry there: 
 
“We are not people who will just go to a community and say this is what you will 
do. No. We engage with them. They will tell us, we want the Department of 
Agriculture to assist us to repair the poultry houses. Then we sit them down and 
say, we cannot repair these poultry houses, they are too small. You need to do 
the thing at the right scale… Remember, our mission is that these people must 
move from the subsistence to the commercial so you cannot then say because 
they wish to produce at 3,000 capacity, then you say that’s what they want. No, 
it’s also our role to analyse, to advise. What we do, we look what the industry 
wants and then we link it up with what the community wishes.”207 
 
Ignoring previous land use plans, the DoA decided to plant the poultry house on the 
Mavungeni redistribution portion, based on investment priorities established at provincial 
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level.208 Construction started in 2008 with a R3.2m investment209 and production began in April 
2009 with the delivery of the first batch of chicks. The house accommodated 45,000 chickens 
on a six week cycle and was run on a computerised system which involved minimal human 
contact with the birds for the duration of the growth cycle. Electricity and water were brought 
to the farm to enable production. The DoA negotiated a ‘strategic partnership’ with Bush 
Valley, a large-scale commercial poultry processor in Tzaneen, some 85km from the farm. The 
partnership was essentially a sub-contracting arrangement, with Bush Valley providing all 
inputs and transport, as well as management oversight, and deducting the costs from the 
income before paying the project.210 
 
The DoA’s only sizeable investment in the area thus connected the space into regional circuits 
of accumulation, materialising the state’s broader representations of rural space, manifested 
in the NSDP. The state established this link. Before this intervention, the small poultry projects 
were selling into local markets, in Vleifontein and occasionally further afield in Elim and the 
surrounding townships and villages.211 The construction of the poultry house and its 
integration into regional corporate commodity chains had the effect of opening the space to 
potentially future investment along similar lines. Bush Valley had similar contract 
arrangements with another 11 poultry houses in the province, and economies of scale 
suggested proximity of production units could be beneficial.212 
 
Negotiations were opened to construct a similar house at Shimange, but the impact 
assessment process was delayed when one claimant asserted ownership over the land the 
poultry house was to be built on. By the time the assertion was eventually withdrawn, the 
official who was driving the investments in the district DoA had left to take up a post in 
Polokwane, the provincial capital, and it appeared unlikely that the proposed construction 
would go any further.213 The ambiguities in conceptions on property between individual and 
collective ownership presented an opportunity to delay, and ultimately to collapse, an attempt 
to materialise dominant representations of space on the farm. 
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Figure 12: Construction of Ntwanano Co-op poultry house on Mavungeni redistribution portion, 
November 2008 
 
The spatial impact of the large poultry house at Mavungeni was relatively small if considered 
purely from the point of view of its material footprint. When Lefebvre (1991:49) referred to 
capitalist space as ‘abstract space’, this is what he was referring to: a space that is 
homogenised to the extent that the environment, the specificity of a locality, is more or less 
irrelevant to accumulation. The large poultry house was unique in this way: the only conditions 
required for its construction was a flat piece of land, access to water and electricity, proximity 
to the road network, a manager and casual labour. It could be anywhere, in a way that a 
macadamia orchard or vegetable production could not be anywhere. 
 
However, the house had potentially wider micro-spatial impacts. Prior to the installation of this 
multi-million rand house, Mavungeni claimants had the smaller house that could produce up 
to 3,000 chickens. These were mainly sold locally to people passing along the main road right 
in front of the poultry house and to residents of Vleifontein, Munzhedzi and Maila, just across 
the road. Production at the smaller house was abandoned when the larger one was built, and 
it was converted into a storage space. Inhabitants of the area regularly continued to come by 
to see if they could buy chickens, but the contract explicitly prohibited the workers either from 
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going into the poultry house during the production cycle or from setting some chickens aside 
for growing in the smaller house for local sale. The reason given for not allowing this was that 
diseases could spread quickly and stringent health precautions had to be followed.214 
 
The construction thus served to ‘disintegrate’ the farm space from the local economy, 
separating it and tying it into broader flows where value addition accrued to established 
corporate processors instead of remaining in the local area. According to Mickey Beech of 
Bush Valley: 
 
“We were doing our own production. And now these houses have come in, so 
we’ve closed down some of our own farms to accommodate them. And our farms 
were the old type of chicken houses. So we’ve accommodated the new state-of-
the-art computerised chicken houses… [We] started off as a live market chicken 
production unit, selling live, and slowly we edged our way into building a small 
abattoir... Slowly but surely we’ve built into a processed market and developed 
it.”215 
 
In essence, the state’s emphasis on receiving direction from the established markets in 
determining investment decisions – that is, in materialising representations of space favoured 
by agribusiness - enabled established commercial producers to move up the value chain and 
capture a greater share of the value added. It reproduced the space of Mavungeni as a 
marginalised space in the hierarchy, but one with a more direct function in the accumulation 
cycle. 
 
However, the investment also altered the micro-spatial dynamics by introducing water and 
electricity where there previously was none. Even though this was initially limited to the 
poultry house itself, it had the potential for expansion onto the rest of the farm, with 
implications of spatial practice and lived space, for example defining where inhabitants lived 
and produced. The DoA was constrained in what it could invest in, yet its interventions could 
sow the seeds for changes in spatial practice: 
 
“At Shimange, we are sure they do not have working water reticulation, they 
don’t have electricity. When we do our application, because of the kind of house 
we are putting, we are also going to test if there is water there, and electricity we 
are going to provide, because it is part of the system, that package we are going 
to put there… As agriculture we cannot say put electricity, this kind of 
transformer, because there is also some settlement. They will have a problem. 
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They will tell us, electricity for settlement is not your responsibility. The 
municipality is responsible. We are only responsible for agricultural production… 
[But+ electricity can always be upgraded.”216 
 
At Mavungeni redistribution farm, prior to the completion of the poultry house, workers 
shared a small two-roomed house without water or electricity during the day. A year later, the 
house was electrified and a water standpipe was installed 50m from the dwelling. This laid the 
basis for other productive activity and more permanent settlement in the future. While the 
construction of the poultry house switched economic activity away from the locality, by-
passing local markets and integrating with established regional commodity chains, it also 
opened up the potential for new spatial practices. 
 
The state’s sole intervention was an amplification of Nkuzi’s initial, contingent, intervention. 
Although Nkuzi’s intervention was unsustainable as an income-generating activity, it generated 
material consequences of bringing further investment that also altered the direction of spatial 
practices on the farms. The state’s investment was justified on the basis that poultry 
production was already happening: “If a project has been engaged in forestry, for us as 
Agriculture, forestry needs to be put into the picture. But we only intervene where agricultural 
activities have been going on.”217 
 
Yet the DoA did not apply this same logic to the numerous small-scale producers of vegetables 
and maize, some of whom were well integrated into local markets. This was partly because 
vegetables and maize were not a strategic priority for the Department, but also because the 
scale of production did not suit the DoA’s model for production support based on their specific 
representations of the spaces. The DoA made a concrete decision to use the limited available 
resources at its disposal to establish a large commercial project integrated into regional value 
chains, rather than supporting smaller activities feeding into local markets. This intervention 
was directed towards materialising a particular representation of space and simultaneously 
undermined the production of other spaces based on small-holder production for local 
markets. 
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7.4.2 Reconstructing on-farm space ‘from below’ 
The entrance to the road to Shimange is at the edge of Vleifontein township. If it is summer, as 
you drive along the narrow road onto the farm, fields of maize can be seen on both sides of 
the road. The road splits, with one branch leading to the old farm houses. The first impression 
is of a dilapidated house, but also a sense that there is some life here. The farm is not 
abandoned. Then on the left you notice a set of three cattle kraals, two small, one bigger, the 
dark, rich manure on the ground in striking contrast to the pale sand and grass around the 
house. Walking around the main farm house you see a stand-alone pit latrine set off to the 
side, a stand-alone corrugated iron cook hut in the middle of the cluster of decaying buildings, 
smoke rising from the chimney, a broken down tractor and rusted trailer and, in summer, a 
flourishing maize stand. A radio playing music. Emaciated dogs. Cattle bells tinkling in the 
background. An occasional chicken scratching in the dirt. 
 
This lived space is something very different from the space of a white commercial farm. There 
is a dilapidated air about it, yes. But the longer you remain, the more often you visit, the more 
you see the vibrant, active (even if troubled and difficult) emergence of a new space. Under 
white, private ownership the farms were exclusive zones where white land owners could 
determine who could stay on the farm and what they could do there. African inhabitants 
either had to subordinate themselves to these determinations or leave. Most did leave or, of 
those who did not leave of their own accord, most were eventually forced off the land. The 
land owners had the power to exclude inhabitants from the land. These exclusive zones were 
earmarked for commercial agricultural production and white occupation at a high standard of 
living. Five- and ten-roomed houses were built and set in lush micro-environments, like oases 
in the middle of the farms. Gravel roads were constructed to the farm houses and to the zones 
of production on the farms. The farms were fenced, boreholes drilled, windmills, reservoirs 
and sheds erected and dams built, all with the dual purpose of supporting commercial 
agricultural production and ensuring a comfortable life for the white land owner and his 
family. “(White) man and land *became] one as the native slipped into invisibility” (Hughes, 
2006:270). Any remaining African inhabitants were situated on the margins, away from the 
oasis, and their access to land for production was regulated by the needs of the white-owned 
commercial enterprise and the whims of the land owner. The macro-spatial practices of 
apartheid were replicated in micro-spatial practices. 
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When the farms were expropriated by the apartheid state, these micro-spatial practices of 
apartheid were sacrificed in the interests of macro-spatial imperatives. The farms were to be 
transferred to the Venda homeland with the main purpose being to form a corridor between 
two fragments of that homeland. The plan was purely at a macro-level and the specific use 
that the farms were put to was irrelevant to the bigger picture. The on-farm infrastructure was 
no longer relevant to state plans for the farms after they were expropriated. By the time the 
land was restored in 2002, most of this built infrastructure was in disrepair after twenty years 
of state ownership with limited, if any, use and maintenance. The buildings and infrastructure, 
designed for a particular type of (white commercial farmer) lifestyle, could be adapted to other 
uses but was not always appropriate: 
 
“*After the white farmer left, the farm] remained without anybody here. So our 
neighbours here, the Vendas, they came and made this place [theirs+… So I think 
this one [building] was for Agriculture, the other one was for Water Affairs, I am 
not quite sure. It was their offices and some were staying here. That’s why it was 
so dirty and dilapidated. It was so nice, and some others were making fire inside. 
When the Jacques’ left it was so neat, it was neat!... They [the Venda inhabitants] 
even cut the electricity. Most of the things were spoiled.”218 
 
Yet the houses were more than merely physical buildings. Memories were embedded in them, 
sometimes memories of pain and humiliation. Eric Tshabalala, the last headmaster at Efrata 
school at Shimange, stood in the doorway of the run down farm house in 2009 and related a 
story about one of his last interactions with the white farmer, Schoeman, who was responsible 
for the violent eviction of a number of the farm’s African inhabitants: “I remember standing in 
this exact doorway and Schoeman told me ‘if I am in heaven and there is a kaffir there, I will 
take my hat off and beat him out with it.’”219 It evokes the daily humiliations Africans had to 
endure at the hands of white land owners. But in 2009, Eric Tshabalala was standing in the 
doorway of a house he collectively owned with other African inhabitants who used to live on 
that land or whose predecessors did. He used to be a teacher there. He was now a land owner. 
The house used to be an exclusive space for the white owner and his family, and Africans could 
only enter in deference and when called for. Now Tshabalala stood on the threshold to 
participate in a CPA committee meeting to make decisions about the future of the farm. After 
restitution, the farm house was subdivided so that individuals living on the farm or visiting 
regularly each had their own private room. The former dining room and kitchen were used as 
collective spaces for meetings. According to Lefebvre (2009b:248): 
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“The history of space would emphasise destruction – be it on the scale of 
architecture and the house (the building), on the scale of the urban or that of a 
country. Such a history would extricate the meaning of these destructions – not as 
the will of a particular agent, but as the substitution of one space by another, 
including the destruction of antecedent spaces by subsequent spaces… The same 
history of space would emphasise reappropriations (modifications of the purpose 
and meaning of buildings) through which the destruction of what exists is 
avoided.” 
 
At Mavungeni the old farm houses were similarly reappropriated. They were dilapidated and 
decaying, since their design was inappropriate and unsustainable where the productive base of 
the farm was no longer geared towards the lifestyle and standards of one individual and his 
family. Yet they were being used in the construction of an alternative space, being occupied by 
workers on the farm. They might not survive the transition, but they were being integrated 
into the creation of new spaces, with new purposes and meanings. So the very fact of the 
return of the land marked a fundamental alteration in on-farm space. 
 
The farms had limited productive infrastructure in the first place, and most of this was 
abandoned at the time of state expropriation. At Shimange, ruins of cattle dips, grain storage 
facilities, reservoirs and a dairy, which was no more than a few bricks hidden in the weeds, 
were the only physical indication of past productive activity. Munzhedzi had no trace of 
inherited infrastructure, apart from a reservoir, indicating the limited extent to which the land 
was ever productively used apart from cattle grazing. On the Mavungeni redistribution portion 
a white farmer, Keith Johnson, leased the land until 2003 and had a dairy with 20 cows. When 
the farm was transferred to the Mavungeni group, the land use plan explicitly warned against 
continuing with the dairy because of “high capital demands and the management intensive 
nature of the enterprise” (Agriconcept, 2000:38). Even before the land use plans were drawn 
up, looking for a ‘quick win’ and influenced once again by dominant conceptions of commercial 
agriculture, the DLA decided to invest in the dairy. “Without any idea we said we wanted to 
renovate the dairy and do poultry. The DLA gave us some dairy cattle, R180,000 for 27 cattle, 
and also bought a tractor. But there was no water or food on the farm for the cattle, and no 
money to buy feed, so all the cattle starved and died”220. The dairy infrastructure subsequently 
decayed and stood abandoned as a monument to unsustainable development (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Abandoned dairy infrastructure at Mavungeni redistribution portion 
 
Other inherited infrastructure, such as internal roads and dams, proved to be of more value to 
the new spaces being constructed. Like the farm houses, they established the basic template 
for spatial organisation on the farms by dictating where people might choose to live and to 
produce. There was some technical logic in the placement of dams and roads – the scientific 
knowledge that formed part of capitalist representations of space. For example, a dam must 
be created on a river, and if it is on high ground water can be gravity-fed to crops and 
homesteads. The internal roads were designed to reach land that was fertile, with a gradient 
which allowed for the potential of growing crops. The roads were not carved into virgin bush 
by white land owners, but were mapped onto historical footpaths that were already part of 
the spatial practices prior to white occupation and the construction of private property. Layers 
of spatial practice were reproduced over time, despite the violent and sad history of the 
human relations on the land, and changes of ownership, systems of authority and land uses. 
These practices, these lived spaces, literally carved channels of human activity into the land, 
creating a template for the spatial organisation of the land that is likely to endure as long as 
people live there. 
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Thus some of the inherited infrastructure proved to be inappropriate, while some provided a 
material framework from which to launch new activities on the land. The decay of the old did 
not mean the complete disintegration of the farms. Outside investment was very limited. Part 
of the restitution agreement was that claimants would receive a Restitution Settlement Grant 
to the value of R5,695/household.221 The money would be pooled and could be used for 
whatever the CPA decided was a priority. The funds therefore potentially could be decisive in 
materialising alternative representations of space (depending on the functioning of the CPAs 
and their committees). The funds were not just to be handed to the CPA, but were to be drawn 
down once the CPA told the DLA what they wanted to use the money for. A supplementary 
Development Assistance Grant, valued at 25% of the total grant, could also be made available 
to carry out specified land use or business plans, although it was up to the RLCC to decide 
whether to provide the additional grant. This control of the funds gave the state authority to 
contain spatial practices unacceptable to its own representations of space. The RLCC owed 
Munzhedzi R2,664 million.222 R880,000 was due to the Mavungeni restitution claimants.223 At 
Shimange, the RLCC was to pay R1,8 million in grants.224 But the settlement and development 
grants were not forthcoming. A news report in July 2010 (Phakathi, 2010), showing that 
government owed R3,4 billion in outstanding payments of post-settlement grants to 
restitution claimants, indicated that this was a national issue. When I spoke to the Limpopo 
Land Claims Commissioner about this he was extremely dismissive: “The money is not there, 
end of story.”225 
 
Whatever was happening inside government, it was clear that it lacked the capacity to make 
systematic investments to materialise its own conceptions of space. Alternatively, if we 
consider it from a broader vantage point, the spaces of these farms were considered to be 
terminally marginal and investment in realising the commercial agricultural model was 
directed to other spaces conceptualised as being more important in the hierarchy of spaces. 
This alternative interpretation is given some weight if we consider the spatial development 
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plans, which identified Vleifontein as a priority local service point. This meant urbanisation of 
the area as opposed to its agricultural development. This is dealt with in some detail later in 
the discussion on settlement. 
 
 
Figure 14: David Baloyi harvesting his maize crop at Mavungeni, with his house and the macadamia 
orchard in the background 
 
The inability to materialise dominant conceptions of space resulted in other, smaller 
investments ‘from below’ reshaping the space on the farms in ways that produced a more 
diverse productive landscape. Land uses based on smaller scale production and settlement in a 
combination of spatial arrangements began to dominate spatial practice. These were not 
articulated in formal planning or institutional documents, and emerged as a product of the 
lived spaces of the inhabitants themselves, in articulation with the material and conceptual 
inheritance. Small-scale (0.5 ha-10 ha) crop production emerged on all the farms (Figure 14), 
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and all the farms had some livestock owners. Decisions about how to organise productive 
space on the farms was the outcome of a number of factors including the ecological conditions 
(in particular terrain, access to water, presence of vegetation, and soil quality) and inherited 
infrastructure (e.g. the location of dams and pipes), which in combination constituted the 
material basis of spatial practice. The location of water and water infrastructure in particular 
was instrumental in determining where production would take place on the farms. 
 
The role of authority in the spatial divisions on the Mavungeni restitution portion was 
elaborated on in Chapter 5. The control over the CPA committee allowed a group of claimants 
to allocate larger individual portions to those they favoured, while seeking to prevent others 
from occupying the land for settlement or production. According to Morris Baloyi, claimants 
were “free to get 10 ha anywhere you want…as long as you have power, if you have 
money.”226 Here his meaning was less about being able to bribe the committee to allocate 
more and better land, and more about those with resources being able to use high quality land 
more effectively than those without resources of their own for production. 
 
Production was relatively dispersed, and this was partly a product of the internal conflicts that 
saw a spatial division appear between the CPA committee members and their supporters to 
the south-east of the farm on larger, stand-alone plots of land, and the Xikopokopo group 
members to the north-west of the farm. Some of the claimants aligned with the CPA 
committee had fairly substantial portions of land. For example Michael Baloyi had 10 ha of 
cultivated land and was employing 5 people in 2010. Dennis Ngobeni with his father Research 
Ngobeni had access to 17 ha, with 10 ha of young macadamia trees (although they were 
struggling to maintain these).227 Figure 15 shows the distribution of production and settlement 
in 2010. Only the epicentre of the Xikopokopo settlement is shown in the figure because by 
mid-2010 it had already expanded to over 100 households. The Xikopokopo group were on 
smaller pieces of land and had integrated production and settlement in their homesteads. 
While many of the latter were mainly producing for their own use, there were some who were 
also producing for the market. For example, Jonas Phulwana had planted 4,000 head of 
cabbages for sale in 2010.228 (Figure 16) This spatial unevenness should not blind us to the 
reality that significant portions of the farm were under cultivation. The character of production 
went against the dominant conceptions of space elaborated by the DoA in particular. 
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Figure 15: Current points of interest 
(Key on following page) 
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Key to Figure 15: Current points of interest 
 
1 Old farm houses, Shimange (occupied) 
2 Chris Baloyi field 
3 Alex Baloyi field 
4 Nursery (Clement Baloyi) 
5 Main fields (approx 8-10 ha) 
6 Noriah Baloyi field (earmarked for new poultry house) 
7 Alex Baloyi field 
8 Rosemary Tiba Baloyi field 
9 Sipho Baloyi field 
10 Cattle kraals 
11 Marima homestead and plot 
12 da Gama plot 
13 Ximange Co-op poultry house 
14 Alex Baloyi piggery (under construction) 
15 Clement Baloyi plot 
16 Noriah Baloyi field/macadamias 
17 Xikopokopo (Audrey Ntshangule and Mabina Matodzi) 
18 Xikopokopo (Thomas Baloyi and others) 
19 Centre of main Xikopokopo settlement 
20 Driving school (Xikopokopo) 
21 Tractor driver’s homestead 
22 Maize fields – owner unknown 
23 Michael Baloyi field 
24 Old farmhouse (currently occupied by farm workers) 
25 Macadamia orchard 
26 David Baloyi homestead and fields 
27 Samuel Vukeya homestead and field 
28 Mdluli field 
29 Marime homestead and field; Nxumayo homestead and field 
30 Dennis Ngobeni kraal 
31 Old shed (currently used by Ngobeni, including workers living there) 
32 Michael Baloyi piggery 
33 Dennis & Research Ngobeni macadamia orchard 
34 Ntwanano Poultry Co-op 
35 Tshikota field 
36 Shidavho macadamia orchard 
37 Munzhedzi Pfano poultry/piggery project 
38 Malehase current homestead and kraal 
39 Chief’s kraal, Munzhedzi 
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Figure 16: Jonas Phulwana’s cabbage crop at the Xikopokopo settlement at Mavungeni, with 
Vleifontein visible in the distance 
 
At Shimange the location of cultivation also to some extent mapped historical production 
patterns. This simply revealed that land appropriate for cultivation and with access to water 
was identified in an earlier period. Cultivation was near the dams and around the old farm 
houses. The main fields (Figure 17) were in an area historically used as a food garden by 
children and teachers from Efrata school in the days before the forced removals and where 
Schoeman, the last white farmer, had also previously produced vegetables and potatoes.229 
Memories of old land use practices were resurrected. There was also some clearing of bush to 
create new fields, indicating an expansion of production on the farm compared with historical 
production. As with Mavungeni, those with resources drove the spatial patterns of production, 
selecting where they wanted to cultivate and the amount of land they could afford to cultivate. 
 
Production fluctuated from year to year and tended to be seasonal, to serve the local market 
at Christmas time when migrant workers returned from the cities. According to Chris Baloyi, 
who had about 4 ha under vegetables at Shimange: 
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“We sell locally, especially in town. There are a lot of customers. We sold a lot last 
year. The amount was too high. In Elim, but mostly Louis Trichardt, around OK, 
Shoprite [national supermarket chains+. Even in the shops.”230  
 
 
Figure 17: Vegetable plot at Shimange, surrounded by dense bush, October 2008 
 
Uitschot (which, recall, was the farm neighbouring Shimange (Figure 2) that was meant to be 
part of the Shimange claim but fell by the wayside after bureaucratic errors in the claim 
process) also came under cultivation. The road to the Mavungeni orchard provided access to 
the farm and up to 10 people had occupied the land, combining production and temporary or 
permanent dwellings. The individual plots at Uitschot were generally larger than those at 
Syferfontein. The space was occupied without any formal authority, although Samuel Vukeya 
received approval from the Mavungeni CPA committee to settle and cultivate on the border 
between Uitschot and Mavungeni.231 At Shimange and Mavungeni, land reform facilitated the 
growth of a range of small-scale agricultural producers (Cousins, 2010b), with a significant 
number of petty commodity producers and some small-scale capitalist farmers, interspersed 
with supplementary food producers and, to a lesser extent, allotment holding wage workers.  
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Production at Munzhedzi presented a very different picture. The large-scale pre-emptive 
occupation of the land in 2000 led by the chief produced a settlement pattern similar to the 
grids of the homeland betterment schemes. This was a state-driven model of forced 
resettlement from the 1940s and 1950s, also replicated elsewhere in southern Africa (Moore, 
2005). The model sought to concentrate historically dispersed settlement into clearly defined 
residential zones that could both be provided with services and also more easily controlled by 
a central authority. It was based on representations of space that made a clear distinction 
between settlement and production, with separate fields allocated for cultivation and other 
areas set aside for grazing. It facilitated control by traditional authorities, in particular by 
establishing a system where individual plots were demarcated and allocated and a fee could 
be paid. The occupation of Munzhedzi led by the chief was organised in such a way that the 
chief allocated plots and people paid for access, whether they were claimants or not. In this 
sense, it was an extension of the homeland residential tenure system onto the farms. 
 
To remain with the issue of the spatial organisation of production for now, the pattern and 
extent of settlement at Munzhedzi meant that there was limited land available to be allocated 
for cultivation. In most cases, inhabitants had access to the standard 40-50m2 plots. In just two 
cases – one the Pfano poultry and piggery group project originally sponsored by Nkuzi with 
about 4 ha232, and the other an individual vegetable plot of 1 ha233 (Figure 18) – was there 
access to more than the standard plot for cultivation. Here and there individuals managed to 
buy a number of plots next to one another to produce a half hectare piece of land under their 
control for production and settlement.234 Despite this limited access, there was a surprisingly 
high level of production, albeit limited to backyard gardening. A survey conducted by Aliber et 
al. (2009b:70) showed that 72% of stands held by the 178 claimant households that had 
returned to the farm had backyard food gardens, while 56% of the 717 stands allocated to 
non-claimants had gardens in 2008, giving an average of 60% of homesteads with gardens. 
There was additional production on 15% of another 229 stands that were demarcated but not 
yet inhabited. Supplementary food producers and allotment holding wage workers, in Cousins’ 
(2010b) terms, dominated here. 
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Figure 18: Seedlings await planting at Thabelo Tshikota’s plot at Munzhedzi, with Pfano poultry / 
piggery project and ploughed field visible in the background 
 
A superficial view of Munzhedzi was one of an occupation that turned the farm into a de facto 
extension of Vleifontein. This was the DoA’s justification for not prioritising support for 
agriculture to Munzhedzi. Said a district official: “Munzhedzi is just hanging there. The problem 
with Munzhedzi, if you look at Munzhedzi, there’s a lot of settlement rather than agricultural 
farming… They have turned it into a settlement. It’s not in our list for putting resources and 
more effort to assist it.”235 But if we imagine separating out the layers of activity, like a 
geographic information system (GIS) map, and removing the housing and fences and 
infrastructure that goes with settlement, we would see a picture of a significant portion of the 
land being cultivated. This is visible in the satellite photo in Figure 10, where the pinkish 
markings show significant agricultural production in amongst the settlement of Munzhedzi – 
more, perhaps, even than Mavungeni (although some of the bigger plots at Mavungeni were 
not yet established in 2007 when the satellite image was taken). It just was not in the form or 
scale expected in the dominant conceptions of what agriculture was meant to look like. The 
specific history of settlement at Munzhedzi constructed the spatial framework within which 
production took place. 
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Across all the farms, grazing was not very tightly controlled. Cattle from Vleifontein and Maila 
grazed on both portions of Mavungeni and, to a more limited extent, at Shimange and 
Munzhedzi. In places there was some rudimentary fencing to prevent cattle from getting to 
crops, but there were no organised camps and cattle roamed freely across the land. 
Vleifontein farmers who had previously grazed cattle on the farms either continued grazing 
without explicit authorisation or paid small rents to the new owners.236 Freely roaming cattle 
posed a problem for those engaged in crop production and this did create tensions at times.237 
However, ownership of livestock was relatively limited, there was still plenty of open land for 
grazing, and thus there were no open conflicts over who could access land for grazing. 
 
This patchwork of different sizes and locations of production, with differing extents of 
integration with settlement, interspersed with open-access grazing land, reconstructed the 
spaces of the farms from the bottom up, producing with them alternative representations of 
space. Yet the new spaces were only emerging, they were not yet consolidated. Producers 
struggled, with limited market access, with poor infrastructure and lack of resources to 
produce. The lack of adequate water infrastructure meant production was limited to the rainy 
season. When it rained, it was also sometimes not possible to get to the fields. In the heavy 
rainy season of summer 2006, for example, production at the lower fields at Shimange was 
abandoned because of difficulty in getting to the plots.238 Lack of fencing meant that cattle, 
wild pigs and monkeys damaged crops, sometimes to the extent where it was not worth the 
effort to plant at all: 
 
“Monkeys and pigs eat the mielies. If you can go around, eish! It’s terrible. If we 
had fences it would be far much better. Monkeys are giving problems during the 
day. So if you are here during the day you can chase them away. But the other 
things, ah! They come at night… This barbed wire? It does not protect anything. 
They get inside. We need razor wire, or diamond mesh. If we had diamond mesh 
we should have a lot of crops.”239 
 
Activity on the land thus remained tenuous. Some of those actively involved in production 
would opt for other livelihood strategies if opportunities arose. Alex Baloyi at Shimange was 
using his money to hire people to assist him to clear fields and build a piggery. Yet if he was 
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able to get his job back in Johannesburg, he would go.240 He might not entirely abandon his 
investments in the farm, but he would certainly spend far less personal time, resources and 
effort on it. Clement Baloyi, a youngster who worked closely with Chris Baloyi in getting 
production going at Shimange said: “My goal is to go back to school, nothing else. I just want 
to go back to school. This is not work. I am just scratching here and there. I want to help the 
people in Limpopo on farming. I want to specialise, I want to be a ‘farmacist.’”241 At the end of 
2010, he had left the farm and was back at school.242 New spaces were still struggling to 
emerge from the old. 
7.4.3 Settlement dynamics, spatial practice and lived space 
At the macro-spatial level, the presence of Vleifontein township in the middle of the farms 
loomed large. Its conceptualisation in municipal plans as a ‘third order town’ or a local service 
point emphasised services and settlement in the area, even while the municipality also 
supported the idea of commercial agriculture on the restitution farms.243 This was rooted in a 
different representation of the space, one that took the late apartheid representations and 
their materialisation, specifically in the establishment of Vleifontein, as its starting point. 
Before the end of formal apartheid, the area was already experiencing growth in residential 
settlement. Maila village, on the other side of Munzhedzi (Figure 2) was first settled in the late 
1980s on the western edge of Vleyfontein 310 LS, gradually expanding onto Duikershoek 389 
LS, the neighbouring farm: 
 
“I moved to Maila *from Nthabalala+ in 1989 when there was settlement… There 
was an old white guy called Pat who had moved by the time people came to settle 
at Maila. It was just bush when we came here. Originally it was said younger 
people should move to Maila, but others also came back when they saw the land 
was flat and fertile.”244 
 
The occupation at Munzhedzi saw a renewed flood of settlement from 2000, and Maila 
continued to expand onto Munzhedzi land even after the conclusion of the claim: 
 
“There is this farm, Diepgezet. It’s for agricultural development. We had a little 
problem, intervention from the Maila people. Chief [Keith] Nthabalala allocated 
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some stands to his people without the consent of Munzhedzi. So I went to them, 
and what I found out is that some of the people who are allocated some areas 
there are beneficiaries. So I thought I won’t chase them away, I’ll just call them 
and sit down with them and try to settle this issue in a good way. Because they’ve 
got big portions of land, where they’ve absorbed a big portion of Diepgezet. So 
that place I still need to divide it into a lot of people.”245 
 
On the Mavungeni side, settlement was not as rapid as at Munzhedzi. Apart from the bulk 
services infrastructure on the Mavungeni restitution portion, historically Vleifontein had not 
encroached as a settlement onto Mavungeni, although there was agricultural production 
there: 
 
“We were told in the 1980s that that place *Mavungeni] is going to be an 
industrial place according to a map we had. We were told that stands are going to 
be erected there and people would get jobs. That’s why people were not 
interested in going there [to establish residential sites]. They were just ploughing 
so that they make sure that place is used in the meantime.”246 
 
Although the formal plans of the municipality to extend the township onto the farms in both 
directions were put on hold as a result of the successful claims, this did not prevent residents 
from Vleifontein from moving onto Munzhedzi and, later, onto Mavungeni. Vleifontein was 
expanding, and by 2009 over 500 residents needed land to establish new households on.247 
The failure of government to carry through plans to construct an RDP settlement at Mavungeni 
opened the door for occupations of other parts of the farm. When the Xikopokopo group 
started erecting shacks on the northern portion of Mavungeni restitution farm, and then later 
began offering stands for sale, some Vleifontein residents took the opportunity to move there. 
From a handful of occupiers in 2008, there were an estimated 100 occupied stands by June 
2010.248 Some of the demand was for land for agricultural production, as indicated above. But 
overcrowding in more formal settlements – not only in Vleifontein, but even in Elim – was also 
a factor in the growth of the informal settlement on the Mavungeni land: 
 
“It was not a matter of coming here because the stands were bigger, but it is what 
was available. Where we were staying [in Elim] there were too many people. It 
was not our own property where we were staying and there were many people 
staying there. We wanted our own place.”249 
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The growth of settlement at Munzhedzi linked Maila village and Vleifontein township in a 
continuous strip of dense settlement along the D4 district road connecting Bandelierkop and 
Elim (Figure 10). The unauthorised occupation on a section of the Mavungeni restitution 
portion extended this settlement further along the road to Elim. Moddervlei, the commercial 
farm managed by the Hennings immediately north-east of Mavungeni along the Elim-
Bandelierkop road (Figure 2), was once protected from the black reserves by the farms in the 
research site. In an ironic twist, Moddervlei itself had become the buffer standing between the 
sprawling (historically mainly Shangaan) settlements around Elim and the expanding 
(historically Venda) settlements around Vleifontein. It was not inconceivable that in ten or 
fifteen years these settlements would form a continuous strip from Maila to Elim and beyond. 
Under apartheid, Venda and Shangaan were spatially segregated into two ethnic homelands. 
As much as migration into the cities broke down ethnic differences – whether constructed or 
real – migration from the more remote rural areas into this strip of dense settlement was also 
likely to break down the divisions between Venda and Shangaan in this area over time. The 
farms were tossed on the waves of far larger demographic changes which threatened to engulf 
them as spaces of commercial agricultural production. 
 
Vleifontein, and by extension the surrounding farms, was a magnet for people moving in from 
villages in the deeper rural areas, especially Nthabalala and Mulima. Location in relation to 
transport and services was a key factor in people moving into the area: 
 
“Vleifontein, it’s an urban settlement. So those who were staying in rural places, 
they think if they are just staying next to Vleifontein, they are next to an urban 
settlement where maybe most of the services are provided. We’ve got this very 
big supermarket, they can get everything there, hardware, groceries. Also 
transport, it’s a problem to them. Because they pay a lot of money from 
Nthabalala to town. So some of them come and make their shopping here at 
Vleifontein. So that is why they thought it is better to come and stay here.”250 
 
This hardly even needed to be full access to services. According to one resident of Munzhedzi: 
“Here we are well sited…because now we can even see the light from Vleifontein… Their lights 
even extend to our place so it’s not that dark at night, unlike the time we were living at 
Nthabalala.”251 The reflected glow of Vleifontein was enough to improve conditions. The 
relative lack of settlement at Shimange can be explained in similar terms. The farm is located 
                                                          
250
 Interview, Godfrey Ramadwa & Vincent Mahladisa, 9 June 2009 
251
 Interview, Kuthama Sishonga, 27 July 2009 
194 
 
at the back of Vleifontein, away from the Bandelierkop-Elim road. People moving into the area 
preferred locations nearer the main road, which meant Munzhedzi or Mavungeni. 
 
While the farms were considered to be low in the dominant spatial hierarchy and far from any 
production or retail centre, the reality of apartheid settlement was that the homeland 
settlements were even more remote. The farms revealed a locational advantage for many 
people living in the former homelands: 
 
“*You don’t think the farm is far away from economic opportunities?] No! This is not 
far from the economic (laughs). Where we stay now is far, not here. The town is 
near. Do you know how much I pay to come from Bungeni to Louis Trichardt, 
Makhado? It’s R36 to and fro. So can you imagine moving from up there to go and 
get some groceries, and move down there? [From here+ in a taxi it’s R18, to and fro. 
In a bus you can pay up to R14… So we are staying far from businesses, far from 
everything that side, very far. That’s why I say people are willing to come and stay 
here, on the farm.”252 
 
Even at the micro-level, access to transport routes shaped where people erected houses on 
the farms. According to Shirinda, who led the unauthorised occupation on the Mavungeni 
restitution land:  
 
“It was agreed that we are going to stay here. The reason being that, you know, 
there, up there [on the south-east part of the farm], if we go and stay there and 
keep the cattle here, it will be a danger to the road. The second point is that most 
of those people who are evicted here, you know it’s long ago, it’s 1968, so they 
are old. Many of them do not have cars. So if we go and stay there, if they are 
dropped here by bus, how are they going to reach that place? When they are 
going for pension benefits, how are they going there? You know a person cannot 
foot 3km to the road, then go and get his pension, then foot 3km back to where 
he is staying. So this is the place. Those are some of the reasons that made us 
agree that we have to come and stay here… This area has been given back to us to 
better our lives. Staying up there, is it to better your life, or to make your life 
worse? They [the Mavungeni CPA committee+ did not have an answer.”253 
 
Some claimants were merely waiting for the establishment of a formal settlement before 
returning to the farms:  
 
“Many of *the other claimants] are very interested [to return]. The problem is 
funds. If the municipality can build some self-help houses that side, put all the 
infrastructure in, electricity, water, roads, they will come back, you will see. They 
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will come quickly. People are tired of these bantustans… So if maybe we can get a 
settlement nearby here, then people come and occupy so they can come.”254 
 
These claimants mostly lived in formal settlements with basic services and infrastructure and, 
apart from a handful of the ‘pioneers’, were not willing to reduce their standards of living to 
return to the farms. According to Shirinda, those who were waiting were not really interested 
in coming back to the farms to settle; they preferred to use the farms for production but not to 
stay there. Shirinda also felt the proposed RDP settlement at Mavungeni was a red herring, 
since most of the claimants supporting it already had other incomes or jobs and would 
therefore not qualify for a house in the settlement in any case.255 His alternative 
representation of the space, which he started materialising in spatial practice, was to settle in 
a less structured way, and to include some land for production as part of the settlement. 
 
The completion of the tarring of the 10km stretch of the D4 road to Bandelierkop, connecting 
Elim to the N1 via Vleifontein, was likely to bolster the local economy and simultaneously 
increase in-migration from the more isolated rural areas. The spatial plan recognised these 
dynamics (Vhembe District Municipality, 2007). Despite this, the municipality was just as 
incapable of materialising its vision for the area as the DoA was. It failed to invest in housing at 
Mavungeni and Shimange, where the CPA committees had agreed this could happen. And it 
failed to invest in improving services infrastructure in Vleifontein itself, which was expected to 
be the service point for in-coming migrants: 
 
“They *the municipality] are doing nothing for us… They made this tar road that 
goes through. If you go there you will see what kind of a street is that, big 
potholes… Such a main road, but, it’s round about two years, but there are 
potholes… When I was still at SANCO [South African National Civic Association], we 
told them this side we don’t have lights. We were told, the main street is tarred, 
we are going to put lights. Now it’s ten or seven years ago… Go to the extension, 
there is an extension there [on Munzhedzi land]. We begged them, those people 
don’t have lights until today… There’s no water even now. We do pay water, but 
there’s no water. Why?... We’ve got seven *boreholes] in total. Four on the other 
side, which are now feeding Munzhedzi with water. But we’ve got one engine *to 
pump] water, and it’s a lot of water we need.”256 
 
Government plans to grow Vleifontein as a local service point would attract more people to 
the area, yet there was no space for further housing development except on the farms. But the 
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farms were simultaneously treated as closed entities and earmarked for agricultural 
production and not settlement. This was a case of the spatial planning of the district and 
municipality being at odds with plans to secure the farms as productive zones. Two different 
representations of space led to irresolvable contradictions. One was based on a general notion 
of commercial production that was not appropriate for these specific farms, and the other was 
based on the artifacts of late apartheid interventions in establishing a settlement and clearing 
the surrounding land. Inhabitants filled the gap, based on their requirements both for places to 
stay and places to conduct agricultural production, i.e., based on the lived space as they 
experienced it in their everyday lives. In so doing, they simultaneously constructed alternative 
representations of space and spatial practices. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Two different historical representations of space contributed to the dominant representations 
informing land use. One was based on the historical productive use of the land by white 
farmers, emphasising the commercial exploitation of the land and its inhabitants. This derived 
less from the actual historical use of the land on these particular farms, and more from an 
abstraction of what commercial agriculture was meant to look like. Yet this representation 
drove government interventions in support of agriculture on these farms. The second 
representation of space was drawn from the late apartheid restructuring of the area, based on 
the establishment of Vleifontein with surrounding farms being made available for a 
combination of agriculture and the expansion of settlement over time. The municipality, 
responsible for human settlement, adopted this as their representation of the space, 
manifested in their plans for the area. These two dominant representations of space sat 
uneasily, if not in downright contradiction, with one another. 
 
In practice, neither the municipality nor the DoA were able to materialise their chosen spatial 
conceptions. For their part, inhabitants produced their own spatial practices which, even 
though they were not clearly articulated as unified representations, had their own coherence 
across the whole area. In contrast to the DoA’s dominant master-plan of tightly controlled 
commercial production, inhabitants created a patchwork of small, mainly individual production 
units across the farms. In contrast to the municipality’s plans of orderly, structured residential 
extensions of Vleifontein, inhabitants occupied land and established various types of 
residential settlement, mostly integrated with some agricultural production. Unplanned land 
uses were widespread, mirroring land reform in other parts of the country (Hall, 2009b). 
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In practice, the resulting space more closely resembled late apartheid representations of the 
space than the commercial farming representations of the DoA and white land owners. 
However, there were significant differences in ownership (CPAs rather than traditional 
authorities) and in the processes of settlement and production, which were less controlled or 
imposed from above. Inhabitants themselves significantly shaped the spaces newly opened by 
land reform in their own interests, even if this was unevenly amongst inhabitants. They 
asserted their own meanings and experiences, their daily lived space, in shaping spatial 
practice. Although traditional authorities and CPA committees, representing relative elites 
from amongst the claimants, did have greater power to shape the emerging spaces in their 
own interests, they were not entirely able to control the process and the production of space 
remained open-ended and dynamic. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Land reform and the production of space 
This thesis aimed to explore the role land reform played in the production of rural space in 
South Africa after 1994. The transfer of land ownership to previously subordinated groups 
poses an inherent challenge to existing social, and hence spatial, relations. While this change in 
spatial relations is not necessarily a threat to the reproduction of capitalist space, it 
destabilises the inherited spatial structure of capitalism. This requires adaptations whose 
outcomes were not automatically ensured. The thesis explored some of these adaptations and 
the extent to which they prefigure changing spatial relations. 
 
In South Africa, capitalism, and its underlying spatial characteristics as defined by Lefebvre - 
homogeneity, fragmentation and hierarchy, persists. But does this mean no meaningful change 
in the production of space as the result of land reform? The findings of the thesis suggest 
otherwise. A core tension lies at the centre of land reform efforts. This is a tension between 
the retention of capitalist social and spatial relations on the one hand, and the desire to 
overcome the inherently racialised production of capitalist space in the South African context. 
This tension is expressed, as Chapters 5, 6 and 7 reveal, across the dimensions of authority and 
land governance, property relations and land use. Lefebvre’s spatial framework is useful in 
connecting discourses of land reform (representations of space), material changes (spatial 
practice), and changing meanings and lived experiences of inhabitants (lived space) resulting 
from land reform. 
 
The impact of land reform on the production of rural space is an on-going and dynamic 
process. Land reform is not an event but an unfolding process, unfurling multiple possible 
pathways of change based on specific contexts. There is a tendency in Lefebvre’s work to 
establish a dichotomous relationship between capitalist space and an alternative space. In this 
he is inconsistent. At times he uses the concept of abstract space to show how capitalism has 
managed to capture and subordinate any alternatives in the production of space. But he also 
repeatedly argues that the seeds of a differential, or alternative, space are found within 
abstract or capitalist space. The issue then is how those seeds are converted into a new space. 
Is it possible to have fragments of alternative space – ‘liberated zones’ - within an overarching 
capitalist space, or does the whole have to be shattered for those seeds to grow? At times 
Lefebvre definitely argues for the latter. The response has to be a total response, the 
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obliteration of capitalist space in one go. A new mode of production is required that “must 
produce its own space, which can no longer be a capitalist space. Any transformation of the 
world that remains caught in the pre-existent morphology will do no more than reproduce the 
relations of domination in a more or less disguised form” (Lefebvre, 2009b:248). 
 
But elsewhere he says that everyday life cannot be transcended in one go: “life cannot be 
changed by magic or by a poetic act… The transformation of everyday life must also pass 
through institutions” (quoted in Merrifield, 2006:141). Everyday life, the basis of 
transformation, has been fragmented under capitalism. Capitalist space can still be ‘detonated’ 
but only through reconnecting the severed and commingling the separated (Merrifield, 
2006:135). Perhaps we can acknowledge, again, that the relationship between a revolutionary 
rupture and incremental reforms is not a binary but a symbiotic one. A rupture is necessary to 
alter fundamentally the basic social relations that over time will produce a new space. But the 
conditions are not always ripe for such a rupture. Time needs to be spent in ‘under-labouring’, 
to borrow a term from Roy Bhaskar (1997), building the subterranean conditions that permit 
an open rupture. Gramsci (1991) talks about a ‘war of position’, a period of patient work in 
building the essential structures of a counter-power from where a ‘war of manoeuvre’ can in 
time be launched. At such times, Lefebvre (2009c:151) proposes that we, “at any given 
moment and in any given conjuncture, attempt the impossible in order to prepare, through 
concerted thought and action, for the disconcerting moment, the conjuncture that would 
change this impossible into possibility.”  
 
The thesis findings suggest the sharp distinction between capitalist space and alternative space 
does not capture the complexity of the production of space and the resulting hybrid forms of 
space as an ongoing and dynamic production. This is evident in the fusions of authority and 
land governance systems, property relations and land uses. Flexibility in the morphing of space 
to accommodate the daily interactions and contestations over meaning and practice – 
especially in the face of a ‘shock’ such as the redistribution of land ownership - may suddenly 
convert into a brittleness that opens opportunities for the structural alteration of the space. 
Whether or not these alterations constitute “hidden evental sites”, a la Zizek (2008), remains 
an open question that can only be answered in hindsight. The point is to work at building the 
potential of land reform, and the new spaces it permits to emerge, into a desired future. It is 
not pre-determined. It is dependent on the actions of people in the present. 
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The Vleifontein area had a number of historical sedimentations that shaped the production of 
space after land reform. The intervention of land reform was decisive in transferring land to 
subordinated groups. But it had to contend with these sedimentations that delimited the 
possibilities for the transformation of space. The construction of the space as a zone of pre-
colonial life, as a buffer zone, as a zone of commercial white agriculture and as a space of 
homeland consolidation and settlement after forced removals packed contested meanings, 
memories and social relations onto the land. Land reform was informed by this history. 
Indigenous tenure and private property regimes, with their accompanying structures of 
authority, governance mechanisms and land uses, succeeded one another historically, and 
were differentially and unevenly absorbed into the post-land reform production of space. The 
result was not either private property or indigenous tenure, either traditional authorities or 
private land owners, either commercial agriculture or settlement, either integrated settlement 
and production or segregated settlement and production. It was hybridised combinations of 
these, based on history and contingency. 
 
The inherited space itself was a hybridised, dynamic production, reproduced in memory and 
contestation. Land reform drew on the dominant framework of private property and 
commercial agriculture to structure the farms on the basis of the old cadastral boundaries. But 
it was forced to take into account memories of dispossession and lived experience, and the 
presence of Vleifontein as a settlement right in the middle of the farms – a product of late 
apartheid homeland consolidation plans. Internal to the farms, at the micro-spatial level, the 
exclusive rights of private owners were mediated in numerous ways that generated both 
hybrid forms of authority and land governance, and land uses. Spatial practice did not 
resemble dominant representations of space in all respects. 
8.2 Authority and land governance 
The land reform programme adopted inherited institutions and systems of land governance. 
Part of the rights of property ownership included exclusive rights to make decisions both about 
land use and about who could inhabit the land and under what conditions. Both the rights of 
property owners and the (not clearly defined) powers of traditional authorities are protected 
in the Constitution. This meant a fundamental protection of the pre-existing structures of 
authority and land governance. Berry (2006:20) has suggested that retaining unelected and 
hence unaccountable traditional authorities “leaves room for explosive conflicts over land and 
authority to occur…without bringing down the government.” At the same time, the ANC in 
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government did attempt to introduce democratic structures into the rural areas for the first 
time. At the broader level, ‘wall-to-wall’ democratically elected local councils brought 
democratic representation to the black majority for the first time. The land reform programme 
offered an opportunity to extend democratic representation further, onto the farms 
themselves. This was realised through the construction of the CPAs. 
 
As Peters (2007) and others (Lund, 2002, Moore, 2005) have concluded, the social struggle 
over land is not only about land in and of itself, but also about legitimacy and authority more 
broadly. The implementation of the land reform programme had contradictory impacts on 
broader social relations. The authority of white farmers was reduced to the extent that they 
lost control over land through the land reform programme, but simultaneously their power as 
land owners was consolidated if they retained other land from which to exert their ownership 
rights and hence authority. Land reform also had a contradictory impact on traditional 
authorities. On the one hand, it opened space for them to reclaim their authority over the 
land, through leading claims for restitution in the context of the entrenchment of their power 
through national legislation. This entailed a reworking rather than repudiation of apartheid 
ethnic categories, also evident in other African post-colonial contexts (Berry, 2006). On the 
other hand, land reform created institutional forms that enabled other social forces to 
challenge their authority over the land. Rather than attempting to identify which of these 
forms of ‘citizenship’ (a community of belonging at various scales) will eventually prevail, Berry 
(2007:4) suggests that we consider “how they are being combined and reworked” in the 
process of struggles over land and authority. 
 
For their part, the CPAs faced real constraints. First, their authority over the land was limited 
to the enclosed parcels of land that were transferred to them. The fragmented, homogenous 
spatial form of private property contained democratic land governance within the boundaries 
of individual land reform farms, and was not generalised throughout the rural areas. Second, 
they were compelled to function as private land owners, an inherently exclusionary authority. 
Third, they were introduced in a context of customs and norms that formed the basis of 
enduring institutions that favoured top-down authority, whether private land owners or 
traditional authorities. Fourth, the post-1994 state was inconsistent in its support for the new 
democratic institutions of land governance. This was partly a product of divergent interests 
within the state, most clearly manifested in the contradictory impulses to retain pre-existing 
forms of authority and simultaneously to introduce new democratic forms. 
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As a result, the CPAs tended to reproduce aspects of the pre-existing, top-down forms of 
authority. The institutions of democratic land governance came from outside, i.e. they did not 
emerge organically from the balance of forces found in the area. This produced local solutions 
to the relationships between CPA committees and traditional authorities that were shaped by 
the unequal power relations on the different farms. New norms and rules were in the process 
of being established, based on selective interpretations of the past, and on the openings 
provided by the introduction of land reform and its accompanying institutions. The resulting 
weakness in control over and management of the land supports Okoth-Ogendo’s (2008) 
assertion that laws on their own will not confer tenure security unless they reflect the basic 
norms and values of the underlying social organisation. Those classes and groups with the 
ability to assert their own interests and to materialise their own visions through investing 
resources, dominated and took control of these institutions for their own ends. 
 
At Munzhedzi, the royal council sidelined the CPA committee. At Mavungeni and Shimange a 
layer of members occupied the committee and were able to use them to keep themselves in 
leadership positions and to further their own material interests in the process. This took 
slightly different paths in these two farms. At Mavungeni, the committee members used the 
authority derived from their positions as executive members to allocate land and resources to 
themselves and those they favoured. But they also encountered a split in the structure of 
authority with the formation of the Xikopokopo group. At Shimange, the leadership group did 
not have a constant physical presence and were indecisive about how to develop the farm, and 
inhabitants had a greater role in shaping spatial practice. 
 
The groups who captured these new institutions were not entirely to blame for the 
degeneration of the democratic impulse. The state, confused and internally at odds with itself, 
initiated the idea of democratic land governance institutions, but was unable to support and 
nurture these institutions in practice. The majority of CPA members remained passive and did 
not participate in the construction of the democratic institutions or in shaping the direction of 
the farms. Again, state failure had an important role to play here. Lack of resources to carry 
out agreed upon plans led to most members becoming cynical and disengaging from the 
restitution process. The state introduced the new governance institutions but literally 
abandoned them to the control of the incumbents and did little to nurture the capacity of 
members to secure systems of transparency and accountability. The failure of the state or of 
civil society organisations to secure and strengthen democratic land governance structures 
revealed a fundamental weakness in rural organisation. 
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The failure to consolidate and advance the democratic institutions meant they lost credibility, 
and authority reverted to pre-existing top-down forms where these still held some weight, or 
otherwise began degenerating into open contestation between groups led by individuals with 
the strongest wills. The CPA committees sought to assert their authority based on their role as 
representatives of the formal land owners (the CPAs). However, these roots wore thin as no 
new elections were called, resources were not forthcoming, and systems of transparency and 
accountability faltered. A nascent middle class found a channel for the assertion of its own 
interests in the context of collective land ownership. This is not an isolated incident, and 
mirrors similar occurrences in land reform elsewhere in the country (see, for example, Cousins, 
2002, SLSA Team, 2003, Lebert, 2005, van Zyl, 2010). 
 
It is not gratuitous to make a connection between these emerging processes and the ANC’s 
dominant agenda of building a black capitalist class in South Africa. The research contributes to 
showing the contingency of the way this happened. It was not just that the ANC decided to 
build the institutional base for the emergence of a black capitalist class and seamlessly 
implemented this decision. It was more that processes unfolded and built on one another 
iteratively, constructing this agenda over time. The first contingency was the collective 
character of the land reform programme. At the outset, this appeared to be in discord with an 
agenda of capitalist modernisation and the creation of a black capitalist class. Yet it was on the 
basis of this character that the CPAs were created as vehicles for collective ownership and 
management of land. This, itself, was not a predetermined outcome within the ANC. 
 
The second contingency was the complex combination of contradictory internal interests in 
the state at all levels, coupled with the lack of capacity to carry out its own plans – for 
example, in providing the CPAs with the resources to begin unfolding the on-farm plans the 
state had helped to create. Again, this lack of provision of resources appeared at the outset to 
work against the interests of a nascent black capitalist class, since these resources were to be 
directed towards constructing commercial farms. Yet this lack of resourcing led to the 
disengagement of the majority of CPA members which in turn opened the door to the 
‘capture’ of the CPA committees by representatives of this nascent class. This was not a 
planned process by the ANC to create institutions that would serve the purposes of this class, 
yet that is the pathway that developed. The state’s interventions and failures led here, but not 
in ways that were pre-determined. At the same time, major state interventions, such as the 
retention of private property and the entrenching of traditional authority in the rural 
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landscape, established the limits to transformation that increased the likelihood of this type of 
outcome, even if the path to get there was not defined step by step. 
 
The research shows how the power generated in everyday social interactions was not entirely 
controlled by the dominant groups. This had material and spatial consequences, as seen with 
the challenges to property rights and the use of the land ostensibly under control of private 
land owners or traditional authorities. Even though we should acknowledge that this did not 
give subordinate inhabitants the ability fully to determine the structuring of space, we must 
also acknowledge the real constraints it imposed on those with formal authority, including the 
state. The process of social change was not closed once new institutions are formed. It 
remained dynamic, contested by a range of social forces. 
 
Land reform thus had an uneven impact on authority and land governance. Representations of 
space, spatial practice and lived space emerged on the basis of struggles to shape relations of 
authority and land control. This supports Lund’s (2002:11) contention that “struggles over 
property are as much about the scope and constitution of authority as about access to 
resources.” At Munzhedzi, the effective usurping of land governance functions by the 
traditional authority resulted in spatial practices that mirrored the homeland betterment 
villages. At Mavungeni, contestation within the claimant group led to competing spatial 
practices. The CPA committee emphasised commercial production while the Xikopokopo group 
emphasised mixed settlement integrated with production. At Shimange, the weakness of the 
authority structure led to the de facto control of spatial practice by the small number of 
inhabitants living on the farm. 
 
On the basis of these findings, there could be value in bolstering the democratic land 
governance institutions, and strengthening systems of transparency and accountability 
(Hellum and Derman, 2010). This could go hand in hand with linking land control to popular 
intentions for land use arising from everyday practice. 
 
An area of relative weakness in the research is around the question of changing gender 
relations as a result of land reform. As indicated in the introduction to the thesis, I found it 
difficult to realise sufficient depth on this score. In this, my personal experience reflects a 
broader weakness in gender analysis in the South African land sector (Cross and Hornby, 
2002). An understanding of changing power relations as a result of land reform that integrates 
changing gendered relations is an area for further work in the future. 
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8.3 Property rights and relations 
The restitution programme was designed within the framework of the willing buyer, willing 
seller policy. This established the primacy of private property and the exclusive ownership 
rights that accompany it. The land reform programme adopted the spatial frame of the 
inherited cadastral system of large-scale commercial farms as the basic unit of land to be 
transferred. From this point of view, restitution - and the land reform programme more 
broadly - fundamentally reproduced capitalist spatial relations. Restitution reproduced the 
errors of land titling programmes in the rest of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, where 
overlapping and multiple rights and uses of land were ignored, and efforts to demarcate 
boundaries and to delimit those included as owners have exacerbated conflict over land 
control (Peters, 2007). 
 
But these boundaries came under pressure both internally and externally. Alternative claims to 
ownership and use both from inside (e.g. Xikopokopo at Mavungeni) and outside (e.g. 
Vleifontein residents mainly at Mavungeni, and various border disputes at Mavungeni with the 
Hennings and between Shimange and Munzhedzi) posed challenges to the reproduction of 
inherited spaces of private property. This resulted in compromises both on the porosity of the 
farm boundaries and on exclusive ownership rights. The demarcated boundaries on the farms 
shimmered and bent in relation to the various pressures on them, without shattering their 
integrity as clearly defined units with private owners possessing a set of exclusive rights. The 
acceptance of a degree of flexibility and negotiability was necessary to “keep the peace” 
(Cousins, 2011:15). 
 
Much of the capacity of private property to absorb pressures resided at the level of 
representation. If inhabitants buy into the legitimacy of private ownership and its physical 
definition in demarcated boundaries, even significant alterations in the patterns of decision-
making and land use may have little effect in producing a fundamentally altered space. In this 
sense, private property – and in particular the acceptance of its representations and the rights 
it confers on owners and non-owners – acts as a framework in a very literal sense in 
structuring the production of space. Lefebvre’s three aspects of the production of space can 
assist in answering this. At a conceptual level, the notion of private property remained intact. 
It was accepted as part of the dominant discourse, manifested in the Constitutional protection 
of private property and ownership rights; in the willing buyer, willing seller model of land 
reform that compelled the state to acquire land as a commodity on the market; and in the 
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essential retention of inherited cadastral boundaries (and in the legal system of boundary 
definition) in the transfer of land. 
 
Contestation over the legitimacy of the prevailing authorities necessarily influenced property 
relations, since the root of private property is the right of legal owners to exclusive rights (even 
if regulated by the state). Once the exclusivity of these rights was questioned, private property 
itself was questioned. Robust challenges to the rights of private property emerged from the 
lived practices sparked by the introduction of land reform. These were unintended 
consequences of land reform, but no less real or significant for that. They took two forms: on 
the one hand, pressure on the inherited cadastral boundaries and on the other, pressure on 
the content of rights of property ownership. The implementation of land reform opened up a 
series of counter-claims to the land and its use, both from those who were excluded from the 
process, like the Vleifontein farmers who lost access to land as a result of restitution, and from 
those who were dissatisfied with the formal plans proposed for the land, such as the 
Xikopokopo group. Less aggressively, claimants and non-claimants who sought to carry out 
small-scale farming activities on the newly available land also asserted counter-claims. These 
challenges, when they came from outside, exerted pressure on the inherited boundaries of the 
farms both by dissolving these boundaries and by renegotiating the terms of the boundaries 
(how flexible they were, what level of encroachment was permissible). Lund (2010) showed 
how boundaries were negotiated in Ghana on the basis of different interpretations of the past, 
mainly by elites (chiefs and ‘earthpriests’). A similar process occurred in the research site, but 
more contestation from social forces outside the elites is evident than the case Lund 
presented. 
 
There was a necessity to move property relations closer to the deeper social norms and values 
of inhabitants. This meant looking at indigenous practices, which produced changes in the 
conceptions of boundaries as well as the content of ownership rights. As Okoth-Ogendo 
(2008:101) points out, indigenous tenure is fundamentally incompatible with “exclusive 
dominion over both access to and control over land resources” characteristic of private 
property. Restitution sought some kind of collective ownership, but based on the retention of 
the capitalist form of fragmented, homogenous space at a macro-level. 
 
Using Okoth-Ogendo’s features of ‘communal’ tenure regimes in southern Africa (based on the 
summary by Cousins, 2008c:129), it is possible to identify the extent to which indigenous 
tenure was incorporated into the collective private ownership model in practice. First, 
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although land rights were embedded in a range of social relationships (the first of Okoth-
Ogendo’s features), many of these relationships were not yet fully worked out. This signified a 
more open construction of rights and authority than a pure adoption of indigenous systems. 
Second, land rights were exclusive in relation to the broader group of inhabitants, rooted as 
they were in officially defined claims processes that established closed membership, rather 
than inclusive as they would have been under an indigenous tenure regime. Nevertheless, 
third, formal rights were derived from a combination of membership defined by the restitution 
process and from the more organic social units that emerged from daily practice on the farms. 
Evidence of this was the de facto provision of rights to non-members at Munzhedzi, to some 
extent at Mavungeni (via Xikopokopo, although not recognised by the CPA committee) and to 
a very small extent at Shimange. Fourth, in practice access to land was distinct from control of 
land, even though this was not the situation the CPA committees would have preferred. This 
reflects a practical imposition of this aspect of indigenous tenure by inhabitants in their daily 
practice. Fifth, the proposed purpose of control of land was structured according to indigenous 
systems rather than private systems. This included guaranteeing access and enforcing rights, 
overseeing mechanisms for the distribution of access, regulating the use of common property 
resources, and resolving disputes over claims to the land. However, in practice, control 
systems were very weak, and land governance institutions struggled to realise these functions. 
Finally, although boundaries were rigid in concept (based as they were on the fixed cadastral 
boundaries), in practice they were flexible and negotiable at some times and places. This 
suggests that, although the farms did not explicitly integrate indigenous tenure systems, these 
began emerging, unevenly, in practice. The collective nature of the ownership opened the 
possibilities for this to occur. At the same time, flexibility and negotiability do not always 
prevent, and sometimes even facilitate, exclusion of some categories of users (Peters, 2007). 
While some formally excluded inhabitants were able to negotiate their way onto Mavungeni or 
Munzhedzi land, others were not. It was mainly those with resources who were able to find 
their way in (especially for production). 
 
The leasing of land was one response the new owners employed in an attempt to contain 
these claims. As with the issuing of informal PTO certificates by the Mavungeni CPA 
committee, lease agreements might reflect the emergence of what Peters (2007:14) calls 
“informal formalisation” of rights, although the lack of effective or strong governance systems 
renders this notion questionable in this particular context. Informal formalisation relies on 
strong governance mechanisms, even if these are controlled by elites. Leasing was not part of 
the original plans for the farms and indicated the lack of complete control over the private 
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property by the new land owners. In a very material sense, this altered the space of the farms, 
since they were open to unpredictable encroachment and demands from outside. Leasing had 
contradictory implications for the maintenance of relations of private property. When leasing 
was authorised by the legal land owners (the CPAs, represented by their elected committees), 
it served the purpose of containing claims to the land by non-owners and of controlling their 
land access. It allowed them to negotiate the terms of access and to keep the integrity of the 
farm boundaries intact. However, in conceding to leasing as a compromise in the face of 
unofficial claims, the private land owners conceded some of the rights to property, including 
exclusive use and the exclusive right to determine on-farm spatial practices. 
 
In other situations, leasing was not available as an option since exclusive ownership rights 
were brought into question. At Mavungeni, the Xikopokopo group questioned the right of the 
CPA committee to decide where people should settle or how the land should be used. 
Likewise, at Munzhedzi the authority of the CPA committee was not only questioned but 
almost entirely usurped by the chief-designate and the royal family. These challenges to the 
rights of property had material effects with changing on-farm spatial practices and the 
diversion of resources to individuals and sub-groups through the unauthorised allocation and 
leasing of land. In the case of the Xikopokopo group, the challenge to rights of ownership was 
contained within the framework of inherited farm boundaries and did not spill over into a 
wider destabilisation of the boundaries of private property. The challenge was also 
constructed on the basis of a counter-claim to the same rights: it was not a challenge to 
ownership rights as such, but a challenge to the legitimacy of the decision-making authority of 
a particular group. At Munzhedzi, the challenge was more profound in some ways. Not only 
was the authority of the CPA committee fatally undermined and usurped by the chief-
designate and the royal family, but it also destabilised the boundaries between Munzhedzi and 
the neighbouring parcels of land, at Shimange, Vleifontein and Maila. The challenge to the 
rights of private property ownership was based on an alternative spatial model of indigenous 
tenure, albeit with significant biases towards pre-existing authority. Unlike the Xikopokopo 
challenge at Mavungeni, which was an ‘internal’ contest over who was to exercise the property 
rights, the chief-designate’s challenge at Munzhedzi was based on an alternative conception of 
property and property rights. It highlights how access to power (i.e. a ‘right’) and its control are 
distinct (Cousins, 2008c), with control sometimes escaping those with the ‘right’ to control. 
 
These various challenges placed significant pressure on owners to adapt their exclusive rights 
to take into account wider claims that transcended the formal restitution process. This 
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contestation was relatively successful in mediating the rights of the new owners in practice, 
and land was made available to those who had no formal claim to it. So overall, while land 
reform retained the framework of private property, the rights associated with private property 
underwent adjustment that enabled a wider pool of people to benefit from the transfer of 
land. This revealed dynamic and on-going processes of defining property rights in practice. In 
the context of these overlapping and contested property rights, de Soto’s (2000) proposal to 
formalise property rights through land titling is precisely the wrong response. On the contrary, 
the ability of indigenous tenure regimes to accept outsiders into the community through 
defined procedures (Cousins, 2008c) might offer a potential model for CPAs inundated with 
claims and requests for land from non-members. Research across Africa cautions against 
“separating land tenure or property from their social, cultural and political-economic matrices” 
(Peters, 2007:23). Once this link is re-established, property rights must necessarily become 
more inclusive. 
 
Land reform thus had an uneven impact on property relations, and on the production of space 
based on Lefebvre’s spatial triad. Dominant representations of space were contradictory, not 
quite managing the tension between private property and collective ownership, drawn in part 
from indigenous tenure regimes. This materialised as collective private ownership, where 
collective property relations on the farms were contained within the fragmented spaces of 
private property. This manifested in spatial practices that sought to retain the integrity of 
cadastral boundaries and where the new land owners, at Mavungeni and Shimange at least, 
initially sought to assert their exclusive rights to shape spatial practice on the farms. This 
generated a response from inhabitants – both claimants and those without formal claims - that 
encroached on both these aspects of private property. The impact on lived space was uneven, 
with some inhabitants losing access to land, others gaining access and others encountering 
changes to their relation to the land. But overall, more inhabitants than in the past were able 
to assert their own intentions. 
8.4 Land use: agricultural production and settlement 
Tensions inherent in the design of the land reform programme produced contradictory 
impulses in spatial practice. Hall (2009b) argues that land reform policy did not envisage the 
kinds of production that were to be promoted through land reform. But representations of 
space based on commercial, large-scale agriculture geared towards individual ownership were 
embedded in the transfer of land on the basis of the inherited cadastral boundaries, the 
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property form and conceptions of property. The business and land use plans sponsored by the 
land reform programme reinforced this logic. The paradigm of private ownership in turn 
reinforced the historical macro-spatial arrangement of private property, homogenous in terms 
of the rights it conferred (representations), but physically fragmented into discrete parcels of 
land (its macro-spatial structuring), based on a particular inherited notion of commercial 
agriculture. However, at the micro-spatial level, on the individual farms, there was greater 
flexibility in the way space was produced, including the necessity of some consideration of 
mass settlement on the farms, and requirements for on-going equity in the distribution of land 
within these spaces. Practically the result was a hybridised reproduction of commercial spaces 
based on inherited infrastructure and the abandonment or appropriation of inherited 
infrastructure for alternative uses that signified an alteration of on-farm spaces. These 
reflected a mix of Hall’s (2009b) categories of large-scale farms transferred to large groups for 
use both by groups and individuals. A second representation of space was the continuation of 
the late apartheid plans for the expansion of Vleifontein as a core settlement in the area. Both 
of these representations drew on aspects of the historical production of space in the area, 
although representations of space based on commercial agriculture tended to produce a 
model that was not appropriate for the area. 
 
The state applied pressure to enforce the dominant commercial orientation on two levels: 
through national level discourse, such as pronouncements that land reform projects had failed 
because they have not resulted in commercial agricultural production; and through decisions 
on resource allocation at the farm level. Government investments in the research site focused 
almost entirely on building Mavungeni’s large-scale poultry house. If we keep in mind that 
investment is the material realisation of specific spatial conceptions, then we can see that 
government oriented its practical interventions towards reproducing dominant capitalist 
spatial relations. Despite the rhetoric of small-scale farmer support, this translated into few 
efforts at practical realisation. State interventions such as organisational support (co-ops and 
producer associations) were explicitly oriented towards facilitating the growth of a commercial 
farming class, tying a small farmer strategy into a particular version of commercial production, 
linked into established corporate value chains and the reproduction of dominant spatial and 
social relations. 
 
This encouragement of a commercial orientation, that usually took the form of land use and 
business plans, sought to develop integrated commercial plans covering the entire farm. This 
was by no means unique to these farms (Hall, 2009b). The cadastral boundaries of the farms 
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were constructed to secure white occupation of the land, to close off spatial possibilities for 
black inhabitants and over time to facilitate a particular model of production centred on 
individual white owners and their families. The land reform programme hardly altered the 
spatial structure of the farms. Rather, the inherited structure was taken over in the given form 
and the new owners were required to adapt their practices to suit this spatial framework. This 
second nature of human infrastructure and spatial arrangement provided the structuring 
framework for future land use. The power of (racial) capital was literally embedded in the land, 
constituting limits to transformation. 
 
A transformative approach might operate the other way around, identifying the spatial 
practices of subordinate inhabitants and tailoring the spatial arrangements to suit these 
activities best. A challenge in realising this was that most new land owners were moving onto 
land for the first time or moving back onto land on which their historical spatial practices had 
long since been disrupted in the processes of eviction and forced removal decades earlier. 
However, the land reform programme did not start from the process of working with new 
owners to identify what practices they were in favour of and then identifying appropriate 
spaces for them to occupy. It did not disaggregate “the different interests, resources or 
livelihood strategies” within each claimant group (Hall, 2009b:38). 
 
Despite the inability of the land reform programme or the various arms of the state to respond 
to land demand outside the preconceived framework, inhabitants took advantage of the 
availability of land and the weakness of structures of authority to assert their own spatial 
visions. The result was the predominance of a patchwork of small-scale production, grazing 
land that was controlled to a greater or lesser extent on different farms, and residential 
settlement mostly not contained within a defined portion of the farms. Cousins (2010b:9) 
proposes a “class analytic” perspective on small-scale farming, based on the twin concepts of 
petty commodity production and accumulation from below, which differentiates between 
smallholder producers and focuses on diverse trajectories of production within capitalism. 
Petty commodity producers function in the context of commodified relations, and Cousins 
(2010b:11) proposes a distinction between producers who engage in “simple reproduction” 
and those who engage in “expanded reproduction”. The latter regularly requires the hiring of 
labour. Bernstein (cited in Cousins, 2010b:14), however, warns against a simple alignment of 
these categories with clearly defined subjective class identities or interests. 
 
212 
 
In the research site, the historically distinct processes of the production of space on each of 
the restitution farms resulted in fairly distinct trajectories developing on each farm. At 
Mavungeni, and to a lesser extent at Shimange, the presence of an infrastructural base and the 
recent utilisation of the land for production laid the basis for expanded reproduction. At 
Munzhedzi, occupation and subsequent mass settlement of the land constrained most 
inhabitants to simple reproductive activities. For those engaged in expanded reproduction, 
processes of class formation were still under way. A small-scale capitalist class, in Cousins’ 
(2010b:16) terms, was still emerging, with one foot in other categories such as petty 
commodity producers or worker-peasants. As much as the classes themselves were still 
emergent, so were class interests and alignments. This was not a linear process, with shocks 
very much able to reverse gains and generate different trajectories for individuals. Hence at 
Shimange, there appeared to be a decline in overall production for a period, and opportunities 
for wage labour continuously posed a threat to sustained agricultural production. 
 
Settlement also surfaced as a different trajectory of land use, and constituted a significant 
element of land demand. This reflected the broader character of land demand in South Africa 
(Hall, 2009b). However, this should not be framed in opposition to production. The more 
important question is how settlement is best integrated with production. The demand for land 
for settlement had its historical roots in the construction of Vleifontein and the subsequent 
expansion of the settlement onto neighbouring land. The major late apartheid intervention in 
the area, the construction of the township, thus fundamentally shaped future spatial 
structuring and trajectories in the production of space. Vleifontein became a pole of attraction 
for inhabitants of villages further away, especially Nthabalala, where inhabitants had historical 
links to the area, having been forcefully removed in the past. 
 
The DoA was powerless to deal with the encroachment of settlement both at Munzhedzi and 
at Mavungeni. It was not within the department’s mandate to deal with human settlement, 
and the department had a very rigid sense of pre-existing commercial farms remaining 
unsullied by human settlement or diverse production arrangements. This also prevented the 
department from investing in the growing small-scale commercial production on all the 
restitution farms. It was blinded by a conception of agricultural production shaped by the pre-
existing white commercial model. The land reform programme was too blunt to respond to the 
local nuances of production and settlement, to the changing spatial practices unleashed by 
land reform. 
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Inhabitants thus used the openings provided by land reform to assert their own land needs 
tailored to the specific circumstances and constraints they faced. This predominantly turned 
out to be a combination of small-scale crop production, grazing and residential settlement – 
typical of many land reform projects across the country (Hall, 2009b). Inhabitants thus 
significantly shaped the on-farm spaces through their everyday practices which to some extent 
transcended farm boundaries, producing a potentially vibrant core settlement surrounded by 
small-scale production. Hall (2009b) argument is relevant here that the failure of business 
plans reflects a broader conceptual problem of planning for the land, rather than planning for 
the inhabitants. But this active use of the land by the rural poor as well as wealthier 
inhabitants also demonstrated the benefits of land access “even when there is no planning and 
even in the absence of external support” (Hall, 2009b:33). Much of the vibrancy came from 
inhabitants who did not have formal claim to the land, but who asserted their own, unofficial, 
claims. This transformed the lived space for many inhabitants who had an opportunity to 
occupy land previously closed to them or under tighter control. 
8.5 Power relations and the state 
Lefebvre accorded the state a central role in the production and maintenance of capitalist 
social relations and space. Despite the slow pace of land reform and the lack of state support 
for agricultural production or settlement after land reform, the state undoubtedly retained a 
central role in the on-going production of rural space in South Africa. It played a decisive role 
at the level of representation. It held together the concept of private property and stood as a 
bulwark in defence of private property. Almost all conflicts and dissatisfactions were referred 
to the state for resolution, and this was apparent even where conflicts were seemingly 
resolved through local action. At Mavungeni, for example, the Xikopokopo group employed a 
legal strategy (i.e. a strategy relying on the authority of the state) and sent requests to the DoA 
for agricultural assistance and support in gaining access to tractors and other resources held by 
the CPA committee. At Munzhedzi, the chief-designate struggled to gain official recognition in 
order to secure his authority and access to resources. The inhabitants persisted in their 
genuflection to the state’s authority long after it had become clear that the state was unwilling 
or unable to arbitrate or intervene in practice. 
 
The state fundamentally shaped the options inhabitants saw for themselves. The state 
introduced democratic land governance institutions and the democratically-elected municipal 
councils. The state sponsored civil society formations, the co-ops and farmer associations. The 
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state determined that land reform should be structured on the basis of private property. The 
state proposed that farms should be commercially oriented. In short, the state intervened to 
restructure rural space on the basis of an agenda of deracialised capitalism. Its practical 
interventions were decisive in restructuring space in the area, both historically and in the 
present. It made investments (resources applied for the practical realisation of a spatial vision) 
in constructing Vleifontein township, roads, and later land reform, which all fundamentally 
altered the character of the space. 
 
Yet our view of this overwhelming importance of the state in structuring space must be 
mediated in the light of the inability of the state to just do what ‘it’ wanted and, indeed in light 
of the lack of unified positions in the state in the first place. The state did not have a 
monolithic agenda in its control of space. Contradictory initiatives from different arms of the 
state meant it acted at cross-purposes. One example from the research site was the aim of the 
DoA to support commercial agricultural production while the municipal department of housing 
aimed to expand settlement on the same farms. Another example was the internal 
ambivalence in the state over the relationship between democracy, traditional authority and 
private property – on the one hand, entrenching traditional authority and the authority of 
private owners, but on the other, seeking to insert a democratic dynamic into the rural areas. 
 
The state was not able to do everything it wanted to, even where the agenda was not 
contradictory. For example, the state was unable to disburse grants to restitution claimants 
despite this having been budgeted for and aligning with the broader agenda of productive use 
of the farms. The state also lacked resources at the local level to implement its spatial model in 
practice. It was able only partly to produce threads of new spatial practice, for example 
through the introduction of new institutions of land governance, or sporadic investments in 
productive activity. So while the state shaped the production of space in the area, it was 
unable to drive this process forward in a systematic way, opening the door for more localised 
initiatives (often disorganised, ‘opportunist’ and open to elite capture) from outside the state 
to structure space. 
 
Given the marginality of the research area, the power of capital was not directly experienced 
but was rather mediated through state efforts to retain a model of private property and 
commercial agriculture. The state represented capital very directly in this instance; but this 
was a representation of the more general agenda of private property as the structuring 
framework for the production of space, the maintenance of fragmented parcels of land as 
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commodities, the continuing dominance of the rights of private owners, and an orientation 
towards facilitating the profitable use of the land where feasible. The weakness of the state 
was at least partly related to lack of investment by private capital. This was based on the 
insufficient profitability of materialising conceptions of how rural space should be arranged, 
leading to the marginality of the area and pushing it down the hierarchy of spaces. 
 
Traditional authority was also conditioned by the state. The central state held traditional 
authority together, it provided it with legitimacy by recognising it and allocating it with 
functions. The daily interactions amongst inhabitants (including local state officials) determine 
and shape this relationship. In practice it produced a dysfunctional relationship between 
traditional authorities and elected local government that came from lack of recognition of the 
former both by councillors and large segments of their constituencies (although this was 
uneven across the farms). Local officials (‘street level bureaucrats’) alert higher levels of 
government, with the authority to allocate resources, about potential sites of investment. If 
individual officials tasked with this were not in favour of particular traditional authorities (as 
was the case in the research site with the chief-designate at Munzhedzi, whose legitimacy was 
not recognised), they could and did bypass the areas controlled by traditional authorities, 
hence confirming the notion of the power of local bureaucrats to be de facto policy makers. 
They were essentially determining investment policies in relation to particular structures of 
governance. 
 
Even where higher levels of the state intervened to structure relationships, they had to rely on 
local officials to follow up. For example, the DoA’s interaction with Xikopokopo leaders after 
orders from the provincial MEC had no result because local officials decided not to pursue the 
task with vigour but rather stuck to the letter of the law (meet with them, hear their issues, 
submit a report, propose a solution that relied on local intervention e.g. to resolve the conflict 
between Xikopokopo and the Mavungeni CPA committee first before providing resources). The 
higher levels of the state were too far from the everyday practices to do more than issue 
orders and hope they would be carried out effectively. 
 
All of this is evidence against a monolithic understanding of the state. There must be 
recognition of the state’s critical role in the production of space simultaneously with 
recognition of the limits of the state. On the one hand, this indicates the continuing 
importance of political strategies that target the state as a site of struggle, and the value of 
control over the political framing of the state in laying the ground for practical changes. Even if 
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weakly implemented at times, and mediated by a number of actors along the way, the agenda 
of high level state actors does filter into everyday life and the state plays a significant role in 
structuring civil society. The ability to reproduce the framework of private property and the 
ability to structure relations of authority are evidence of this. On the other hand, an over-
emphasis on the state may lead to a neglect of the potential role the everyday, practical 
activities of inhabitants can have in shaping space. When spatial practice has moved far 
enough away from dominant conceptions of space, the relationship may become increasingly 
brittle and open to sudden structural change. But for now we must conclude that, even though 
the state is disunited and internally contradictory, and notwithstanding its inability to advance 
aspects of its agenda, it still has enough discursive and material force to realise the broad 
contours of its spatial vision. This is particularly related to the reinforcement of the private 
property framework, and of the state’s own capacity to regulate this framework where it 
matters. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Returning to the epigraph at the start of this thesis, we may use this analysis of spatial change 
to say something about social change in South Africa following political democratisation in 
1994. Two fundamental points can be made. First, the state ensured a high level of continuity 
in spatial form, especially through securing the reproduction of private property relations and 
through entrenching pre-existing forms of authority in the rural areas. This imposed significant 
limits on the possibility of transformation of spatial relations and consequently of social 
relations. In Lefebvre’s terms, we cannot consider the democratisation in South Africa to be 
revolutionary in scope, since even the “ideological superstructures, institutions or political 
apparatuses” (Lefebvre, 1991:54) inherited from the past were hardly changed in some 
fundamental respects, such as overall property relations and mechanisms of authority. But the 
second fundamental point is that, despite these significant constraints, land reform enabled a 
micro-level change in spatial arrangements that, while not strong enough to threaten the 
structural framework of land reform, nevertheless generated spaces that departed in 
significant respects from the dominant representations of space. Changes in spatial form at the 
on-farm, micro-level had not yet translated into macro-level changes. The micro-level changes 
were effectively contained within the framework of private property and the authority of the 
state and its proxies. And across South Africa’s rural areas as a whole, these micro-level 
changes were few and far between, given the limited extent of land transfer. It does suggest, 
however, that if land reform was more widespread, even in its currently weak form, it has the 
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potential to widen the extent of changes in spatial form and consequently in rural social 
relations. 
 
The impact of land reform is multi-dimensional (Cousins, 2010a, Cousins and Scoones, 2010). 
The dominant approach to analysing the effects of land reform emphasised the economic 
results, and considered the programme a failure. But if we consider the micro-spatial dynamics 
and the significant role land reform played in opening opportunities for a range of actors (and 
not only beneficiaries), there was a more subterranean shift in spatial and social relations that 
can be considered at least to be a partial success, especially if measured on the basis of 
inhabitants’ own desires and needs. The most promising changes in spatial form have emerged 
at this micro-level, out of lived space, from the everyday activities of inhabitants. In one sense 
the research site was very specific, especially the fact that there was limited agricultural 
production prior to transfer of land. This might seem atypical of land reform in South Africa. 
But in another sense it enables revelations about what people’s interests might be when not 
compelled into adopting pre-conceived production and settlement models from above. An 
analysis which looks at the broad economic outcomes without considering the micro dynamics 
will not be able to identify the multiple possible trajectories that emerge as a result. 
 
The findings of the thesis raise a number of development implications, specifically around how 
to adapt land reform interventions to reflect spatial practice emerging from the ground, how 
to project micro-level spatial shifts onto a broader canvas. The dominant conception of 
development is equated with business or commercial activity (Hellum and Derman, 2006). But 
development might be conceptualised very differently if more attention was paid to 
supporting the dynamic and ongoing processes of change driven by inhabitants themselves. 
Commercial and economic activity might be a part of that, but it would not necessarily define 
the entire project. The farms, which historically were marginal, had potential to become less 
marginal if sub-divided into smaller units to permit a combination of settlement and small-
scale production. Agricultural support might be more effectively provided if it shifted away 
from large projects like the poultry houses towards nurturing the diversity of small-scale 
practices that already exist. Greater flexibility could be built into the land reform programme 
to transfer units of land with contemporary relevance to the inhabitants, rather than 
reproducing farm boundaries specifically constructed in pursuit of the goal of racial 
segregation and white domination more than 100 years ago.  Spatial practices were already 
heading in this direction in the research site, producing differential spaces out of everyday 
practice in combination with the decisive intervention of the state in transferring the land. 
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A transcendence of the fragmented space – where farms are segregated from one another and 
from the township – seems to be a precondition for integrated development in the area. This 
would mean bringing Vleifontein and the farms into a single process, rather than two separate 
ones run by different arms of government. Greater emphasis could be placed on securing 
tenure for all inhabitants, whether formal restitution claimants or not. Vleifontein is not going 
to disappear, even if the Masangani claim is finalised and some inhabitants return to Louis 
Trichardt. Therefore, housing and the provision of bulk services – roads, water and electricity – 
are a priority. 
 
The disjuncture between the evident hybridity of property relations, combining collective land 
ownership and control with a framework of exclusive rights and systems of governance, poses 
difficult questions for the establishment of democratic, collective land governance institutions. 
Added to this complexity is the character of some of the counter-claims to the land, such as 
from the traditional authorities, who in some instances (like Munzhedzi) made claims to 
ownership as well as control. Inclusion and exclusion are not necessarily mutually incompatible 
categories, as in the case of overlapping but differentiated rights to land and natural resources. 
The inclusion of all inhabitants into decision-making processes regarding land governance in 
the area, and of establishing processes that incorporate all claims to land access in the area, 
must necessarily be a self-selecting process. That is, those who want to take part must bring 
themselves forward and those who have no interest must deselect themselves. Not everybody 
in Vleifontein, or amongst the formal restitution claimants for that matter, is interested in 
accessing land on the farms for production or settlement. 
 
Governance institutions could seek to draw in all those with an expressed interest, while 
leaving out those with no interest. This might overcome the dual problem of excluding those 
who want to be included, and including those who want to be excluded. On the one hand, 
people who wanted, and had some historical claim to, land access were excluded from 
decision making or from any consideration on land rights. On the other hand, a large number 
of formal claimants had no interest in returning to the land but their presence on formal 
claimant lists constituted an obstacle both to non-formal claimants getting land access, and 
was choking up decision-making processes (because of the inability to constitute a quorum 
within the CPAs, for example). At the same time, a process of self-selection would need to pay 
real attention to the ability of elites to prevent a new redistribution of resources and power 
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that might threaten their own interests, and of the inability of weaker, resource-poor and 
lower-status inhabitants from articulating their own interests or desires for inclusion. 
 
 Ideally, the entire space – incorporating Vleifontein and the surrounding farms – would come 
under the democratic control of all inhabitants, with formal links established between land 
governance institutions and the municipality, essentially co-governing with the municipality 
across this entire area. This form of governance could be rooted in the ‘adaptation’ paradigm 
that recognises, strengthens and adapts land rights based on the principles of customary law, 
offering secure rights to property without privatising it. Such a model has been adopted by 
many African countries following disappointing results with individual titling (Cousins, 
2008b:10). Spatial plans could then involve all inhabitants, taking into account settlement and 
production alike. It would have the added advantage of breaking down the entrenchment of 
ethnic spatial divisions. This kind of area-based planning was already on the table in South 
Africa (Manenzhe, 2006), although not adequately implemented, and had proven to be 
successful in pockets in Zimbabwe and elsewhere (Hall, 2009b). 
 
Nevertheless, land governance arrangements that might transcend the individual farms and 
incorporate all inhabitants, rather than a select few based on the formal restitution claimants, 
would encounter severe difficulties in practice. Not only have opportunities been opened for 
traditional authorities to reassert their own claims to governance, but restitution has laid the 
ground for the establishment of a layer of claimants who have developed a vested interest in 
consolidating their ownership and governance rights on the land. Since this nascent capitalist 
layer have material interests in the status quo, any attempts to broaden the democratisation 
of land governance beyond the terms established by the restitution programme would be 
likely to face opposition. The way restitution was formulated at the outset thus has created 
new obstacles to the realisation of democratic land governance. 
 
Perhaps there is an over-emphasis on rights and formal structures and institutions, both in 
terms of democratic representation and decision-making, and in terms of dispute resolution. 
There is an assumption that democratic organisation necessarily operates in favour of the 
marginalised and resource poor. But such an approach ignores the embedded power relations, 
some of which the thesis has uncovered, which mean that relative elites are able to dominate 
whatever structures or institutions are created. Who will drive processes of change, especially 
in the context where the capacity of the state in Africa (including, it is clear, in South Africa) to 
carry out land reform is severely limited (Manji, 2001:328)? There may be need to 
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acknowledge that democratic institutions are ideal types that are unlikely to be realised in 
their totality. The possibilities are based precisely on the specific context. A potential focus, for 
NGOs in the absence of other support organisations, could be on building the ability of the 
marginalised and resource poor to articulate and act on their own interests even in the 
absence of democratic structures. 
 
The state has absolved itself of its responsibilities by asserting the requirement for the prior 
existence of democratic structures before it will intervene. The question is how to move 
towards democracy in practice even while these structures are partial, decaying or do not exist 
at all. It implies the necessity of other ways of organising, e.g. class or gender-based 
organisational structure. But we must heed, again, Bernstein’s warning (cited in Cousins, 
2010b:14) against assuming a simple alignment of classes (or, by extension, genders) with 
clearly defined subjective interests. Another suggestion is not to try to formalise agreements 
on boundaries and land rights too much, leaving these as more informal processes that are 
organically rooted in everyday social practices (Singh, 2008).  However, we need to retain an 
awareness of the dynamics that may lead to some people having less secure tenure as a result 
(e.g. the da Gamas at Shimange). As Peters (2004) argues, we must recognise the extent to 
which negotiability and informality can serve to entrench vested interests and act against the 
interests of the marginal and poor. Further thinking might be done on ways to build 
accountability and transparency in decision-making in practice even if not formalised, while 
recognising that accountability ultimately is a function of the balance of social power. 
 
Overall, it becomes apparent that differential space and capitalist space are not two mutually 
exclusive categories. Although the spatial practices emerging from land reform remain 
contained within the fragmented spaces of capitalism which are held together in a broader 
unity by the state, we cannot therefore conclude that these spaces have not changed in favour 
of previously subordinated inhabitants. Making land available for settlement and production, 
widening access to that land, introducing the concept (if not yet fully the practice) of 
democratic authority and land governance, have altered on-farm spaces and reinforced 
practical links between fragmented spaces, giving more people more options than they had 
prior to land reform. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS 
 
All interviews conducted by Stephen Greenberg except MA = Michael Aliber. Where translation assistance was received, translator’s initials are indicated. 
MM = Mike Mokgalapa; SB = Sipho Baloyi; SR = Simon Rambau; TM = Themba Maluleke 
 
1. Individual interviews 
Name Gender Description Date Location Translator Recorded? 
Baloyi, Boysie M President of Shimange CPA 2010.05.29 Shimange -- N 
Baloyi, Chris M Shimange CPA member; member of local committee 2009.08.26 Shimange -- Y 
Baloyi, Clement M Worker and on-farm inhabitant at Shimange 2009.08.28 Shimange -- Y 
Baloyi, David M Mavungeni CPA member; secretary of CPA committee 2008.10.27 
2009.05.01 
2009.05.06 
2009.06.02 
2010.02.08 
2010.02.11 
Mavungeni 
Mavungeni 
Mavungeni 
Mavungeni 
Mavungeni 
Mavungeni 
-- N 
N 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
Baloyi, Eddie M Shimange CPA member; Acting Chair of CPA committee 2009.07.28 Elim -- Y 
Baloyi, Marks 
 
M Shimange CPA committee chair (now deceased) 2009.05.06 Giyani SB N 
Baloyi, Morris 
 
M Chair, Ntwanano poultry co-op, Mavungeni 2009.05.01 
2010.02.11 
Mavungeni 
Mavungeni 
-- N 
N 
Baloyi, Thomas M Shimange CPA member; member of CPA committee 2009.04.27 Ribungwani SB Y 
Baloyi, Vakisa F Shimange CPA member 2009.07.29 Riverplaats SB N 
Barnett, Eddie M Acting Director, Nkuzi Development Association 2009.04 29 Polokwane -- Y 
Beech, Mickey M Manager: Bush Valley 2008.10.05 Tzaneen MA 
interview 
Y 
da Gama, Jimmy M Shimange CPA member 2009.04.27 Shimange -- Y 
da Gama, Rita F Shimange CPA member 2009.04.27 Shimange -- Y 
Erasmus, Cornelius M Senior Manager: Restitution Support, Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture 
2009.04.28 Polokwane -- N 
Girardin, Michel M Owner of Shiluvari Lodge, descendant of Swiss Missionaries 2009.10.02 Shiluvari -- Y 
Gondo, Joe M Representative, National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU) Limpopo 2009.04.29 Polokwane -- Y 
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Henning, Arthur M Farmer at Moddervlei, former owner of Vleyfontein 310LS 2008.11.17 
2009.10.01 
Moddervlei 
Moddervlei 
-- Y 
N 
Henning, Carl M Farmer at Moddervlei 2009.04.30 
2009.10.01 
Moddervlei 
Moddervlei 
-- N 
N 
Hoffman, Stefan M Chair, Soutpansberg district Transvaal Agricultural Union 2009.06.12 Levubu -- Y 
Kharommbi, Mr. M Agricultural extension officer, Makhado Department of Agriculture 2009.06.04 Elim -- N 
Khosa, Elias Zifa M Former inhabitant of Groenkloof farm, east of Shimange 2009.06.09 Ribungwani SB Y 
Khosa, Mhlaba F Former inhabitant of Groenkloof farm, east of Shimange 2009.06.09 Ribungwani SB Y 
Khosa, Samuel M Member of Shimange CPA 2009.07.28 Shimange SB Y 
Khosa, Sello M Director of Post-Settlement Support Unit, Limpopo Land Claims 
Commission (subsequently left position) 
2008.11.14 Polokwane -- N 
Kwinda, Ndiafhi David M Fieldworker, Nkuzi Development Association 2009.04.27 Elim -- N 
Leach, Charles M Historian 2009.10.02 Louis Trichardt -- Y 
Leshabane, Zille M Munzhedzi CPA member 2009.11.10 Maila MM N 
Livhebe, Nkumeleni M Agribusiness Development and Agricultural Planning Unit, Vhembe 
District Department of Agriculture 
2009.08.27 Sibasa -- Y 
Mahladisa, Vincent 
Ramadwa, Godfrey 
M 
M 
South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), Vleifontein branch 
executive members 
2009.06.09 Vleifontein -- Y 
Maiwasite, Martin M Resident of Vleifontein 2009.06.11 Vleifontein -- N 
Makgakga, Simon M Resident of Vleifontein 2009.07.27 Vleifontein SB Y 
Makhavhu, Thomas M LED-Agriculture Unit, Vhembe district municipality 2009.05.04 Thohoyandou -- Y 
Makhuga, Livhuwani F Xikopokopo occupier 2010.02.10 Mavungeni SB Y 
Malaka, Bethuel M Former Munzhedzi CPA chair 2009.11.12 Vleifontein SB Y 
Malatjie, Martha F Inhabitant of Munzhedzi 2009.11.11 Munzhedzi SB N 
Malehase, Mike and 
Malehase, Andrew 
M 
M 
Inhabitants of Munzhedzi and Vleifontein 2009.06.10 Munzhedzi -- Y 
Malete, Dudley M Ward 20 councillor, Makhado municipality 2009.06.10 Louis Trichardt -- N 
Malisha, Frans M Munzhedzi CPA member; member of Pfano piggery project 2009.07.29 Vleifontein SB Y 
Maluleke, Winston M Chair, Mavungeni CPA committee 2010.02.11 Shimange SB Y 
Marimi, Richard M Shimange CPA member, on-farm resident and farmer 2009.07.29 Shimange SB N 
Mashele, Wilfred M Makhado municipal councillor, ward 17 2010.02.08 Waterval -- Y 
Mashimbye, Norah F Member of Shimange CPA 2009.07.29 Bungeni SB Y 
Mathomu, Constance F Planner, Vhembe district municipality 2009.05.04 Thohoyandou -- Y 
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Matodzi, Elias M Land reform advisor, Makhado Department of Agriculture 2009.07.27 Louis Trichardt -- N 
Matodzi, Mabina F Xikopokopo occupier 2010.02.10 Mavungeni SB Y 
Mavunda, Mackson M Former inhabitant of Groenkloof farm, east of Shimange 2009.08.25 Ribungwani SB Y 
Mdluli, Ms. F Shimange claimant, farmer at Uitschot 2009.04.27 Uitschot SB Y 
Milambo, Thoko F Xikopokopo occupier 2010.02.10 Mavungeni SB Y 
Mokgalapa, Elizabeth 
Avhapfani 
F Munzhedzi CPA member, cousin of chief-designate at Munzhedzi 2009.11.13 Polokwane -- N 
Mokgalapa, Thomas M Munzhedzi CPA member, cousin of chief-designate at Munzhedzi 2009.11.13 Munzhedzi -- N 
Moloto, Mr. M Soil scientist, Makhado Department of Agriculture 2009.04.30 Louis Trichardt -- Y 
Mphephu, David M Inhabitant of Munzhedzi 2009.06.08 Munzhedzi SB N 
Mudau, Esrom M Member of Masangani/Tshikota (Vleifontein) claims committee 2009.07.28 Vleifontein -- Y 
Mudau, Martha F Munzhedzi CPA member; member of Pfano poultry project 2009.06.07 Vleifontein SB N 
Mugwedi, J.V. M Butcher and cattle farmer, Vleifontein 2009.06.11 Vleifontein SB N 
Mukhari, Chief Tsakani 
Njhakanjhaka 
M Chief of Njhakanjhaka Tribal Authority (now deceased) 2009.11.14 Waterval SB Y 
Mulembamuthihi, Rose F Member of Munzhedzi CPA; member of Pfano poultry project 2009.07.27 Munzhedzi SB N 
Munzhedzi, Musia F Member of Munzhedzi CPA, on-farm inhabitant 2009.05.07 Munzhedzi SB Y 
Mushandana, Lawrence M Chair of Munzhedzi CPA committee 2008.10.28 
2009.11.12 
Munzhedzi 
Munzhedzi 
-- Y 
Y 
Muvhumbe, 
Mushavhela Albert 
M PR councillor in Makhado municipality; land reform portfolio 2008.11.18 
2008.11.24 
2009.04.30 
Louis Trichardt 
Louis Trichardt 
Louis Trichardt 
-- N 
N 
Y 
Nemanashe, 
Nyamukhamadi 
F Vleifontein resident, also resident of Xikopokopo at Mavungeni 2009.06.07 Vleifontein SB N 
Ngobeni, Research M Member of Mavungeni CPA, farmer at Mavungeni 2010.02.11 Mavungeni -- Y 
Ngobo, Mpho Patricia F Munzhedzi CPA member, member of CPA committee 2009.11.12 Munzhedzi SB/MM Y 
Nkumeleni, Robert M Crop specialist, Makhado Department of Agriculture 2009.07.30 Louis Trichardt -- Y 
Nthabalala, David 
Naiedzani* 
M Headman Keith Nthabalala’s brother 2009.11.09 Maila -- Y 
Nthambeleni, William M Xikopokopo occupier 2010.02.10 Mavungeni SB Y 
Ntshangule, Audrey F Xikopokopo occupier 2010.02.10 Mavungeni SB Y 
Paswana, Frank M Munzhedzi CPA member; advisor to chief-designate 2009.06.08 Munzhedzi SB N 
Paswana, Masakona F Munzhedzi CPA member 2009.11.12 Munzhedzi MM Y 
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Pulwana, Jonas M Xikopokopo occupier 2010.02.10 Mavungeni SB Y 
Rambau, Simon (with 
Paswana, Frank) 
Rambau, Simon 
Rambau, Simon (with 
Rambau, Violet) 
M Chief-designate, Munzhedzi and advisor 
 
Chief-designate, Munzhedzi 
 
Chief-designate, Munzhedzi and head of Royal Council 
2008.10.24 
 
2009.05.07 
 
2009.10.01 
Munzhedzi 
 
Munzhedzi 
 
Maila 
-- 
 
-- 
 
SB 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Sambo, Constance F Member of Shimange CPA and on-farm inhabitant 2008.10.24 Shimange TM N 
Selepe, Solly M Senior planner, Limpopo Land Claims Commission (subsequently left 
position) 
2008.11.13 Polokwane -- N 
Seshoka, Jethrick M Co-ordinator: Land and Agrarian Reform, Vhembe District 
Department of Agriculture 
2009.05.07 
2009.08.27 
Sibasa 
Sibasa 
-- Y 
Y 
Shanganise, Andries M On-farm inhabitant of Munzhedzi 2009.07.28 Munzhedzi SB N 
Shirinda, Shirami 
 
M PLAAS researcher 2008.11.14 
2008.11.17 
Louis Trichardt 
Louis Trichardt 
-- N 
N 
Sidimela, Patrick M Head of Makhado municipality LED/IDP Unit 2009.04.29 Louis Trichardt -- Y 
Sishonga, Kuthama F Munzhedzi CPA member; member of Pfano poultry project 2009.07.27 Munzhedzi SB Y 
Sithole, Kensani F Mavungeni CPA member; Xikopokopo occupier 2010.02.10 Mavungeni SB Y 
Sitholimela, Mr. M Agricultural extension specialist, Makhado Department of Agriculture 2009.06.04 Louis Trichardt -- Y 
Tiba, Rosemary 
 
F Shimange CPA member, member of ‘local committee’ 2008.10.24 
2009.08.27 
Shimange 
Shimange 
-- Y 
Y 
Thovha, Solomon M Executive member, Nthabalala land claims committee 2009.10.01 Nthabalala -- Y 
Tshabalala, Eric M Shimange CPA member; former principal of Efrata school 2009.08.25 Bungeni -- Y 
Tshikota, Peter M Vleifontein resident, farmer at Munzhedzi 2009.06.07 Vleifontein -- N 
Tshikota, Thabelo M Farmer at Munzhedzi 2009.11.13 Munzhedzi MM Y 
Vukeya, Samuel M Member of Shimange CPA, farmer at Uitschot 2009.06.08 Mavungeni SB N 
*Headman/chief was present but did not speak directly to interviewer 
 
2. Group discussions 
Names Description Date Location Recorded? 
Baloyi, Alfred 
Baloyi, David 
Baloyi, Samuel 
Maluleke, Eric  
Mavungeni CPA committee focus group 
 
2008.11.15 Mavungeni N 
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Baloyi, Percy 
Baloyi, Thomas 
Shirinda, Sam 
Shirinda, Willie 
Vukeya, Phineas 
Members of Xikopokopo group, Mavungeni 2008.11.16 Mavungeni Y 
Baloyi, David 
Baloyi, Samuel 
Chauke, Gibson 
Maluleke, Eric 
Maluleke, Winston 
Mavungeni CPA committee focus group 
 
2008.12.03 Waterval N 
Matodzi, Elias 
Muronga, T. 
Ndzadza, Mr. 
Ramukozi, Mr. 
Land reform advisors, Makhado Department of Agriculture 2009.06.01 Louis Trichardt Y 
Makubela, Peter 
Nthabalala, Chief* 
Thovha, Solomon 
Chief Nthabalala and executive members of Nthabalala land claim committee 2009.06.11 Nthabalala N 
Madima, Elisah 
Rambau, Samuel 
Rambau, Violet 
Members of Munzhedzi CPA; Violet Rambau is head of the Munzhedzi Royal Council 2009.11.09 Elim Y 
Vleifontein farmers  Vleifontein farmers previously farming at Mavungeni (names not recorded) 2009.06.11 Vleifontein Y 
*Headman/chief was present but did not speak directly to interviewer 
 
3. Meetings attended 
Description Date Location Translator Recorded? 
Munzhedzi tribal gathering  2008.10.28 Munzhedzi SB N 
Makhado municipality and Nkuzi exploratory meeting  2008.11.14 Louis Trichardt -- N 
Limpopo and Makhado Departments of Agriculture, meeting with Xikopokopo group 2009.06.03 Mavungeni -- N 
Shimange CPA committee meeting 2009.08.27 Shimange SB N 
Nthabalala land forum meeting 2009.11.10 Nthabalala SB N 
Nthabalala tribal council meeting 2009.11.10 Nthabalala SB N 
Nthabalala land forum delegation to Department of Land Affairs 2009.11.11 Polokwane SB N 
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